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CHAPTER 1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overview I: Colour and Recognition Memory 
 
 
 
Color and light are major factors in man-made environments; their impact influences 
man's psychological reactions and physiological well-being...It is no longer valid to 
assume that the only role of light and color is to provide adequate illumination and a 
pleasant visual environment. F. Mahnke & R. Mahnke, 1987. 
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Colour is an integral part of our everyday life and as such may affect many aspects of 
our life culturally, psychologically and physiologically. As an example, colour 
commonly enters into our language and contributes to the human ability to 
communicate meaning. The English language has many familiar sayings derived from 
colour symbolism (Walker, 1990).  "Seeing the world and viewing our past through 
rose-coloured glasses", "once in a blue moon" and "green with envy" are just a few 
examples of the ways we have infused colour into our language and related them to 
our emotional state of mind.  
 
Colour also has an influence on our everyday personal and professional decisions by 
affecting our spending habits, buying decisions, or even our general personal well-
being (Birren, 1961). Scientifically, the effect of colour on human behaviour has been 
widely investigated in the domains of perceptual and cognitive processes. The 
following series of experiments primarily concern the influence of colour on the 
human memory system. Specifically, the current thesis aims to explore the role of 
colour in recognition memory for emotional information. To my knowledge, there are 
no particular investigations specifically aimed at studying the above area of interest. 
Thus, this work is mostly motivated by, and theoretically leans on, the numerous 
studies which have thoroughly investigated the role of colour in recognition memory 
of objects. 
 
1.1 The Role of Colour in Object Recognition: 
 
1.1.1 Edge-based model for object recognition 
 
Whether colour plays any role in recognition memory has been the subject of much 
debate for the last decade. Early investigations have included objects as the most 
common stimulus type (e.g. Biederman, 1987; Livingstone & Hubel, 1987; Lowe, 
1985; Marr, 1982; Ostergard & Davidoff, 1985), and thus much of the theoretical 
modelling and experimental work has focused specifically on the role of colour in 
object recognition. Studies that have examined the role of colour in object recognition 
memory have typically used an assortment of tasks for assessing recognition 
including classification (e.g. Price & Humphreys, 1989), verification (e.g. Biederman 
& Ju, 1988; Joseph, 1997; Tanaka & Presenell, 1999), naming (e.g. Ostergard & 
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Davidoff, 1985), recognition memory (e.g. Wurm, Legge, Isenberg & Luebker, 1993), 
sequential-matching (e.g. Hayward, Zhou, Gauthier & Harris, 2000) and even object-
Stroop tasks (e.g. Kline, 1964; Naor-Raz, Tarr & Kersten, 2003). Many of the 
foregoing studies revealed equivocal results.  The majority support an effect of colour 
on naming but not on classification or verification performance (Biederman & Ju, 
1988; Brodie, Wallace, & Sharrat, 1991; Davidoff & Ostergaard, 1988; Ostergaard & 
Davidoff, 1985; Price & Humphreys, 1989; Wurm, Legge, Isenberg & Luebker, 
1993). For example, in their influential experiment, Biederman and Ju (1988) asked 
participants to verify whether a word followed by a picture referred to the same 
object, where the picture was either a black-and-white line drawing or a full-color 
photograph. No advantage for colour photographs was found and this made the 
authors conclude that surface color was not a factor in recognition performance 
relative to the influence of shape. Clearly, when the colour of an object is displayed 
out of context, identifying a specific object from several different object categories 
would be regarded as a difficult if not an impossible task. For example, seeing a red 
patch is not sufficient for identifying a certain object. Similarly, 'red' is not a 
beneficial cue for selecting apples from cherries.  For this reason, previous attempts to 
explain colour effects on object recognition postulated that object recognition can 
operate directly from the boundary contours of objects (Biederman, 1987; Grossberg 
& Mingolla, 1985; Pentland, 1986). These investigations have formed a route of 
influence which led to the formation of the edge-based model or recognition-by-
component model of object recognition (Biederman, 1987). Biederman specifically 
pointed to the fact that objects are represented in terms of geons, basic geometric 
building blocks and special terms that define relations among them (e.g. geon G is 
beneath geon H, geon F is to the left of geon E). According to this model, in order to 
name or identify an object the perceptual system computes a structural decision, based 
on the object's geons and the relations among them, which will eventually result in 
naming the object. This process is deprived of any colour information and is solely 
based on lower level processes such as edge and shape detection.  
 
From an edge-based point of view, an evolutionary advantage could ensue from 
allowing only the fast pathways to play a central role in object-recognition 
computations (Davidoff 1991). However, it can equally be argued that in situations 
where the viewing conditions are imperfect, multidimensional objects will benefit 
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more than objects that are coded by a single dimension (Price & Humphreys, 1989). 
Tanaka, Weiskopf & Williams (2001), accordingly argued:  
 
"…in the real word, recognition-under-occlusion is more the rule than the exception, 
and hence, color might play a critical role in everyday object recognition." (p. 212) 
 
A methodological argument made recently by Uttl, Graf & Santacruz (2006), argued 
against the edge-based accounts. The authors reviewed 35 studies that previously 
investigated the effect of colour on object identification and priming processes and 
highlighted the flaws in methodology that led these studies to fail to show significant 
evidence of colour-specific priming (e.g Cave et al., 1996; Biederman & Ju, 1988; 
Brodie, et al., 1991). These flaws, according to Uttl et al., were mainly a lack of 
power and weak manipulations of object and colour displays as a result of using line-
patterns only. Thus, in their attempt to replicate the foregoing findings, they applied 
the same basic methodology used before with the exception of increasing the study's 
power (one hundred and forty participants as opposed to an average of 40 participants 
in the previous studies) and including object photos that varied in their level of 
colouring (as measured by a colour complexity rating scale). They found that objects 
were indeed easier to identify from colour than from black and white photos and that 
the level of an object's colour complexity significantly affected the magnitude of 
priming (large priming effect for colour-complex objects, but minimal for colour-
simple objects). In summary, the arguments made above against the edge-based 
model (Price & Humphreys, 1989; Tanaka, et al, 2001) for object recognition, 
together with the recent findings of Uttl et al., emphasise the need for a different 
explanation for colour's role in recognition memory.  
 
 
1.1.2 Surface-plus-edge-based model for object recognition 
 
At about the same time that Beiderman et al. proposed the theory of edge-based 
representations during object recognition, a series of studies revealed a different 
pattern of results and all proposed that ‘surface-coded’ descriptions such as colour, 
depth and texture, provide a necessary step in the recognition process (Humphreys, 
Riddoch, & Quinlan, 1988; Marr, 1982; Price & Humphreys, 1989). Thus, a new, but 
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not less dominant, account for the role of colour on recognition memory was opened 
for further investigation - the surface-plus-edge-based position (Bruner, 1957; 
Gibson, 1969; Marr, 1982). 
 
Unlike the edge-based model, the surface-plus-edge-based account allows for object 
representations to comprise information not only about an object's shape but also 
about its surface characteristics including colour, brightness, depth, motion and 
texture. Price and Humphreys (1989), for example, predicted that when shape 
information is not sufficient for distinguishing among category members, surface 
colour becomes significant and can influence both object naming and categorisation. 
Results were exactly as predicted: controlling for the level of structural similarities 
among their objects, it was shown that congruent surface colour not only helped 
recognition but that incongruent colour interfered with both naming and 
categorisation tasks. This led the authors to speculate whether studies (Biederman & 
Ju, 1988; Davidoff & Ostergaard, 1988; Ostergaard & Davidoff, 1985) that obtained 
no advantage in recognition and naming paradigms did so by using a rather restricted 
number of objects. As an example, they presumed that the reason Davidoff & 
Ostergaard, 1988, did not find that colour sped performance on living versus 
nonliving categorisation was because their objects were specifically disparate in shape 
and relied on judgments that mostly concerned function (rather than structure) details. 
Similarly, in the following series of studies, Humphreys and his colleagues 
(Humphreys Riddoch, & Quinlan, 1988; Humphreys, Lloyd-Jones, Fias, 1995; 
Riddoch and Humphreys, 1987b; Vitkovich et al., 1993) have shown that objects from 
structurally similar categories (e.g. fruits or birds) take longer to name than items 
from structurally dissimilar categories (e.g. furniture or tools) because structurally 
similar objects' representations are more likely to be co-activated, resulting in more 
competition within the object recognition system. 
 
1.1.3 Colour contributes to recognition memory at a low level of vision  
 
Although it has been well documented that surface properties such as colour and 
contour information help the visual system to recognise images both quickly and more 
efficiently, this does not prove in itself that colour is part of the memory 
representation. Rather, the possible advantage of colour in recognition memory has 
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been interpreted as a sensory facilitation in which surface properties are processed in 
parallel and contribute together, at an early processing stage, to the internal visual 
representation of the world. These properties may relate to some sensory attributes 
that include both edge and surface information cues such as luminance, shading, form, 
depth and motion of a certain item and which suggest that the recognition advantage 
of coloured stimuli is not a result of a memory of the colour but is more due to 
sensory attributes such as improved image segmentation or increased distinctiveness 
of features highlighted by colour. In support, one line of studies has demonstrated that 
such factors (other than the colour per se) are the main source of the colour 
recognition superiority (Aginsky & Tarr, 2000; Chainay & Humphreys, 2001; Hanna 
& Remington 1996; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Triesman & Gormican, 1988; Wolf, 
Cave & Franzel, 1989; Wurm, Legge, Isenberg & Luebker, 1993; Wichman, Sharpe, 
Gegenfurtner; 2003; Yip & Sinha, 2002). For example, in Hanna & Remington’s 
(1996) study improved image segmentation of the stimuli has been shown to elicit a 
colour's sensory contribution to recognition memory. Gegenfurtner & Rieger (2000) 
further showed that colour information result in a coding advantage rather than 
representation advantage since coloured stimuli were recognised equally well (and 
better than non coloured stimuli) when they were tested in black and white or colour. 
This advantage of recognition memory was evident in very brief presentations roles 
out the possibility that colour aids the recognition of stimuli both through coding and 
representation since colour was not always available in retrieval (stimuli coloured in 
black and white). In line with this reasoning, Mollon and Jordan, (1988) and Polyak, 
1975 and Walls, (1972) pointed toward a low-level contribution effect of colour to 
recognition memory. They found that colour plays a highly specialized role in some 
image segmentation tasks such as detecting ripe fruit or nutritious leaves among 
mature foliage. Finally, Wurm et al (1993) demonstrate that the advantage of coloured 
images was independent of whether the colour is linked to the identity of an object or 
not (e.g. carrot and lemon did not benefit more from colour than foods like apple and 
pepper).  This result suggests that the influence of colour has failed to occur at a 
cognitive (high) level of visual analysis, but reflects a lower visual process where the 
knowledge of object properties is not yet perceived. 
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The above evidence indicates that colour is involved in a rapid, automatic sensory 
facilitation that does not necessarily participate in memory representation. This lead to 
the question of whether the effect of colour operates independently of other sensory 
attributes such as shape, depth or motion (Hanna & Remington, 1996; Livingstone & 
Hubel, 1987; Ostergaard & Davidoff, 1985). Two lines of experimental evidence 
support the view that colour is processed independently of other sensory attributes. 
The first is indirect in showing a superiority effect of colour from outline stimuli with 
very little surface details (Homa, Haver & Schwartz, 1976; Davidoff & Donnelly, 
1990). The second is direct investigation of the separate role of colour and form in 
recognition memory. If colour and form are bound together, recognition improvement 
should be revealed in a condition where colour and form details are matched to 
objects, but not in a condition where the colour details only are matched to objects. 
This counterintuitive prediction has been refuted by Hanna and Remington (1996). 
Their findings revealed that performance in the congruent colour condition was not 
different to performance in the colour-form matched condition, and hence ruled out 
the idea that colour and form details are necessarily encoded together. The authors 
further concluded that the binding of colour and form requires deliberate focal 
attention and thus is not a natural consequence of processing visual stimuli. Likewise, 
in the Ostergaard and Davidoff (1985) study, although colour congruence facilitates 
object naming, shape (geometrical) information failed to reveal the same effect. These 
two lines of study point toward a higher level of colour processing or, as referred to 
by Wichmann, Sharpe and Gegenfurtner (2002), a cognitive facilitation of colour to 
recognition memory, where colours conceivably take part in the memory 
representation.   
 
1.1.4  Colour contributes to recognition memory at a high level of vision  
 
Several studies support a high level contribution of colour to memory.  Most have 
aimed at investigating the difference in memory facilitation between the typical or 
neutral colours of objects and non-typical or non-neutral colours. The limited role for 
colour in recognition, and hence its absence at the memory representation, had been 
initially disputed by Price and Humphreys (1989). First, they argued that surface 
colour is significant to recognition and can influence both object naming and 
categorization, especially when shape information is not sufficient for distinguishing 
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among category members and when the decision at stake mostly involves judgments 
relating to the object's structure rather than its function.   
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Figure 1.1: A model for object and colour naming (Davidoff, 1991) 
 
Second, congruent surface colour specifically benefited classification speed, whereas 
incongruent colour interfered with both naming and categorisation tasks. The 
existence of two separate memory representations for object structure versus function 
information is in accordance with Davidoff's (1991) model of object recognition 
(Figure 1.1) in which they were termed as hasa and isa representations, respectively. 
Object colour, according to this model, is specifically part of the associated hasa 
properties, so that recognition of an object’s colour takes place after the initial visual 
representation (representations at the entry level) has accessed the hasa colour 
knowledge. Since only appropriate or congruent colour information is stored in these 
representations, recognition memory will be faster and better for objects coloured 
appropriately than for objects coloured inappropriately.  
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Support for a separate route of colour processing in object recognition was also 
obtained from studies of brain-damaged populations. Patients with visual form 
agnosia (who exhibit a profound impairment in shape perception) also benefit from 
colour information (Hanna & Humphreys, 2001; Humphrey et al., 1994; Milner & 
Heywood, 1989; Milner et al., 1991; Mapelli & Behrmann, 1997; Steeves, Humphrey, 
Culham, Menon, Milner, & Goodale, 2004; Wurm et al., 1993). Humphrey et al. 
(1994) showed, for example, that colour facilitated object recognition in a patient with 
visual form agnosia and that normal observers benefited from coloured stimuli (on 
explicit memory tasks) only when objects were presented in their natural colour. The 
patient showed a profound deficit in object recognition on the basis of shape, size and 
orientation, but a relatively spared ability to recognise objects on the basis of colour 
and texture. 
 
Case studies on colour agnosic patients reveal that, like controls, these patients show a 
recognition improvement with the use of colour in general, but unlike controls, do not 
benefit from the colour congruency. Colour agnosia is a type of associative agnosia 
(rather than apperceptive), in which patients typically have intact perception (low-
level processing), but a profound impairment in associating their percepts with stored 
memories of objects (e.g. lost colour association and semantic representations). The 
inability of these patients to benefit from appropriate colouring is attributed to the 
inability to process colour at a high level of processing, thus failing to activate 
memory representations of object colours (Nijboer, van Zandvoort, & de Haan, 2006, 
2007).   A recent case study (Nijboer et al., 2006) has reported a patient with visual 
agnosia who was unable to explicitly use colour information (e.g. to categorise 
colours) but continued to process colour information implicitly (e.g. to match 
coloured patches on hue) despite the absence of explicit recognition. Furthermore, the 
patient showed recognition facilitation from congruent colours in priming tasks at 
about the same level as demonstrated in age-matched control subjects.  
 
Several studies provide evidence to the claim that congruent colour information is 
stored in memory representations and thus correspondingly affects recognition 
memory performance (which is known also as the effect of colour diagnosticity). 
Appropriate coloured objects are generally recognised faster than monochrome 
objects (Davidoff & Ostergaard, 1998; Humphreys et al., 1994; Price & Humphreys, 
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1989; Wurm et al., 1993; Yip & Sinha, 2002; Uttl et al., 2006), and inappropriately 
coloured objects (Humphrey et al., 1997; Joseph & Proffitt, 1996; Joseph, 1997; Price 
& Humphreys, 1989; Vernon & Lloyd-Jones, 2003; Nagai & Yokosawa, 2003; Naor-
Raz, Tarr & Kersten 2003). Proponents of the high-level facilitation effect of colour 
on recognition memory have been able to generalise the above findings to a broad 
range of stimuli types including photographs, simple line drawings, textures, faces, 
graphs, symbols and animals (Home & Viera, 1988; Denis, 1976; Holt, 1977; Yip & 
Sinha, 2002; Latimer, Palethorpe, Mezey, Ellwood, Raju, & Hicks, 2002; Intraub & 
Nicklos 1985; Park & Mason, 1982; Suzuki & Takahashi, 1997). More recently, a 
substantial body of research has generalised this superiority effect of colours to 
stimuli other than objects, namely, natural scenes (Wichmann, Sharpe & 
Gegenfurtner, 2002; Gegenfurtner & Rieger, 2000; Olivia & Schyns, 2000; Olivia & 
Schyns, 2005). I will return to this pattern of findings for a more thorough review 
later in this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: The 'Shape + Surface' model of object recognition (Tanaka, et al. 2001) 
 
Based on these recent conclusive findings of a colour congruency effect (or, as will be 
discussed later, colour-diagnosticity effect) on recognition memory, Tanaka et al., 
(2001) recently presented a revised model (Figure 1.2) of the shape-plus-surface 
account of object recognition, similar to Davidoff's (1991) model, in which a high 
level of visual processing of colour is involved. The model allows for objects to be 
represented in terms of both their shape and colour (and possibly other surface input, 
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such as texture). Visual colour knowledge can be triggered during object recognition 
either by the perceptual bottom-up process (input depicted on the left side) or by its 
lexical label during verbal or imagery processes (input depicted in the right side). 
Easy access to the knowledge of an object's colour and hence to the loci of their 
memory representations, through verbal labels rather than a pictorial form, was 
similarly suggested by both Paivio and Linde, (1980), and  Davidoff and Ostergaard, 
(1988). As depicted by the two sided arrows, the model allows for a top-down effect 
on the perceptual processes involved in recognition. This may include the effect of 
prior associations between the object's identity and its colour, thus incorporating not 
only the importance of colour in general, or the surface colour itself, but also the 
congruent colour - the particular colour that a particular object may have in everyday 
life (Joseph & Proffitt, 1996; Joseph, 1997). The model suggests that the process of 
object recognition is a result of both the bottom-up influence of perceptual colour and 
the top-down influence of colour knowledge (Rumelhart, 1986).  
 
The significance of the specific top-down influence of colour knowledge on 
recognition memory beyond any other bottom-up or top-down effects of colour on 
memory was investigated in two experiments by Joseph et al., (1996) and Joseph 
(1997). Joseph et al. were interested in which of the two types of facilitation bottom-
up or top-down, is more influential? It was argued that many of the previous studies 
concentrated solely on the effect of surface colour on recognition memory, leaving the 
effect of the 'prototypical' colours (or congruent colours) still unresolved. The studies 
measured reaction times using a verification task in which subjects were asked to 
indicate whether the pictorial and word stimuli referred to the same object. Two 
colour manipulations were used: stimuli coloured in the object's surface colour and 
stimuli coloured in the object's typical colour. Unlike typical colours, surface colours 
were chosen arbitrarily (e.g. purple tomato). The effects of colour as a surface feature 
or colour as stored knowledge were assessed separately for objects that could and 
could not be easily discriminated on the basis of shape. The findings revealed a 
dominant influence of stored colour knowledge over the surface colours. Stronger 
interference effects were produced by inconsistent semantic colour associations than 
by inconsistent perceptual colour associations. For example, when a picture of an 
apple was followed by the label cherry, interference was always greater than when a 
picture of an apple was followed by the label blueberry. This interference occurred 
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regardless of the surface colour of the apple so that even when a purple apple was 
presented, the label blueberry did not produce more interference than the label cherry 
did. These findings were replicated and generalised a year later to verification tasks 
that included pictorial stimuli only (Joseph, 1997). The author therefore proposed that 
the activation of stored colour knowledge during object processing may have special 
status as an identifying attribute of objects during an automatic conceptual process. A 
few other studies can support this proposal. Firstly, it has already been mentioned that 
object colour knowledge, such as associative or functional object knowledge, is stored 
separately from information about its structure and possibly with other sensory object 
attributes (see above Davidoff's model for object recognition, and also Luzzatti and 
Davidoff, 1994). Secondly, a few studies show that children choose different grouping 
criteria - colour, for unfamiliar objects that they thought may taste similar (Macario, 
1991), and shape, for unfamiliar objects that reminded them of some kind of toys 
(Humphrey et al., 1994) thus perhaps reflecting the separate processing of colour and 
shape information within the visual recognition system.  
 
To conclude, various types of investigations using different methodologies as well as 
stimuli are indicating that colour plays a prominent role at high levels of visual 
processing as a result of memory representations directly linked to the knowledge of 
the object's colour. 
 
1.1.5 A multiple memory systems framework of object recognition 
 
The studies reviewed above demonstrate that the role of colour in recognition memory 
involves both low-and high-level processing. At the lower level, colour helps the 
visual system to segment (complex) images faster and more efficiently, thereby 
separating images in the visual field into identifiable objects. At the higher level, 
colour may be stored as part of the semantic representations of an object knowledge, 
which may be activated in cases where it resembles the perceptual input (surface 
colour) presented to the visual system and in turn result in memory facilitation. There 
is still considerable debate about the level of visual analysis at which colour 
influences recognition of objects. However, given evidence for both sensory and 
cognitive contribution, it has been argued that the question that ought to be asked is 
how can these findings be reconciled theoretically? Schacter & Cooper's (1992) 
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distinction between two components of multiple memory system - a structural 
description system and an episodic memory system, may offer a reasonable solution. 
The first processes and represents structural information of images in the visual field 
and is responsible for mediating priming on implicit memory tasks, but not for 
representing visual properties like object size and colour. The second codes and 
represents the semantic and visual information that comprise the distinctive 
representation of a specific object (e.g. colour, function) and is associated with 
explicit memory tasks. Schacter & Cooper (1992) suggest that these two memory 
systems normally interact with each other when the task at hand demands the 
identification of a certain object in the human visual field: 
 
"The picture emerging from our experimental work is of separate aspects of or 
systems for the representation and retrieval of information about visual objects. These 
systems act in concert during ordinary perceptual encounters with objects in the 
word, however, the systems can be dissociated and their distinguishable properties 
examined more closely by appropriate experimental manipulations with normal 
subjects and also in individuals with brain injury." (p. 145) 
 
Recently, Wichmann et al., (2003) adopted the idea of a multiple memory systems 
framework to account for evidence that supports both a sensory (low level) 
contribution of colour to recognition memory and cognitive (high-level) facilitation of 
colour. Their findings revealed that the addition of colour was found effective in two 
different colour manipulations: it enhanced recognition memory in image 
segmentation of natural scenes and removed a memory advantage for falsely coloured 
images. 
   
It has been well established that colour contributes at high levels of visual processing, 
and as a surface cue may activate memory representations that link to the knowledge 
of the object's congruent colour. It may therefore be asked whether a similar high-
level of colour processing is also involved in the processing of emotive stimuli.  Any 
attempt to scrutinise such investigation necessitates a close examination of the colour 
diagnosticity effect, an effect that concentrates specifically on the role of the object's 
congruent (diagnostic) colour to recognition memory, (Biederman & Jul, 1988; Wurm 
et al., 1993; Tanaka & Presnell, 1999). 
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1.2. Colour Diagnosticity 
 
1.2.1 Colour diagnosticity in object recognition 
 
Just as the research of Biederman et al., (1988) was an important building block of the 
low level account of colour processing in object recognition theories, Tanaka and 
Presnell’s (1999) study was the foundation for the high level account of colour 
processing in object recognition models. Their study was the first to measure colour 
diagnosticity rigorously, and thus to provide normative data as to whether diagnostic 
colours of objects benefit recognition memory more than non-diagnostic colours. The 
basic assumption behind Tanaka and Presnell's (1999) study was that objects may 
vary in the extent to which colour influences (or can be diagnostic of) recognition. 
Colour diagnosticity was defined as the degree to which a colour is associated with or 
symptomatic of a particular object. The authors postulated that colour information 
would affect recognition of objects high in colour diagnosticity but not those low in 
colour diagnosticity. They used two different measures of colour diagnosticity: the 
feature listing task and the typicality task. These two distinctive measurements of 
colour diagnosticity were first used by Wurm et al. (1993) who, nevertheless, failed to 
find any superiority effect of high diagnostic colours of objects over low diagnostic 
colours of objects:  
 
"…from an information-theory perspective, two factors determine whether colour is 
diagnostic of an object: The colour must be symptomatic of the object (e.g., "green" is 
a "symptom" of spinach), and not many other objects in the allowable domain should 
have the same colour." (p. 901) 
 
In both studies (Tanaka & Persenall 1999 and Wurm et al., 1993) an object was rated 
high in colour diagnosticity if a specific colour was consistently mentioned first in the 
feature listing task and was also rated as the most typical colour of the object. The 
failure to show any effect of colour diagnosticity in the earliest study can be 
attributed, firstly, to a subjectivity bias caused by using a panel of nine judges only (as 
opposed to 30 in Tanaka and Presenell's study), and, secondly, to their failure to 
control for differences in size and shape among their objects. When these two 
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shortcomings were accounted for, Tanaka and Presenell reported sweeping findings in 
favour of the colour diagnosticity theory.  
 
Following Tanaka and Persenall's (1999) study, many other investigations began to 
emerge with supporting evidence of the colour diagnosticity effect on recognition 
memory when using a variety of task measurements as well as a wide range of stimuli 
(Naor-Raz, Tarr & Kersten, 2003; Latimer et al., 2002; Suzuki & Takahashi 1997; 
Wichmann, Sharpe & Gegenfurtner, 2002; Gegenfurtner & Rieger, 2000; Olivia & 
Schyns, 2000; Olivia & Schyns, 2005; Nagai & Yokosawa, 2003;  1999 ; Vernon & 
Lloyd-Jones, 2003). For example, Nagai and Yokosawa (2003) have questioned 
whether the colour diagnosticity advantage was due to the frequent use of natural 
objects and images in the majority of the above studies. Their results however, 
revealed that the advantage of colour to recognition memory was obtained regardless 
of object category (man made versus natural) but only for objects high in colour 
diagnosticity.  
 
Images of everyday scenes have also often been used as stimuli in recognition 
memory paradigms that question the colour diagnosticity hypothesis. Although, 
Suzuki and Takahashi (1997) reported that colour recognition superiority was more 
due to increased distinctiveness and image segmentation than due to the memory of 
the colour per se, Olivia and Schyns (2000) provided clear evidence that colour 
diagnosticity is also beneficial to scene recognition. Like other recent studies 
(Gegenfurtner & Rieger, 2000; Olivia & Schyns, 2005; Wichmann, et al., 2002), they 
stressed the importance of applying methodological improvements to ground scene 
recognition on colour information, namely, controlling the diagnosticity of colour and 
the physical luminance of the neutral stimuli. More specifically, as in the study by 
Wichmann et al., they used luminance-matched colour and black and white images 
and excluded the effect of image contrast from the colour contribution to recognition 
memory. A comparison between diagnostically and non-diagnostically coloured 
scenes revealed better performance for scenes coloured diagnostically on both 
accuracy and latency measurements of recognition memory. Similarly, computational 
models that permit accurate scene classification without the prior recognition of 
individual objects (Oliva & Torralba, 2001; Vailaya, Jain, & Zhang, 1998) make use 
of properties such as the spatial complexity of the scene, visual texture and diagnostic 
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colours (Oliva & Schyns, 2000; Oliva & Torralba, 2001; Olivia & Schyns, 2005). 
Thus, the research succeeded in generalising the colour diagnosticity advantage on 
recognition memory from isolated objects to everyday scenes.    
 
Although an extensive body of research validates the theory of colour diagnosticity, 
Naor-Raz, Tarr and Kersten (2003) have recently argued that it is still uncertain 
whether diagnostic (or natural) colours of certain objects play a substantial part in the 
conceptual representation of objects and should be tested preferably by using a Stroop 
paradigm (Menard-Buteau & Cavanagh, 1984; Klein, 1964; Naor-Raz, Tarr & 
Kersten, 2003).  In their paper, Naor et al. made the argument that object recognition 
tasks recruit both visual and non-visual sources of information and thus impede the 
ability to establish the specific level or levels of processing (visual, conceptual, or 
lexical) at which the surface properties of an object affect its recognition. 
Accordingly, to test whether the visual representation of an object intrinsically 
includes surface properties such as colour, observers need to make judgments that do 
not directly invoke object identity - that is to name the colour of the object (rather 
than to name or identify the object itself). Their results were consistent with Klein's 
(1964) in showing faster mean response times for objects coloured in typical colours 
than for objects coloured in atypical colours. Clearly, this support for the colour 
diagnosticity theory, even when using a completely different task to those used 
previously in recognition paradigms, further strengthens its reliability. 
 
The idea that colour (and shape) information is stored as part of the long-term 
memory representations, even for novel objects, was also proposed by Nicholson and 
Humphrey (2004). Their study manipulated colour congruency across study and test 
phases and used an old versus new shape-identification task to explore the role of 
colour in the recognition of novel 3-D objects. Correct identification was faster when 
stimuli were coloured congruently across study and test phases than when presented 
in different colours. This colour congruency effect on novel objects was shown to be 
significant when object colour was incongruent across study and test, but not when 
background colour was incongruent across study and test. It was concluded that 
congruent colour was a significant cue for correct identification of objects and as such 
takes part in the long term conceptual representation of objects. 
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1.2.2 Colour diagnosticity in the brain 
 
The studies reviewed above indicate that colour is a powerful tool for recognition 
enhancement, particularly if it is a diagnostic colour of the stimuli to be remembered. 
Various different test paradigms were employed to provide evidence supporting the 
notion that colour is stored in the conceptual representation of objects and natural 
scenes. The scientific evidence provided above mainly involves support on cognitive 
grounds. Clearly, perceiving that a specific object (e.g. banana) appears in a typical 
(diagnostic) colour (e.g. yellow) and knowing that this object is typically coloured in a 
certain colour (e.g. banana is yellow) are two different cognitive processes (Tanaka et 
al., 2001). Neuropsychologically, evidence that the two distinct cognitive processes 
are associated with neural activation in distinct regions may support the colour 
diagnosticity theory. There are a few studies that concentrated specifically on this task 
(Chao, & Martin, 1999; Luzzatti & Davidoff, 1994; Martin, Haxby, Lalonde, Wiggs, 
& Ungerleider, 1995; Ungerleider, L. & Mishkin, M., 1982; Wiggs, Weisberg, 
Martin, 1999; Howard, Ffytche, Barnes, McKeefry, Ha, Woodruff, Bullmore, 
Simmons, Williams, David & Brammer, 1998; Zeki & Marini, 1998). Firstly, 
neuroimaging findings suggest a link between colour knowledge and object 
recognition processes, as evidenced by the common activation regions (left inferior 
temporal, frontal and posterior parietal area) triggered by both object-recognition and 
object-colour association tasks (Chao, & Martin, 1999; Martin et al., 1995). Secondly, 
Howard, et al. 1998 also discovered that there are separate neural areas that are 
activated by colour knowledge tasks and colour perception tasks. The left inferior 
temporal regions, specifically, were found highly activated by the retrieval of object 
colour knowledge (e.g. responding 'red' to a picture of an achromatic fire engine) but 
not by colour perception tasks (e.g. responding 'red' to a picture of a fire engine 
coloured in red; passively viewing a red fire engine). Thirdly, patient studies showed 
an intact ability to process perceptual colour and shape information (e.g. name the 
object or its colour) but an impairment in discriminating between appropriately and 
inappropriately coloured objects (Luzzatti & Davidoff, 1994). 
 
More direct neural correlates of the colour diagnosticity effect on recognition memory 
come from the study by Zeki and Marini (1998). Participants were asked to observe 
normally coloured objects, abnormally coloured objects and achromatic Mondrian 
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displays (arrays of different coloured patches). The two types of coloured stimuli, not 
surprisingly, activated V1 and V4 - both are cortical areas known to be involved in 
colour processing. The unexpected finding, however, was that different neural 
pathways were activated by the normally and abnormally coloured objects. Naturally 
coloured objects (e.g. red strawberries) activated the same brain areas that were found 
activated by different object colour-knowledge tasks - the fusiform gyrus, 
hippocampus and ventrolateral portion of the frontal cortex. Abnormally coloured 
objects (e.g. purple strawberries) on the other hand, activated the dorsolateral region 
of the frontal cortex.  Although the above neuropsychological research provides 
evidence for separate neural correlates for congruently versus incongruently coloured 
objects, and also supports a separate neural mechanism for colour-perception 
processes and colour-knowledge processes in object recognition tasks,  none have yet 
linked these separate neural mechanisms have not yet been linked with recognition 
memory processes. Thus it is still uncertain whether these neural correlates also 
reflect a neural network for the colour diagnosticity effects or merely show neural 
evidence for colour congruency.  
 
1.3. Study Rationale I 
 
As comprehensive as the above studies regarding the investigation of colour and 
memory may be, none have addressed the question of whether recognition memory 
will benefit particularly from colour cues when the stimuli are emotional. This is 
surprising given that colour and emotion have long been known as two dimensions 
that can be easily associated with each other, within and across cultures (Eysenck 
1941; Wexner, 1954; Choungourian 1968; Valdez & Mehrabian 1994; Terwogt & 
Hoeksma, 1995; Boyatzis & Varghese 1996; Hemphill 1996; Hupka, Zaleski & 
Tarabrina, 1997; Zenter, 2000; Burkitt, Barrett & Davis 2003; Leichsernring 2004; 
Ou, Luo, Woodcock & Wright, 2004) and at different developmental stages (even for 
children as young as three years old, Zenter, 2000; Burkitt, Barrett & Davis 2003). 
These associations are often used in clinical settings as a therapeutic tool to enhance 
the ability to express deep traumatic feelings. If found beneficial to recognition 
memory, colour may also be valuable as a memory tool for the retrieval of suppressed 
emotional information (e.g. traumatic experiences and eyewitness testimonies). The 
present investigation aims to examine the role of colour in recognition memory of 
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emotional information and specifically the colour diagnosticity effect on recognition 
memory of six basic emotions, presented both as textual (emotive words) and pictorial 
stimuli (facial expressions). Since Gohar and Latimer (submitted) demonstrated that 
colour improved recognition memory of the above emotional stimuli more 
significantly than grey-scale, luminance-matched stimuli, the present thesis mainly 
focuses on whether colour can be diagnostic for recognition memory of emotional 
information conveyed by facial expressions and emotive words. To address this aim, 
any effects of emotion on memory and of colour on emotions may also need to be 
considered, as these two additional effects may shape the direction in which 
diagnostically emotional colours influence memory. Consequently, in the following 
pages, studies regarding these two additional effects will be reviewed and discussed in 
light of their contribution to the current investigation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overview II: Memory for Emotional Information 
 
 
 
 
"An impression may be so exciting emotionally as almost to leave a scar upon the 
cerebral tissue." (James 1890, p. 670) 
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2.1 The Role of Emotion in Memory 
 
Emotions manifest with some measurable response to a typically acute event. These 
responses can be overt, such as facial expressions, or covert, such as changes in the 
autonomic or central nervous systems (Ekman, 1964; Ekman, 1965; Levenson, 
Ekman & Friesian, 1990, Ekman, 1993). Psychologists have known for a long time 
that such emotional responses have a strong influence on many cognitive functions, 
among them is memory. There is evidence from many studies that emotional material 
is better remembered than neutral material (for review see Reisberg & Hertel, 2004; 
LeDoux, 2000). This memory enhancement of emotionally laden visual stimuli has 
been reported for various kinds of stimulus features including film clips (e.g. Cahill et 
al., 1996), pictures (e.g. Bradley et al., 1992), words (e.g. Kensinger et al., 2002; 
Nagae & Moscovitch, 2002),  sounds (Bradley & Lang, 2000) and autobiographical 
experiences (Rubin & Schulkind, 1997). Emotional responses (measured 
behaviourally and physiologically) to these materials were shown to fit reliably with 
two primary dimensions: valance and arousal (Greenwaild et al., 1989; Lang, Bradley, 
& Cuthbert, 1998). The dimension of valence typically refers to the direction of an 
emotional response - that is whether the effect is positive/appetitive or 
negative/aversive and ranges from highly positive to highly negative. The dimension 
of arousal, on the other hand, most often refers to the magnitude of an emotional 
response and ranges from calming to exciting (Russell, 1980; Lang et al., 1992). 
Physiologically, research has shown that somatic responses are specifically tied to 
differences in the rated pleasantness of emotive stimuli whereas skin conductance 
responses reliably covary with changes in rated arousal. For example, Lang, 
Greenwald, Bradley and Hamm (1993) reported that facial electromyographic 
responses have the ability to index the affective valence dimension, specifically the 
corrugator (‘frown’) and zygomatic (‘smile’) muscles, which vary with changes in 
pleasantness ratings. As the pleasantness of the emotive stimuli decreases, corrugator 
activity increases and zygomatic activity decreases. Judgments of arousal can be 
traced by the magnitude of the skin conductance responses. Past research aimed at 
addressing the question of which of the above dimensions is the most influential on 
memory has produced mixed results (e.g. Bradley, Greenwald, Petry & Lang 1992; 
Cahill et al., 1994; Cahill & McGaugh, 1995). Although emotional arousal, in most 
cases, found to be critical for the emotional enhancement effect in memory, there is 
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evidence that memory can be also enhanced even for positive or negative stimuli that 
do not elicit arousal (Ochsner, 2000; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Kensinger et al., 
2003; D'Argembeau & Linden, 2004; Doerksen, & Shimamura,  2001).  
 
2.1.1 The use of six basic emotions as emotional stimuli  
 
This investigation will employ facial expressions and (emotional) words as emotional 
stimuli representing the six basic emotions – happiness, anger, sadness, surprise, fear, 
disgust, and a comparable neutral category. The use of six basic emotions has been 
proven, in the literature, sufficiently reliable and valid to represent the range of human 
emotional expressions (Ekman, Friesen & Ellsworth, 1982; Ekman, 1973; Ekman & 
Friesen, 1978, 1986; Plutchik, 1962, 1980; Russell, 1995, 1994). Ekman and Friesen 
proposed that the basic emotions appear to be universally associated with, and 
recognisable by, characteristic facial expressions and as such may further serve 
identifiable biological functions related to the survival needs of the individual and of 
the species. 
 
 “… in my view expression is a central feature of emotion, not simply an outer 
manifestation of an internal phenomenon.” (Ekman, 1993, p. 384) 
 
Silvan Tomkins has also suggested that a face has “… the greatest importance in 
producing the feeling of affect.” (Tomkins, 1998: p. 212) 
 
Though it may be argued that facial expressions may represent emotions more reliably 
than any other emotional stimuli, specifically words, Doerksen and Shimamura (2001) 
have pointed out that the emotional intensity associated with word stimuli may be less 
than with pictures. Kensinger and Schacter (2006) found that valence-dependent 
activation of the prefrontal cortex was much stronger for pictures than for words. 
Consequently, both stimulus types were employed in the present study, to account for 
any potential differences in the intensity of emotional responses produced.  
 
Although some basic emotions can be seen as representing either an arousal or a 
valence dimension (happiness has a positive valence whereas surprise has high 
arousal) most of the six basic emotions, like other more complex emotions, reflect an 
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orthogonal relationship between the two dimensions (Russell, 1980; Lang, 1995; 
Bradley et al., 1992) depending on the degree of intensity and the magnitude of the 
emotional state experienced at a certain time (e.g. anger can be highly negative but 
also highly arousing). Clearly, with the exception of surprise (which can be 
interpreted as either negative or positive) it may be argued that the valence (the 
direction of positive versus negative) of the six basic emotions is less prone to 
subjectivity (fear, anger, sadness and disgust are mostly referred to as negative 
emotions, and happiness as positive). However, studies investigating the dimension of 
arousal provide a basic understanding of the general role of emotions in memory 
(Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Lewis, Critchley, 
Rotshtein, & Dolan, 2007). Consequently, theories and possible cognitive 
mechanisms of how emotions affect memory will be discussed first with regard to the 
arousal dimension. Focus will be then given to the more specific effect of valence on 
memory for emotional versus neutral information.   
 
2.1.2 Effect of arousal on memory 
 
The experimental literature paradigms has tended to assess memory for stressful or 
high arousal material (mostly negative), often compared to neutral stimuli 
(Christianson & Lofttus, 1991; Christianson & Nilsson, 1984; Brown & Kulik, 1977; 
Clifford & Hollin, 1981; Neisser & Harsch, 1990). The findings are diverse. Some 
studies have found that arousal has an adverse effect on memory and may disrupt 
certain aspects of memory. Kihlstrom (1995) suggested that severe emotional trauma 
can cause amnesia for the traumatic event. According to the Freudian repression 
hypothesis, unpleasant emotional or traumatic events are repressed from the conscious 
state to avoid confrontation with psychological pain (Freud, 1915, 1957). On the other 
hand, a wide variety of studies also demonstrate that memories for negative emotional 
events are retained quite well (e.g. Bohannon, 1992, for a review see Christianson, 
1992). The common explanation for the enhancement effect of arousal on memory is 
that, over time, the unpleasant events are less threatening and thus become more 
accessible to conscious memory  
 
Yerkes & Dodson (1908) proposed an inverted-U-form relation between arousal and 
cognitive performance to consolidate the diversity in the emotion and memory 
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literature. According to this model, moderate levels of emotional arousal are assumed 
to facilitate learning and memory performance. Successive increase in emotional 
arousal beyond the optimal arousal level correlated with a lower degree of 
performance. Such an argument assumes a single dimension of arousal that ranges 
from low to high and as such will predict a very low memory performance at extreme 
levels of negative arousal. This assumption was challenged later by numerous 
contemporary studies which showed evidence to the contrary - a general increase in 
the arousal or intensity of affect promotes memory for a broad spectrum of details. In 
the eyewitness literature for example, it was demonstrated that some critical 
information of traumatic events (e.g. rape cases) was retained quite well (e.g. 
Christianson & Nilsson, 1989) and is also manifested in the common phenomena of 
flashbulb memories (coined by Brown & Kulik, 1997). Flashbulb memories are 
highly vivid and detail-oriented memories for emotional events that seem to remain 
stable over long periods of time. A photograph-like memory for the circumstances in 
which one learned of the attacks on the Word Trade Center would be an example of a 
flashbulb memory. Studies examining the specific phenomenon of ‘flashbulb’ 
memory have further claimed that the more intense the emotional reaction to the 
discovery of the shocking event, the better the retention of attendant circumstances 
over time (Bohannon, 1988, 1992; Pillemer, 1984). Others have recently suggested 
that these highly emotional memories are usually associated with vivid details of the 
event and high confidence that the memory is accurate which, however, do not 
necessarily accurately reflect the facts (Neisser & Harsh, 1992; Talarico & Rubin, 
2003; Schmolck et al., 2000). Taken together, these flashbulb memories suggest an 
important role for emotion in memory processes - an independent enhancement of the 
subjective sense of remembering (Phelps, 2006).  Thus, high levels of emotional 
arousal (which are mostly negative) tend to be associated with the persistence of a 
broad spectrum of detailed information, both central and peripheral although not 
always with high accuracy.  
 
Easterbrook's (1959) cue-utilization hypothesis suggests that subjects in intense states 
of stress and emotion attend to only a few details using a limited availability of 
attentional resources and at the expense of attention for irrelevant cues (such as 
contextual or source information). The contemporary variation of Easterbrook's 
(1959) theory is the attentional narrowing hypothesis. It also states that heightened 
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emotion directs attentional focus toward the emotion-eliciting stimulus at the expense 
of attention (and subsequent memory) for peripheral information (Reisberg & Heetel, 
2004; Loftus et al., 1987; Schmidt, 2002). Touryan, Marian & Shimamura (2007) 
have recently assessed memory for central item (emotional arousal versus neutral) 
information, peripheral information (object), and the association between item and 
peripheral information. Their findings show better memory for negative arousal center 
items than for neutral center items. In line with the attentional narrowing theory, 
performance worsened for associative memory between item and peripheral 
information when the central items were negative compared to neutral. Nevertheless, 
memory for the peripheral objects themselves was equal for the negative emotional 
arousal items and the neutral items. The authors concluded that negative arousal 
information particularly disrupts the associative links between peripheral information 
and central emotional events. Thus, it seems that attention plays a major role in 
mediating the effect of emotional arousal stimuli on memory and tends to be the 
reason for an increased likelihood that emotional aspects of experiences are 
remembered. Emotional items also appear more likely to be processed when attention 
is limited, suggesting a facilitated processing of emotional information (Dolan & 
Vuilleumier, 2003). For example, Kensinger & Corkin, (2004) reported that 
processing of arousal items is less likely to suffer from demands on attention. Their 
study participants were asked to encode words either as the sole task or while 
concurrently performing an auditory discrimination task. Results showed that memory 
performance for the neutral items was significantly affected by the performance of the 
secondary task, whereas memory performance for emotional items was not. Other 
studies revealed similar results using a phenomenon known as ‘attentional blink’ 
(Raymond et al., 1992; Chun & Potter, 1995; Keil, Ihssen & Heim, 2006) which 
demonstrates that when items are presented in close proximity within a stream of 
rapid presentations, participants are less likely to miss an emotionally targeted item 
than a neutral item.  
 
Different distributions of attention to different stimuli dependent on the level of 
emotionality are certainly central to explaining the effect of emotional material on 
memory. However, other mechanisms that are more automatic in fashion and that 
involve preattentive (perceptual) processes are also suggested in the literature. 
Christianson et al., (1991) proposed that certain characteristics of emotional 
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information are processed in an automatic fashion that uses preattentive mechanisms 
which do not involve consciously controlled memory processes either at acquisition 
or retrieval. Their study, like some others (Christianson & Loftus, 1991; Christianson 
& Fallman, 1990), revealed congruence in memory performance at short and long 
exposure durations for emotional material but not for neutral material. Subjects 
presented with emotional stimuli at short exposures (180 ms) performed equally well 
as when the same stimuli were presented at a longer exposure. Thus, it was concluded 
that preattentive or automatic information processing took place when stimuli were 
presented at the short exposures. Such preattentive processing is assumed to be fast, 
non-conscious, independent of context and dependent on limited processing resources 
(Öhman, 1991; Tulving & Schacter, 1990). According to this model of processing, 
being faced with emotional circumstances will therefore result in a process that 
promotes memory for central detail information, but impair memory for peripheral 
information of the emotional event. This can be demonstrated again by the eyewitness 
testimony effect called ‘weapon-focus’ (Loftus, 1979; Loftus, Loftus & Messo, 1987). 
Witnesses to a crime often will remember the weapon from the crime but not other 
details such as the perpetrator's clothing or vehicle. 
 
In addition to aspects of attentional selectivity that are part of the encoding phase, 
emotional arousal items also seem to uniquely influence retrieval and storage stages. 
There are indications that  memories of personal experiences associated with very 
intense feeling (regardless of their valence) are stored more accessibly (as evidenced 
by their being quick to be retrieved) than those associated with mildly intense feeling 
(Christianson & Nilsson, 1984; Robinson, 1980; Wagenaar, 1986). Pertinent to this 
discussion of retrieval facilitation in memory for emotional information are the mood-
congruency and mood-dependent retrieval effects, originally demonstrated by Bower 
(1981). A variety of mood and memory investigations, which often used the strategy 
of mood induction, have made the general point that people will store more 
information consistent, rather than inconsistent, with their mood - an effect called 
mood selectivity or mood congruency (Blaney, 1986; Bower, 1981; Bower, Monterio 
& Gilligan, 1978; Clark, Milberg & Ross, 1983; Eich, 1980). For example, a person 
who feels excited is more likely to notice and later remember positive information 
(e.g. being praised for doing good work) than negative information (e.g. forgetting 
someone's birthday). Similarly, a depressed person is more likely to notice and later 
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remember negative rather than positive information. On the other hand, research 
focused on the effects of mood states on the retrieval of previously learned material 
(mood-state-dependent) has revealled more equivocal results. In most of these studies, 
the main hypothesis generally tested was whether mood induced at the time of recall 
selectivity influences what is remembered from previously learned material. That is, 
will people remember better if they are in the same mood when they recall an 
experience as they were in when they originally had the experience? Some 
experiments investigating mood only at recall succeeded in finding the mood 
selectivity effect (Laird, Wagener, Halal & Szegda, 1982; Teasdale & Russell, 1983; 
Forgas, Bower & Krantz, 1984; Fiedler & Stroehm, 1986) while others have failed to 
show the effect (Bower & Mayer, 1985, 1989; Bower et al., 1981). To consolidate the 
differences in these findings, Bower has suggested the causal belonging hypothesis 
(Bower, 1987) which attributes the failure to show a mood selectivity effect during 
retrieval to the fact that the subject’s mood has been induced externally to the to-be-
remembered items. In line with this postulation, memory enhancement for details of 
emotional events will exist only when the emotional arousal is evoked by the to-be-
remembered item rather than being evoked by a source that is causally unrelated to 
the to-be-remembered item. It has therefore been concluded that: 
 
"…a state of increased emotional arousal is significant as an intervening 
variable in explaining memory enhancements only when the emotional 
reaction is an inherent property of the to-be-remembered event.” 
(Christianson, 1992, p. 293) 
 
Beside the beneficial effect on storage and retrieval of emotional information, there 
are empirical findings that suggest that there may also be some additional critical 
aspects of increased memory consolidation for emotional arousal items. It has been 
argued that beside the different encoding process for emotional and neutral events, 
there may also be recall patterns that are different for the two types of events which 
reflect different patterns of storage. Heuer and Reisberg (1990), for example, argued 
that unlike neutral memories, emotional memories are centered around the causes of 
the emotions and as such may provoke thoughts, feelings, and other reactions that 
would cause subjects to personalise the meaning for the emotional event - a process 
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which will result in better and longer memory for the emotive event compared to the 
non-emotional one.  
 
Similarly, MacKay and Ahmetzanov (2005) have argued that flashbulb memory 
effects may reflect enhanced elaboration and repetitive encoding of emotional 
experiences during the recall interval, rather than the superior initial encoding that the 
term ‘‘flashbulb’’ suggests. An experimental paradigm (a Stroop colour-naming task) 
designed to induce an analogue of flashbulb memories was used in two experiments 
(MacKay et al., 2004; MacKay & Ahmetzanov, 2005) to assess memory for 
emotional events (taboo words) and their contextual details (font colour and location 
of the taboo and neutral words) while controlling for attention, stimulus factor, 
elaborative encoding and rehearsal. Participants were instructed to first name the font 
colour of the word as quickly as possible and to then recognize the contextual details 
(colour or the location) of the words in a surprise recognition memory test (to prevent 
rehearsal or elaborative encoding). In both experiments participants remembered the 
contextual details better and with higher confidence ratings when the words were 
associated with emotional-taboo words than when they were associated with neutral 
words. The authors suggested that the results support the binding hypothesis in which 
emotional reactions trigger binding mechanisems that link the specific source of an 
emotion (the meaning of emotional word or event) to salient contextual details such as 
location and colour. Memory for contextual details was enhanced only for those 
details that were directly linked with the emotional word but not for details that were 
indirectly linked with the emotional words, the fuzzy-photograph hypothesis, which 
suggests that emotions induce imagelike memories (storage of all perceptual features 
that are active simultaneously during the induction of an emotional event regardless of 
their relation to the emotion), was rejected as a possible account for the flashbulb 
memory  effects. 
 
Taken together with the studies reviewed above, it can be concluded that the 
processing of emotional arousal information implements an elaboration mechanism 
that may interact with preattentive, fast, automatic mechanisms. The evidence that 
subjects remember central detail better from emotional events than from neutral 
events, even when the detail is shown only for very brief durations, may suggest that 
preattentive processes and attentional capture alert people to attend to emotional 
Diagnostic colours of emotions 
  
 
39
information which then leads to more elaborative, controlled processes that eventually 
enable people to preferentially process central details over peripheral details. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that even when attention, elaboration and rehearsal 
processes during emotional processing are controlled, binding mechanisms between 
units representing an emotional event and its closely related perceptual details are 
active during emotional reactions to the emotionally charged event (or word) and 
allow for a memory facilitation effect for these contextual features 
 
2.1.3 Effect of valence on memory 
 
In comparison to the large number of studies investigating memory abilities for 
arousing items, relatively few studies have examined memory for non-arousing 
positively or negatively valenced information. Nevertheless, the studies that have 
examined memory for the two types of emotive stimuli have suggested that the 
valence dimension is sufficient to boost memory performance (Kensinger & Corkin, 
2003). A few recent studies which have used words (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; 
Doerksen & Shimamura, 2001; D'Argembeau & Linden, 2004) as well as photographs 
(Dolcos & Cabeza, 2002; Kensinger et al., 2002; Ochsner, 2000; Margaret et al., 
1992) found that positive and negative items were better remembered than neutral 
ones. Unlike the findings from the arousal literature, which mostly demonstrated 
memory facilitation for the gist of emotional events at the expense of peripheral 
details, studies investigating emotionally valenced words tend to reveal memory 
enhancements not only of the emotional item itself and its closely related details but 
also of its contextual and more peripheral information. For example, Kensinger & 
Corkin (2003) asked subjects to judge whether a visually presented word was (a) 
vividly remembered from a collection of neutral and negative words (b) familiar and 
believed it had been presented before, or (c) a new one that was not presented 
previously. In a second experiment, subjects were also asked to indicate the colour in 
which the word was initially presented. The results revealed that 'remember' responses 
were more frequently assigned to negative words than neutral words and that subjects 
remembered the correct colours in which negative words were initially presented 
significantly more than the colours of neutral words. Likewise, Doerksen and 
Shimamura (2001) used colour as a contextual detail presented in two different ways: 
colour was used as the ink colour of emotionally valenced and neutral word stimuli 
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and even more peripherally as the colour of the background. The results demonstrated 
the same pattern of memory facilitation shown in the former study, with memory 
enhancement for the content and the contextual colour (when used both as 
background and ink) of the emotionally valenced stimuli but not for the content or 
context of the neutral stimuli. 
 
What cognitive explanation may support the memory enhancement effect for valenced 
emotional stimuli and their associated details? Suggestions have been made toward 
processes distinct from those mediating the enhanced memory for arousing items 
which, as discussed above, are known to be affected more by automatic, attentional 
modulation (Kensinger, 2004). Craik, 2002 among others (e.g. Macrae et al., 2004; 
Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004) has proposed that memory 
for positive and negative non-arousal stimuli may benefit most from conscious 
encoding strategies, like elaboration that can be either autobiographic or semantic. For 
example, the author suggested that people may process negative or positive 
information in regard to themselves such that words like ‘grieving’ and ‘gladness’ 
may be more likely to be associated with previous autobiographic memories than 
neutral words such as ‘equalize’ or ‘abstain’. Similarly, it can be argued that valenced 
items contain a semantic cohesiveness typically not present with neutral items. Talmi 
and Moscovitch (2004) have specifically tested this postulation and found that the 
memory advantage for valenced over neutral stimuli is eliminated when both types of 
stimulus share similar inter-item associations (this elimination of memory 
enhancement however was not present for arousal stimuli, Buchanan, Etzel, Adolphs 
& Tranel, 2006; Doerksen & Shimamura, 2001). Contrary to the above findings, 
D'Argembea and Linden (2004) provided evidence that suggests that the influence of 
affective meaning on context memory may involve an, automatic modulating effect of 
attention on the contextual and perceptual details of the emotional item. Their 
findings showed that subjects remembered the colour in which affective words were 
presented significantly more than the colour of neutral words only when subjects were 
not directly instructed to remember the colour details (when given incidental 
instructions rather than intentional instructions). Memory of the emotional stimuli 
themselves, however, was consistently higher than the memory of neutral stimuli, 
regardless of the type of instructions given. The authors then further argued that this 
memory enhancement effect, evident for both the emotional stimulus itself and its 
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contextual information, was due to the distinctiveness of these stimuli relative to 
neutral words since the memory advantage was eliminated when the stimuli were 
presented to subjects in pure lists of emotional valenced and neutral stimuli. 
 
Considering that the benefit of valenced emotional stimuli can be explained due to 
their being more semantically cohesive or distinctive than neutral stimuli, and given 
also the known phenomenon of colour and emotion association (which will be 
discussed in more detail in the following chapter), it may reasonably be assumed that 
such association will benefit memory of emotional stimuli more than neutral stimuli, 
particularly when the emotional information is presented with highly associated 
colours of emotions. Further support for this hypothesis comes from a recent study 
(Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton & Schacter, 2006) which, contrary to the previous study’s 
failure to show effects of emotion on memory for visual detail, succeeded in 
providing evidence that emotional content can increase the likelihood that visual 
details are remembered. The study therefore indicates that emotional information can 
influence not only the subjective feeling of vividness associated with a memory 
(Dewhurst & Parry, 2000; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Ochsner, 2000; Reisberg et al., 
1988) but also the likelihood that specific visual details (like colour) are remembered 
quite well from a previously encountered emotional item.  
 
Since the majority of the studies reviewed above report a memory advantage for non-
arousing negatively and positively valenced information compared to neutral 
information, the question of whether this memory advantage is different for the two 
types of valenced stimuli, negative versus positive, is still unanswered. Generally, 
isolating the effect of happy or positive non-arousing information on memory is 
evident only to a limited extent in the literature (Kensinger, 2004) and the few 
experimental investigations that have addressed this issue reveal inconsistent patterns. 
For example, Matlin and Stang (1978) found better memory (recall) for pleasant 
verbal materials than for unpleasant materials, an effect called the Pollyanna 
Principle. The effect was explained by the human tendency to store positive 
information more accessibly in memory since information that is positive may have 
greater levels of contextual associations than negative information. Warr (1971) 
similarly argued that positive words are, in general, used more often than negative 
words, which may imply that there is a lower information-processing threshold for 
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positive characteristics versus negative characteristics. More recently, D'Argembeau, 
Linden, Comblain and Etienne (2003) conducted an experiment in which participants 
were presented with happy and angry faces in an intentional or incidental learning 
condition and were later asked to recognise the same faces displaying a neutral 
expression. The results showed that the neutral expressions were better recognised 
when presented with a happy rather than an angry expression, but only when the 
subjects were given intentional instructions. The authors suggested that this 
recognition facilitation for happy facial expressions reflects the social meaning of 
emotional expressions given by the observer. 
 
Many other studies indicate that cognitive processes tend to favor negative rather than 
positive information. Taylor (1991) reviewed the literature and noted that negative 
stimuli produce "more cognitive activity", "more cognitive work" and "more complex 
cognitive representations" than positive stimuli do (pp. 70-71). Robinson-Riegler and 
Winton (1996) also presented results in favour of memory facilitation for negative 
information. Their participants were presented with two encoding phases, one visually 
and the other auditory, and they were then assigned to two recognition conditions. 
The first recognition condition required them to exclude all the items presented during 
the first encoding phase and to identify old items from new only if they had been 
presented in the auditory encoding phase. In the second condition, all items previously 
presented were included as old and participants were asked to identify them from a set 
of new items. Results showed that participants assigned to the first (exclution) 
condition were significantly better at correctly rejecting negative items than positive 
items. Other experiments have revealed either marginal or non-significant differences 
between the two types of stimuli (Bradley & Baddeley, 1990; Bradley, Greenwald, 
Petry & Lang, 1992). 
 
2.1.4 Biological and neurological mechanism of emotional memory  
 
Taken together, the studies reviewed above suggest that emotion has powerful 
influences on memory which involve multiple cognitive stages of information 
processing. The question that will be addressed in this section is - what neural and 
biological mechanisms support these effects? Just as recent findings suggest the 
involvement of different types of information processing for arousing versus valenced 
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emotional stimuli, the corresponding neural mechanisms have also been recently 
suggested to be quite distinct (Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; Lewis, 2007; Sharp et al., 
2004, Small et al., 2001).  
 
When processing emotional arousal stimuli which can be selectively attended and 
may also benefit from preattentive processes, a sub-cortical structure within the 
temporal lobe called the amygdala usually shows high activation. 
Psychophysiological studies (McGaugh, & Roozendaal, 2002; McGaugh, 2004) 
suggest that stress and emotional arousal lead to the release of two stress hormones: 
norepinephrine (a fast acting neuromodulator) and glucocorticoids (a slow acting 
neuromodulator). These hormones influence the activity in the amygdala which then 
feeds back into memory consolidation and storage sites as well as the amygdala itself 
to enhance memory over long time delays (Buchman, Karafin & Adolphs, 2003; 
LaBar & Cabeza, 2006; Kensinger, 2004).  The amygdala does not seem to store 
emotional memories (or associations to previously experienced emotional events) but 
rather modulates the hippocampus which activates these memory representations 
(Roozendaal, 2003; Richter-Levin, 2004). Hippocampal function is also sensitive to 
glucocorticoids but in a non-liner fashion. Low levels of this chemical, such as that 
released during a mildly stressful event, can facilitate hippocampal function 
(Roozendall, 2003; Sapolsky, 2003; Richter-Levin, 2004). The slow-acting nature of 
glucocorticoids may explain the findings that memory improvement for arousal 
emotional items is greater after longer delays than after relatively short ones 
(Eysenck, 1976; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990; LaBar & Phelps, 1998). Furthermore, this 
mechanism can reconcile the inconsistency in literature that on one hand shows 
memory enhancement for arousal stimuli but on the other hand presents evidence that 
stress can impair memory. Since the amygdala is sensitive to emotional stimuli, it 
may encourage (via modulation of memory areas like the hippocampus) selective 
processing of particular emotive information. The result is an enhanced emotional 
memory for the item itself but at the expense of consolidation of the neutral peripheral 
information associated with that item (LaBar & Cabeza, 2006; Phelps, 2006).  
 
Numerous neuroimaging and patient studies examining the neural responses 
associated with processing valenced versus arousing stimuli have shown distinct brain 
regions mediate the analysis of each type of stimulus. Amygdala activation varies 
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with arousal but not with the valence of presented stimuli, whereas activity in the 
prefrontal cortex varies with valence but not with arousal (Corkin, 2004; Kensinger & 
Schacter, 2006; LaBar & Cabeza, 2006; Lewis, et al., 2007; Phelps, 2006; Savage et 
al., 2001). These studies specifically suggest that the neural processes that underlie 
the conscious encoding (and elaboration) of valenced non-arousing stimuli are mostly 
mediated by prefrontal-hippocampus interactions (Kensinger, & Corkin, 2004; 
Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; LaBar & Cabeza, 2006; Lewis, et al., 2007; Phelps, 
2006; Savage et al., 2001). Evidence for the role of the prefrontal cortex in mediating 
elaborative processes partly derives from data from patients with specific prefrontal 
damage who could not engage in controlled, self-introspective or encoding strategies 
(Gershberg & Shimamura, 1995). Other support comes from findings showing 
correlations between depth of processing, likelihood of memory enhancement and 
prefrontal activity (Sharp, Scott & Wise, 2004; Savage et al., 2001) and from the 
modulation of prefrontal activation during encoding disruption, such as when the 
subject's attention is divided (Anderson et al., 2000). 
 
Although most studies to date have confirmed that amygdala activity has been found 
to relate to the intensity, or arousal, of the stimuli irrespective of valence, Kim et al. 
(2003) found evidence that the dorsal amygdala may respond on the basis of arousal, 
whereas the ventral sub-regions may respond in a valence dependent manner. Lewis 
et al. (2007) recently found that orbitofrontal modulation mostly correlated with 
increases in valence, but a small region of this area also correlated with changes in 
arousal. The latter study, like a number of others, also proposed a neurological 
distinction between aversive versus positive responses as reflected in the activation of 
lateral prefrontal cortex regions and medial prefrontal cortex regions respectively 
(Kensinger and Schacter, 2006; O’Doherty et al., 2001; Small et al., 2001).  
  
 
2.2 Study Rationale II 
  
In summing up the findings so far, one can conclude that the interaction between 
emotion and memory is very complex. The focus of this thesis will be on the 
differences in memory between emotional and neutral facial expressions and words 
with special regard to the effect of colour congruency on these memory differences. 
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Thus, this thesis seeks to expand on the previously shown findings of memory 
facilitation for emotive stimuli compared with neutral stimuli and to investigate 
whether the addition of colour associations with each type of stimuli will also reveal a 
similar pattern of memory enhancement. The key question is, will the difference in 
recognition memory between appropriately and inappropriately coloured emotive 
stimuli be greater than the difference between appropriately and inappropriately 
coloured neutral stimuli? Since this investigation mainly focuses on the effect that 
colour and emotion associations may have on memory, the use of six basic emotions 
is particularly imperative for the representation of such emotional associations. As it 
will be shown in the following chapter, when assessing the associative relationship 
between colour and emotion, research has often utilised at least some of the six basic 
emotions for emotional representations. Thus, within the emotional dimension (and 
with the addition of appropriate and inappropriate colours) the present study will 
focus more on the difference in recognition memory among the six basic emotions 
than on differences between positive or negative emotions, thus relying more on the 
contribution of valence to memory than on the contribution of arousal to memory. 
 
Finally, the above discussion also suggested that visual details (e.g. colours) are often 
stored during the participants' exposure to emotional information. Thus it is expected 
that when these visual (colour) cues are also presented in retrieval they will aid 
memory performance of the emotional stimuli itself. Such memory advantage may be 
even stronger for visual details that are closely associated with the to-be-remembered 
item than for visual details that are not associated with the to-be-remembered 
stimulus. As will be demonstrated later, colour is undoubtedly a good candidate to 
examine these assumptions.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overview III: The Relationship between Colour and 
Emotion 
 
 
 
My Red is so confident 
He flashes trophies of war and ribbons of euphoria 
Orange is young, full of daring 
But very unsteady for the first go round 
My Yellow in this case is not so mellow 
In fact I'm trying to say that it's frightened like me 
And all these emotions of mine 
Keep holding me from giving my life to a rainbow like you.  
Jimi Hendrix, AXIS - Bold as Love [1968] 
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3.1. Colour and Emotion Associations 
 
As was suggested in the first chapter, the basic purpose of human colour vision may 
involve the discrimination of objects among similarly structured stimuli. At a more 
elaborate level, however, this sensory capacity may also be used to attribute salience 
and meaning to colourful stimuli that are constantly present in our everyday lives. A 
prime example is that individuals not only show specific colour preferences but also 
attribute emotional characteristics to colours from a very early age (Boyatzis & 
Varghese, 1996; Zentner, 2001). This phenomenon was verified both within and 
across cultures (e.g. Hemphill, 1996; Valdez & Mehrabian, 1994; Wexner, 1954). A 
large number of empirical studies offer scientific evidence for the influence of colour 
on emotional responses, many of which have specifically focused on the link between 
colour and emotional associations. To date, this evidence for colour-emotion effects 
spans several disciplines including art, design, marketing, linguistics, health and 
psychology. Together these disciplines encompass a multitude of applications. Artists, 
for example, often use certain colours to evoke particular emotions or to create a 
certain type of atmosphere in an artwork. The colour red, for instance, is often used in 
art to convey energy, danger, anger, passion, desire or love. Within the domains of 
marketing and consumer behaviour, studies suggest that colour can be used to 
increase or decrease appetite (Zellner & Kautz, 1990), enhance mood, calm down 
customers and reduce perception of waiting time, among others (Singh, 2006). 
Psychological investigations that have employed colour present a wide array of 
effects on human behaviour. Colour, in its many applications, has been shown to 
affect not only people's preferences or their conceptual associations, but also 
physiological measures of emotional responses, work performance, mood and even 
voting behaviour. Thus, it seems that colour information impacts upon many aspects 
of human behaviour, and emotional state. This chapter presents a review of the extant 
literature on colour and emotion associations, together with a few other effects of 
people's emotional responses to colour. It therefore begins with reviewing colour 
effects that have been studied thoroughly in previous years but have received rather 
limited support recently and continues with what is currently and most commonly 
agreed on.   
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3.1.1 Physiological responses to colour 
 
The literature on the effect of colour on human behaviour initially pondered whether 
physiological responses can determine an individual's reaction to colour and how 
these responses interact with emotional responses. The argument developed from the 
predominant findings on colour and its effect on plant growth. Colour has the ability 
to evoke physiological changes in plant growth (Birren, 1961). For example, most 
plants will react in opposite directions to red and blue light. They turn toward and 
experience increased growth under warm coloured light (red, orange, yellow) and 
become inactive or experience slowed growth under blue light (Birren, 1961). 
Research that followed studied the physiological effects of colour on humans and 
measured physiological responses to colour by means of galvanic skin response 
(GSR), electroencephalograms (EEG), heart rate, respiration rate, oximetry (level of 
oxygen in the blood), eyeblink frequency and blood pressure (Kaiser, 1984). These 
studies have been largely motivated by the hypothesis that long-wavelength colours 
(warm colours: red, orange, yellow, etc.) are more arousing than short-wavelength 
colours (cool colours: green, blue, etc.) (Lewinski, 1938; Goldstein, 1942; Dixon, 
1960; Wilson, 1966; Valdez & Mehrabian, 1994). Empirical studies generally have 
shown that the colours red and yellow are indeed more arousing than blue and green 
(e.g. Jacobs & Suess, 1975; Schauss, 1985; Wilson, 1966). Similarly, Lüscher (1971) 
demonstrated that the colour red resulted in a faster heart beat, increased pulse, 
increased blood pressure and faster breathing frequency in subjects. More recently, 
Abbas, Kumar and McLachlan (2005) exposed subjects to eight different colours at 
various light intensities and revealed changes in heart rate, skin conductance and self-
assessment reports of arousal and valence due to change in colour and lighting 
conditions. However, since most of the above findings were not successfully 
replicated (Ingram & Lieberman, 1985; Kunishima & Yanase, 1985), Davidoff (1991) 
assumed that most studies had resulted in premature conclusions that were based on 
poor experimentation by failing to implement proper stimulus control (e.g. the 
brightness of different coloured lights). When Kaiser (1984) reviewed studies on 
physiological responses to colour, he acknowledged that there may be a certain effect 
of colour on physiology but critically concluded that the evidence of various 
physiological tests were inconclusive and the results were not yet stringent enough to 
reveal a general tendency. Detenber, Simons, Roedema and Reiss (2000) 
Diagnostic colours of emotions 
  
 
49
subsequently, demonstrated that colour does not cause any effect on the physiological 
component of emotional experience. The investigation involved the emotional effects 
of colour in brief television clips using physiological (skin conductance, heart rate and 
facial electromyography) and self-report measures of the participants' emotional 
reactions. Participants reported that colour pictures were more pleasing and exciting 
than monochrome versions of the same images, yet there was no difference in their 
physiological responses. 
 
3.1.2 Effect of colour on mood, performance and other behaviours  
 
Studies on the measurement of behavioural patterns of emotional response to colour 
carried out both under laboratory and field conditions also reveal a few well-
documented effects of colour on behaviour. Colour has been employed in the 
participant's environment in many different ways (e.g. colour of light, colour as a 
contextual or environmental cue) and yielded a variety of behavioural effects on 
perception (Damhorst & Reed, 1986; Hill & Barton, 2005), identification of odors and 
tastes (Zellner, Bartoli & Eckard, 1991), voting behaviour (Garrett & Brooks, 1987), 
aggression in sport (Frank & Gilovich, 1988) and enhanced work or other 
performance attainment (Ainsworth, Simpson, & Cassell, 1993; Hill & Barton, 2005; 
Stone, 2001). To illustrate, in a study by Schauss (1985), subtle shades of pink were 
purported to reduce aggression and violence. Its application indeed revealed some 
success in police detention cells. Damhorst and Reed (1986) showed that male raters 
perceived female models wearing dark jackets as more powerful and competent than 
models wearing light jackets.  Garret and Brooks (1987) found that the colour of 
ballot papers (pink or green) influenced voters’ choice. Female voters more 
favourably chose candidates whose details were displayed on pink paper, whereas 
male voters more favourably chose candidates whose details were displayed on green 
paper. Respondents’ behaviour was also shown to be affected by the colour of the 
questionnaire. Matteson (1974) had found, in a mailing survey, that a pink 
questionnaire compared to a white questionnaire increased the response rate 
significantly. The colours of the physical environment are thought to have important 
effects on human behaviour. Read, Sugawara and Brandt (1999) found that wall 
colours were related to levels of cooperative behaviour among preschool children. A 
white ceiling compared to a red ceiling led children to lower levels of cooperation (i.e. 
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playing together with a toy). Furthermore, coloured lighting was suggested to have the 
capacity to exert a powerful influence on an individual's mood. The idea behind this 
hypothesis posits that long-wave light (red) can produce a direct effect on the 
endocrine system via the pituitary gland and through its activation it increases 
aggressive behaviour. Under the short-wave (blue/purple) light, however, such 
behaviour seems to decrease (Lewinski, 1938; Nourse & Welch, 1971; Schauss, 1985; 
Wilson (1966). Rosenathal, Sack, Cerpenter, Parry, Mendelson and Wehr (1985) 
accordingly found that bright light has an antidepressant effect and was therefore 
found to be a useful intervention tool for patients suffering from seasonal affective 
disorder. More recently, a study (Knez, 2001) investigated the influence of the colour 
of light (‘warm’, ‘cool’ and artificial ‘daylight’ white lighting) on subjects' self-
reported mood, cognitive performance and room light estimation. Although no direct 
effect on positive and negative mood was indicated, all subjects performed better in 
the ‘warm’ than in the ‘cool’ and artificial ‘daylight’ white lighting on a short-term 
memory task. On a long-term memory task males performed best in the ‘warm’ and 
‘cool’ white lighting and women performed better than men in artificial ‘daylight’. 
Colour was also found to have a significant role in odor identification tasks (Zellner et 
al., 1991; Zellner & Kautz, 1990). Zellner et al. (1991) for example found that 
participants identified flavors more accurately when they were appropriately coloured 
(e.g. orange-orange) than when they were coloured inappropriately (e.g. orange-
cherry). Furthermore, Zellner & Kautz (1990) showed that colour can also affect the 
intensity of flavors, regardless of the appropriateness of the colour, their participants 
judged flavor solutions more intense than equally concentrated flavor solutions 
without colour. Interestingly, Elliot, Maier, Moller, Friedman and Meinhardt (2007) 
demonstrated cross-culturally that the perception of red prior to an achievement task 
unconsciously impairs cognitive performance (on anagram, analogy, and numeric 
tests) relative to the perception of green or an achromatic colour. The effect was 
shown when colour was inconsequentially manipulated such as including the colour 
of the participant's number on an IQ test cover or using red as the background colour 
of the test cover itself. Considering its irrelevance to the tasks used in the last study, 
the fact that colour significantly affected performance in each of the given tasks may 
suggest a profound effect of colour on people's behaviour. Nevertheless, the pattern of 
results revealed from the majority of studies investigating these colour effects on 
behaviour to date is fairly inconsistent. Many studies have simply failed to replicate 
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these effects, showing null effects of colour on performance and mood (e.g. 
Ainsworth, Simpson, & Cassell, 1993; Goodfellow & Smith, 1973; Green et al., 1982; 
Hatta et al., 2002; Kwallek & Lewis, 1990; Kwallek, Lewis, Lin-Hsiao & Woodson, 
1996; Kwallek, Lewis & Robbins, 1988; Kwallek et al., 1997; Profusek & Rainey, 
1987; Rosenstein, 1985; Shick, 1975; Stone & English, 1998) and others 
demonstrating opposite patterns of results compared to previous studies (e.g. James & 
Domingos, 1953; Nakashian, 1964; Sinclair, Soldat & Mark, 1998; Soldat et al., 1997; 
Stone, 2001). A good example is a study (Ainsworth at el., 1993) which examined the 
affect of three colours (using three painted office walls coloured red, white-neutral 
and blue-green) on mood (e.g. anxiety, depression and arousal) and work performance 
(e.g. typing and basic office tasks). No significant differences were found among the 
three coloured environmental conditions on either of the dependent variables.  
 
Given that the research is inconsistent in this respect, it may be argued that any effect 
that colour may have on human behaviour or mood is first and foremost a result of the 
tendency to associate specific meaning and convey specific information with colour. 
In other words, any behavioural influence of colour, be it on an individual's cognitive 
performance, his/her mood or his/her psychological functioning, can be explained by 
the individual's colour associations with emotions.  Although it will be argued that 
some of these colour-emotion associations are either culturally dependent (learned) or 
deeply embedded in individual predispositions (innate), they can nevertheless vary 
significantly between individuals. Thus, individual differences in colour and emotion 
associations may at least partly explain the inconsistency of colour effects that were 
reviewed above. One particular example claimed to have a notable effect on colour 
and emotion associations is an individual's colour preferences (Terwogt & Hoeksma, 
1995). The following section is therefore dedicated to the body of literature that has 
investigated, more directly, emotional associations with colour and its relation to an 
individual's colour preferences. 
 
3.1.3. Colour Preference 
 
Colour preferences have been widely studied throughout the years (e.g. Birren, 1973; 
Eysenck, 1941; Frank, 1976; Guilford, 1934, 1940; Norman & Scott, 1952; Terwogt 
& Hoeksma, 1995, Guilford & Smith, 1959). Most studies have yielded a 
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considerable variation in findings, depending on age, gender and culture.   Within 
Western society, for example, the favourite adult colour is blue, followed by red and 
green and the least preferred colours are yellow and black (Chongourian, 1967, 1972). 
Normann and Scott (1952) found that young children prefer the colours red and 
yellow. Terwogt and Hoeksma (1995) recently found patterns of colour preference 
similar to previous colour preference studies. Within a group of 7-year-olds, blue was 
also rated the highest colour preference ("Which of these colours do you feel is the 
most beautiful one?") followed by yellow and red. At older ages, yellow was less 
favoured, but the popularity of green tended to increase (Birren, 1978; Norman & 
Scott, 1952; Choungourian, 1969). Achromatic colours such as white and black were 
consistently disliked, regardless of age (Osgood, 1975; Williams, Boswell & Best, 
1975; Terwogt & Hoeksma, 1995). Boyatzis (1994) and Hemphill (1996) provide 
further support for the different patterns of colour preferences among different 
populations. In two different studies the authors investigated both colour preferences 
and colour and emotion associations on adult and child populations. The results 
revealed significant differences in age and gender. Within the older population, men 
preferred blue the most followed by black, brown, green and red. Women also rated 
blue as the most favourite, however this was followed by orange, yellow, purple, 
green and red. The most preferred colours for children were also different for boys 
and girls. Boys rated blue followed by red as their favourite colours and girls rated 
pink followed by purple.  
 
Despite the fact that the colour preferences revealed in the above studies are only 
partially similar, at best, Terwogt and Hoeksma (1995) have argued that the links 
between colours and emotions can be accounted for by preferences for both colours 
and emotions. In other words, the authors posited that colours and emotions may be 
related to each another due to the preference given to each of them within their own 
domain. The hypothesis was tested by asking participants to rate their preferences 
both on colours and six basic emotions (“Which of these emotions do you like best or 
feel is less bad.”). However, high correlations between the two types of preferences 
were only found for 7-year-old children. Burkitt, Barrett and Davis (2003) found 
similar results, with children aged from 4 to 11. In their study, participants first 
completed two different colour performance tasks: colour rating task (“How do you 
feel about this colour…point to the face to show how you feel about the colour.”) and 
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ranking task (“Point to the colour which you like the most.”). Correlations between 
these two rating tasks were found significant at all ages, but reflected a very narrow 
emotional dimension - positive, negative or neutral only. Thus, children tended to 
give a more positive rating to colour that was ranked highly on the colour rating task. 
In a different session, each child was also asked to colour in three pre-drawn outline 
drawings of a man, a dog and a tree that were varied by their level of valence 
(positive, negative and neutral). Children's colour preferences were found by the 
colour selected for completion of the three drawing tasks. Highly ranked colours were 
used significantly more for the positive drawing tasks and lowest ranked colours were 
used more significantly for the negative drawing tasks. Although the evidence that the 
children's colour preferences can explain their emotional associations with colours is 
far from conclusive, the results do support the notion that, from a young age, children 
use colour symbolically and can alter their colour choices in response to affective 
topics. 
 
The correlation between colour preferences and colour-emotion associations was also 
used to explain a documented link between colour preferences and psychopathology.  
The two seemingly unrelated areas have been linked in research involving the 
Rorschach Test (Exner, 1974, 1978; Exner & Wiener, 1982) and the Beck Depression 
Inventory. For instance, Nolan, Dai and Stanley (1995) found that undergraduates 
scoring above ten on the Beck Depression Inventory expressed a preference for black 
and brown. Holmes, Fouty, Wurtz and Burdick (1985), however, found that the colour 
preferences of psychiatric patients completely reflected those of the normal 
population. Luscher’s (Luscher & Scott, 1969; Scott, 1970) test of personality also 
relied on the link between colour preference and colour-emotion associations, but was 
simply based on preference for colour patches and as such its validity has been 
questioned due to its lack of any predictive value.  
 
In summary, attempts to explain the relationship between colour and emotion via an 
individual’s colour preferences have not gained consistent support. Such equivocal 
results demand a careful evaluation of how extensive the phenomenon of colour and 
emotion associations really is. 
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3.1.4 Emotional associations with colour 
 
That an individual can readily associate colours with emotions (or adjectives of 
emotions) is supported both empirically and linguistically. The English language 
abounds with expressions relating colours with emotions. It is possible, for instance, 
to be in a state of feeling blue or being green with envy. There are a few examples 
that can be given from other languages too. In the Hebrew language, for example, a 
‘black day’ refers to a very bad or negative day, whereas the common blessing ‘may 
you have an orange day’ is used to wish one the opposite - a very happy day. And in 
Dutch, one turns yellow with envy.  
 
Significant support for the human ability to associate colours with emotions also 
comes from a large number of studies that have used visual colour stimuli (D'Andrade 
& Egan, 1974; Johnson, Johnson & Baksh, 1986; Osgood, 1960; Osgood, May & 
Miron, 1975; Adams & Osgood, 1973; Byrnes, 1983; Schaie, 1961, 1962; Terwogt & 
Hoeksma 1995). Wexner's (1954) study is one of the earliest studies which sought to 
appraise the degree to which colours (hues) are associated with mood tones. Based on 
previous work on verbal associations of colour and mood, Wexner's study, illustrated 
a relationship between colours (e.g. red, orange, yellow, green, blue, brown and 
black) and a list of eleven moods (presented as words which had been selected by 
agreement by four judges). For each mood tone, certain colours were found to be 
associated with a specific mood tone significantly more often than the remaining 
colours. For example, blue was found more often to 'go with' secure-comfortable than 
with the remaining mood tone words. Moreover, no significant differences were 
obtained in colour-mood relationship between men and women.  
 
Other research has used more rigorous methods to explore colour and emotion 
associations with children as well as with adults.   Valdez and Mehrabian (1994) used 
experimental controls in investigating emotional reactions to hue, saturation, and 
brightness. Using the PAD model that illustrates the dichotomous dimensions of 
Pleasure-displeasure, Arousal-non-arousal and Dominance-submissiveness for the 
description of emotional states, the association of brightness and saturation to 
emotional reaction was found to be stronger and more predictive than the relationship 
between hue and emotions. For instance, more saturated colours elicited greater 
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feelings of arousal; brighter colours were rated as more pleasant, less arousing and 
induced less dominance than darker colours. In addition, the short-wavelength hues 
(e.g. blue, green) were rated as the most pleasant whereas long-wavelength hues were 
rated the least pleasant. Weaker results were obtained with relating hue to arousal and 
dominance emotions. Comparing the results between men and women, it was 
suggested that women were slightly more sensitive in their emotional reaction to 
brightness and saturation levels of colours, as evidenced by a larger number of 
significant effects.  
 
3.1.5 Colour-emotion associations at different developmental stages 
 
The study by Boyatzis and Varghese (1994) represents one of the latest investigations 
into children's emotional associations with colours. Sixty children aged between five 
and six-and-a-half years old were asked to select their preferred colour from eight 
different options (pink, red, yellow, black, gray, blue, purple and brown). They were 
further asked to state their emotional feeling about the remaining eight colours and to 
explain why they felt that way. A positive colour-emotion relation was found as a 
higher percentage of positive emotional responses were obtained for bright colours 
than for dark colours. Additionally, for girls, negative feelings were induced by dark 
colours, but boys were more likely to react positively to dark colours than girls. Using 
an identical procedure, Hemphill (1996) tested these results on adults and compared 
them with those of Boyatzis and Varghese (1994). It was indicated that the association 
of colour and emotion becomes more complex with increasing age but nevertheless 
with similar trends. More recently, Zentner (2001) conducted a study using three 
emotional facial expression (sadness, happiness and anger) to detect emotional 
associations with colours using an unusually large sample size (n=127) and an 
unusually young age group.  The ability to detect a relationship between the two 
perceptually unrelated categories, colours and emotions, was evident even for 3- to- 4-
year-old children. For this young population, yellow was the best match for 
happiness, whereas blue was most consistently associated with sadness. The use of 
unique emotional stimuli also revealed similar colour associations to studies that have 
used textual or pictorial stimuli. Brighter colours such as yellow, red, green and blue 
were assigned to songs identified as happy songs while gray mostly corresponded to 
songs identified as sad songs (Barbiere, Vidal & Zellner, 2007). 
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Although the above findings may indicate in general that colours are perceived to 
have emotional meaning, a closer examination suggests that the nature of this 
relationship is far from consistent. To illustrate, the colour blue has been shown to be 
related to ‘sad’ (e.g. Zentner, 2001) but also to ‘pleased’, ‘peace’, and ‘soothed’ 
(Collier, 1996), to ‘secure’ and ‘comfortable’ (Wexner, 1954), to ‘relaxed’ and 
‘released’ (Luscher, 1971), ‘good’ (Adams & Osgood, 1973) and ‘happiness’ 
(Terwogt et al., 1995). Similar variation has been found for other colours (Whitfield 
& Whitfield, 1990). The variability of results may reflect the fact that people differ in 
the meaning they give to colours. These associations may be a function of cultural 
conventions or simply a function of individual differences.  This raises the issue of 
nature versus nurture in attempting to provide some explanations for the 
psychological phenomenon of acquiring colour and emotion associations. 
 
3.1.6 Cross-culture evidence for colour-emotion associations 
 
The question whether emotional meanings of colours are culturally dependent 
(learned) or similar across cultures (innate) has been investigated by an assortment of 
studies (D'Andrade and Egan, 1974; Pecjak, 1970; Murray & Deabler, 1957; Osgood, 
1960; Osgood, May & Miron, 1975; Oyama, Tanaka & Haga, 1963; Hupka, Zaleski, 
Otto, Reidl & Tarabrina, 1997), which resulted in findings that both support 
(D'Andrade et al., Pecjak, Murray et al., and Osgood et al) and undermine cross-
cultural consistencies (Courtney, 1986). 
 
D'Andrade and Egan (1974) sampled across the entire Munsell colour chip set and 
compared two entirely different cultures (Americans and the Tzeltal from Chiapas in 
Mexico). For both cultures they found, for example, that ‘good’ is strongly associated 
with saturated colours while ‘bad’ relates more to unsaturated ones. Similarly, Wright 
and Rainwater (1962) studied German subjects and found that lighter or more 
saturated colours consistently corresponded with happy connotations. Arguments in 
favour of the innate (nature) causation idea posit that all human beings may be 
exposed to some learned associations of common environmental features. For 
example, many naturally occurring objects and events have the same colours in 
different cultures (e.g. the yellowness of the sun, the blueness of the sea and the 
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redness of one's blood). Davidoff (1991) pointed toward a possible anatomical locus 
for universal associations of mood and colour, which is suggested to arise from links 
between neural areas responsible for colour categorisation (that are thought to be 
universal) and subcortical structures. Furthermore, the neural links from colour 
categorisation areas and mood areas have been shown to be separated (after brain 
damage) from neural links that are correlated with learned colour names (Damasio, 
Mckee & Damasio, 1979).  Nevertheless, as was the case with studies investigating 
colour and emotion associations within cultures, any similarities that the above cross 
cultural investigations demonstrated are not necessarily consistent across studies. 
Most notable is the association with the colour red. It may seem that this colour might 
be the most automatic to be linked emotionally with ‘fear’ or ‘anger’, and thus also 
the most consistent in showing such associations, Courtney (1986) in fact revealed 
that it was not conclusively universal. Consequently, Hupka et al., (1996) were well 
aware that culture plays an important role in giving emotional meanings to colours. 
They thus postulated that emotions with a strong cultural component such as ‘envy’ or 
‘jealousy’ may acquire colour associations that are culturally specific. Emotions that 
are common to all human beings, however, such as ‘anger’ and ‘fear’ (two of the six 
basic emotions suggested by Ekman) were hypothesized to be universally associated 
with colours. Their results supported the hypothesis in showing more cross-cultural 
agreement in colour-emotion associations for ‘anger’ and ‘fear’ than for ‘envy’ and 
‘jealousy’. For example, five different nations, Germany, Mexico, Poland, Russia and 
the US, listed the colours black and red as the best to remind them of the emotion 
‘anger’. The colour associations for ‘envy’, however, differed significantly among the 
five nations. Mexico, Poland, and the United States associated it with black, whereas 
Germany and Russia thought that yellow was more closely related. 
 
Regardless of whether colour associations are consistent or not across cultures or from 
one individual to another, studies conclusively show that people do give emotional 
meaning to colours. This raises the question of whether there are specific neural 
structures or particular neural pathways that can be identified with and activated by 
such associations. The failure to find consistent colour and emotion associations, both 
within and across cultures, may refute any arguments in favour of an innate 
explanation for these associations. This in turn may reduce the likelihood for a 
specific neural mechanism common to all human beings. However, it has been 
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suggested the neural mechanism involved in the neurological phenomenon of 
synaesthesia may mediate colour emotion associations in non-synaesthets.  
 
3.1.7 Synaesthesia (associations with colours in the brain) 
 
Synaesthesia derives from the Greek words syn (union) and aesthesis (sensation), 
which can be literally interpreted as a mixing of the senses. It is an involuntary 
neurological condition in which one type of stimulation evokes the sensation of 
another (Baron-Cohen & Harrison, 1997; Cytowic, 1989, 2002). This sensation or 
perceptual experience is elicited in the absence of normal sensory stimulation. The 
sensation of taste, for example, can be experienced as shape (Cytowic, 1993) or in 
response to specific sounds (Beeli et al., 2005; Ward & Simner, 2003). The most 
common form of synaesthesia and the most studied one is grapheme-colour 
synaesthesia, in which graphemes (letters or digits) elicit colours (Ward & 
Mattingley, 2006). A typical synaesthetic sensation would be to perceive, for 
example, the letter ‘a’ as pink, ‘b’ as blue, and ‘c’ as green, no matter in what colour 
they are printed.  
 
Syneasthesia research has experienced a resurgence of interest in recent years, such 
that many investigators from different fields of research (e.g. neuroscience, 
philosophy, linguistics) pursue the study of synaesthesia using a variety of techniques 
(e.g. psychophysics, neuroimaging).  Recently, studies have attempted to address the 
similarities between synaesthetic experiences and normal perceptual experiences.  It 
has been acknowledged that synaesthesia can shed light on the neural and cognitive 
substrates of perceptual awareness (Gray, 2003, Gray et al., 2006). Since synaesthesia 
typically represents a case of cross-modal processing, or inter-attribute binding with 
in a modality it may be of relevance to understanding the interaction of different 
senses in the brain (Calvert, et al., 2004). Treisman (1999) has raised, for example, the 
question of how form and colour are integrated in perception in the absence of 
external colour information. Answers to such questions are thought to help clarify the 
basic neural mechanism and level of representations behind cross-modal processing 
and inter-attribute binding. For this reason, research of synaesthesia has recently 
involved the investigation of whether synaesthetic experiences really resemble those 
experienced by normal individuals using both psychophysical and functional 
neuroimaging techniques. Ward et al., (2005) recently found an overlap between brain 
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regions involved in synaesthetic cross-modal processing and cross-modal processing 
areas. 
 
Further evidence of possible similarities between synaesthetic experiences and normal 
perceptual experiences is documented by a line of studies which have used a 
psychophysical approach to compare performance of synaesthetes to that of non-
synaesthetes on a variety of tasks. Many have, in fact, resulted in the conclusion that 
synaesthetic colours are incorporated within the stream of normal visual processing. 
Witthoft and Winawer (2005), for example, were able to demonstrate that 
synaesthetic colours are susceptible to normal mechanisms of lightness constancy. 
Their results showed that a grey background affected the perceived lightness of the 
synaesthetic colour induced by an achromatic grapheme. Hubbard et al., (2006) found 
that the contrast between a grapheme and its background affected the extent to which 
synaesthetic colours biased performance and thus postulated that synaesthetic colours 
may be elicited at contrast dependent stages of visual processing. 
 
Theories attempting to provide an underlying mechanism for the unique phenomenon 
of synaesthesia have proposed that synaesthetic colour can be determined by factors 
that include both perceptual and conceptual properties and may reflect a cross-wiring 
of areas in the brain between limbic regions (responsible for emotions) and cortical 
regions, such as the fusiform, which is known to be involved in visual recognition and 
colour processing (Cytowic, 1989; Nunn et al., 2002; Ramachandran & Hubbard, 
2001; Weiss, et al., 2001). Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001) specifically suggested 
a distinction between ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ synaesthesia which is assumed to reflect 
the individual differences between conceptual and perceptual processing of an 
inducer, respectively. More specifically, ‘lower’ synaesthetic induced colours are 
thought to be a form of grapheme-colour synaesthesia that is mostly determined by 
the physical appearance of the inducing stimulus and less by its meaning or identity 
(and thus is more perceptual in nature). An account for the perception of ‘lower’ 
synaesthetic induced colours posits a cross-activation between colour selective 
regions (V8/ hV4) and regions involved with visual recognition of number graphemes 
and visual words which are both located in the fusiform gyrus. Other researchers have 
focused more on ‘higher’ synaesthesia which was found to be influenced conceptually 
from the emotional responses that a certain grapheme may evoke, as well as from the 
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meaning or the identity of the inducing stimulus (Dixon et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2006; 
Callejas et al., 2007; Lupianez & Callejas, 2006; Ward, 2004).  Gray et al., compared 
synaesthetes who have a synaesthetic colour that does not match the meaning of the 
word (e.g., where the word ‘red’ is experienced as blue) to those who experience the 
same colour as the word’s meaning (e.g., ‘red’ as red) and revealed significantly 
greater hippocampal activation in the former which the authors interpreted as 
reflecting conscious conflict resolution. 
 
Weiss, Zilles, Gereon & Finka (2005) provide evidence that grapheme-colour 
synaesthesia may originate from enhanced cross-modal binding of form and colour. 
They compared neural activity during surface colour processing and grapheme-colour 
synesthesia. Enhanced activity in the left intraparietal cortex was evident during the 
experience of grapheme-colour synaesthesia, whereas the perception of surface colour 
per se preferentially activated the colour centers in the fusiform gyrus bilaterally. 
Interestingly, as was found in non-synaesthetes (discussed in section 2.1 Colour-
dignosticity in the brain) who were presented with abnormally coloured objects (e.g., 
a violet banana) an incongruent synaesthetically induced grapheme-colour (when 
surface colour was different from the synaesthetic colour) also activated the left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Since the DLPFC has been implicated in 
cognitive control (MacDonald et al., 2000) the authors (Weiss et al, 2005) concluded 
that synaesthetes implemented the cognitive control processes to resolve the 
perceptual conflict resulting from a mismatch between the synaesthetically induced 
colour and the visually presented surface colour. This similarity in the neural 
correlates (activation of the DLPFC) of the induced incongruent colours in both 
synaesthetes non-synaesthetes suggests that the incongruity of colour associations 
experienced by non-synaesthetic subjects relies on a neural process somewhat similar 
to that experienced by synaesthetes. 
 
More evidence to support the similarities between colour association in synaesthetes 
and non-synaesthetes comes from studies that were specifically interested in whether 
emotion can mediate the phenomenon of synaesthesia (Ward, 2004). There is 
considerable debate in the literature concerning which aspect of an inducing stimulus 
(or level of representation) is critical for triggering a synaesthetic colour. Arguments 
have been made in favour of shape information (Edquist et al., 2006), abstract identity 
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(Dixon et al., 2006) and other properties such as pronunciation (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1993). Ward (2004) postulated differently - that it is the affective component of, or 
the emotional response evoked by, the induced stimulus that directly elicits a 
synaesthetic sensation of colour. The study reports a synaesthete, GW, who 
experiences colours in response to certain people, words, letters and numbers. GW's 
colour associations differ from those generated by control subjects in terms of both 
consistency and automaticity as measurements of genuineness (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1987). Ward used the Stroop paradigm to demonstrate that stimuli with an emotional 
connotation (familiar people) were more likely to induce a synaesthetic response than 
those that do not (e.g. colour names, food) despite the fact that these stimuli usually 
have colour associations. Furthermore, word stimuli that had emotional connotation 
also elicited synaesthetic colours and the valence of these emotional responses greatly 
affected the colour induced. For instance, for GW bright synaesthetic colours (e.g. 
pink, orange, yellow, and green) were elicited for words associated with positive 
emotions. Words associated with negative emotions evoked dark synaesthetic colours 
such as brown, grey and black, whereas blue and white were elicited by neutral or 
non-valenced words. These colour-and-emotion associations clearly resemble those 
found in non-synaesthetic, adults and youngsters (e.g. Boyatzis & Varghese, 1996; 
Hemphill, 1996; Valdez & Mehrabian, 1994; Zentner, 2001). This evidence of 
emotionally mediated synaesthesia fits with other studies that pointed toward an 
involvement of the limbic system and thus to an underlying emotional mechanism 
(Cytowic, 1989; Ward, 2004; Callejas, Acosta & Lupianez, 2007) common to both 
synaesthetes and the normal population: 
 
 ...certain synaesthetic individuals have an exaggerated cross-
wiring (or some other neural mechanism) between centres involved 
in emotional processing and colour perception, which enables the 
emotion-inducing stimulus to explicitly acquire this novel 
dimension…some forms of synaesthesia can be considered to be 
exaggeration of normal, innate cross-modal mechanisms that are 
present in us all. The key difference is that the mechanism results 
in an automatically elicited conscious percept in the case of the 
synaesthete.  Ward (2006) p.771. 
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While conducting our own investigation on the effect of colour and emotion 
associations on memory, we were also witness to synaesthetic experiences triggered 
by emotional responses evoked in three participants who revealed their condition of 
synaesthesia to the researcher. All three synaesthetes reported somewhat unique 
synaesthetic sensations as a result of their exposure to the experiment’s emotional 
stimuli. The specific sensation, described below by SS, demonstrates the elicitation of 
taste and sound sensations for a specific emotion, beside other induced grapheme- 
colour sensations. Since such sensations disappeared over time it may mean that the 
specific synaesthetic sensations of taste and sound as reported below were merely a 
result of the exposure to the emotional stimulus of 'surprise'. 
 
Further neuropsychological evidence for an embedded human ability to associate 
colours with emotions is demonstrated by a case study of brain damage (Ferro & 
Santos, 1984). The patient reported in the study is a 58-year-old male who had an 
intact ability to associate colours with emotions despite a severe visual recognition 
impairment. Furthermore, performance on visual perceptual and categorisation tests 
revealed an inability to categorise or name colours but a preserved ability to recall the 
colours of objects. This finding not only provides neuropsychological support for 
emotional associations with colour, but also suggests that such associations may be 
closely related to the associations between colours and objects (as suggested in 
Chapter 1). 
 
3.1.8 An associative network theory for colour and emotion 
 
From infancy onward, people encounter both obvious and subtle pairings between 
colours and particular meaningful messages, concepts and emotionally laden 
experiences. With repetition, these pairings are posited to produce strong colour 
associations, such that the mere perception of a colour in a particular situation 
activates its paired associate and influences affect, cognition and behaviour 
accordingly (Baldwin & Meunier's 1999). An associative network theory (e.g. 
Anderson & Bower, 1973; Bower, 1981; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Kintsch, 1988) is 
suggested to account for this type of learning. Collins and Loftus (1975) proposed a 
model of semantic knowledge that represented semantic information as an elaborate 
network of conceptual nodes and connections between them. When a concept is 
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accessed (e.g. because it is presented to the visual system) the node for that concept is 
activated. However, nodes connected to the accessed node are also activated. Nodes 
connected to these nodes are then activated. As the activation spreads out from the 
accessed node it grows weaker. This was termed by Collins and Loftus as the spread 
of activation, which allows us to access semantic information about concepts. Based 
on the Collins and Loftus model of associative networks, Bower (1981) more 
specifically suggested the network theory of memory and emotion, where an emotion 
rather than a general semantic concept serves as a memory unit such that its activation 
serves to prime other related emotional knowledge. According to this theory, each 
distinct emotion such as joy, fear or sadness has a specific node or unit in memory 
that collects together many other aspects of the emotions. Verbal labels of each 
emotion as well as expressive behaviour (like facial expressions) are therefore 
connected to the emotion by associative pointers. Since colours are constantly 
integrated in every one of our life’s events (and as a result are associated with 
emotions evoked by daily events) colour nodes may be linked to emotional nodes 
accordingly. Thus, the emotional network theory assumes a strong direct relationship 
between the activation of an emotion associated with a stimulus and an identification 
of the semantic content of the stimulus (e.g. colour). In other words, the theory 
reflects a function of the links between the semantic (colour) and affective content of 
the stimulus (a specific event) in a person's semantic network.  
 
Many studies further suggested that the activation of the colour association, as well as 
its influence on affect, cognition and behaviour, may occur without the individual's 
conscious awareness or intention (Callejas et al., 2007; Dixon, 1960, 1981; Lupianez 
& Callejas, 2006; Ward, 2004). If colour association is presumed to operate non-
consciously this may explain its automatic influence on psychological functioning 
(Bargh, 1990) and cognitive performance (e.g. implicit memory tasks, Stroop tasks). 
Experiment 4 of this dissertation implemented the Stroop paradigm to specifically test 
the above hypothesis on the normal population.  
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3.2 Study rationale III 
 
The ability to associate colours with emotions is unquestionably part of being human. 
What is less certain, however, is how consistent these associations are, not only across 
different cultures, but more importantly from one individual to another.   
 
The majority of the literature reviewed above suggests that unlike colour associations 
with natural objects, the degree to which people associate colours with emotions is 
highly varied not only across cultures but also from one individual to another (e.g. 
Eysenck 1941; Wexner, 1954; Choungourian 1968; Valdez & Mehrabian 1994; 
Boyatzis & Varghese 1996; Hemphill 1996; Hupka et al. 1997). For exmple, the 
colour blue has been shown to be related to ‘sad’ (e.g. Zentner, 2001) but also to 
‘pleased’, ‘peace’, and ‘soothed’ (Collier, 1996), to ‘secure’ and ‘comfortable’ 
(Wexner, 1954), to ‘relaxed’ and ‘released’ (Luscher, 1971), ‘good’ (Adams & 
Osgood, 1973) and ‘happiness’ (Terwogt et al., 1995). Similar variation has been 
found for other colours (Whitfield & Whitfield, 1990). This evidence of idiosyncratic 
colour and emotion associations necessitates an investigation which accounts for the 
individual differences in associating colours with emotions. Therefore, the studeies 
presented in this thesis do not represent a universal investigation of colour and 
emotion and therefore could not be generalized from one culture to another. Rather, it 
aimed to study on the individual level, whether the beneficial effect of colour on 
recognition memory of objects extends to the recognition memory of emotional 
information.  
 
Consequently, we have decided to account for any potential individual differences 
that may occur within our student population. Thus, emotional word and facial stimuli 
were coloured according to each individual's associations of colour with emotions. 
For example, an angry facial expression or word was coloured in the individual's most 
highly associated colour of ‘angry’ or in the least associated colour of ‘angry, 
depending on which condition he or she was assigned to. As many of the studies 
above used descriptions or facial expressions as the emotional stimuli (Boyatzis, 
Varghese, 1996; Collier, 1996; Hupka, et al., 1996; Terwogot et al., 1995; Wexner, 
1954; Zentner, 2001) the present study, accordingly, implemented both types of 
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stimuli in the colour-emotion association task as well as in the following memory 
tasks.  
 
With regard to the colour manipulation that was used in this investigation, colours 
were mostly varied in hue while keeping the measurements of brightness and 
saturation constant. Although many studies have shown that emotional reactions to 
brightness and saturation are stronger and more consistent than emotional reactions to 
hue, previous research (Garro, 1986, Mervis, Catlin & Rosch, 1975; Glynis 2002 
Davidoff & Ostergaard, 1984; Lucy & Shweder, 1979; Ridley, 1987) have also 
demonstrated that it is easier to name, communicate, remember and to form 
associations with certain colours (focal colours) compared with others (non-focal 
colours). This was found across speakers of languages with different colour naming 
systems (Heider, 1972). The supposition of universality of basic colour terms and 
their focal colours was first made by Berlin and Kay (1969). They prepared a 
rectangular array of Munsell colour chips and asked informants to choose a “focal 
colour” i.e., the best example of each colour. The informants were tested in their 
native language, including 20 different languages. The chosen focal colour chips (the 
best examples of English “black”, “white”, “red”, “yellow”, “green”, and “blue”) for 
each basic colour term were narrowly clustered regardless of the language the 
informant spoke. Thus these studies suggest that focal colours constitute a universal 
cognitive basis for both colour language and colour memory. Although there are 
number of studies that failed to replicate this advantage of focal colours (Lucy, 1997; 
Roberson, Davies & Davidoff, 2000; Roberson, Davidoff, Davies & Shapiro, 2005), 
there is in fact recent evidence for colour naming universals (Kay & Regier, 2003; 
Kuehni, 2005; Regier, Kay & Cook, 2005; MacLaury, 1997; Webster & Kay). 
Furthermore, psychophysically, particular hues of blue, red, yellow and green, are 
also considered as 'pure colours' or 'unique' in the sense that they seem to observers 
not to be tinted with any other colours (Hurvich & Jameson, 1957; Hering, 1964; 
Valberg, 2001). Using identical colour stimuli Miyahara (2003) have recently 
indicated high correspondence between focal colours and unique hues and concluded 
that these two concepts of colours are very similar.  
 
Focal colours appear to be salient for children as young as four months of age 
(Bornstein, 1975) and have specific colour-name labels (Mervis, Catlin & Rosch, 
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1975). Non-focal colours on the other hand take significantly longer to name, and 
may attract a variety of basic and non-basic terms (Brown & Lenneberg, 1954; Lantz 
& Steffire, 1964). For example, a colour near the category boundary between green 
and yellow might be trigger the verbal terms  'green', 'yellow', 'lime', 'turquoise' or by 
some other name. Thus, focal colours tend to be remembered more successfully than 
non-focal colours since the former could be remembered using a verbal recoding 
strategy (Davidoff & Ostergaard, 1984; Garro, 1986; Lucy & Shweder, 1979; Ridley, 
1987).  Similarly, since colour-emotion associations may also activate verbal 
representations of colour names, it may be argued that for memory purposes 
specifically, (unique or focal) hues may provide more beneficial information than the 
brightness or saturation of colour patches. Accordingly, in this dissertation I 
employed hues that were chosen to be close to the 'unique hues' or 'focal colours' in 
the sense that they were similar in their degree of lightness- not particularly bright or 
particularly dark. 
 
The next section will summarise the main hypotheses that this dissertation adheres to. 
This will be followed by a report on four experiments which, together, are designed to 
investigate the effect of colour on recognition memory of emotional information. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary of the study rationale and main 
hypotheses 
 
 
 
Individuals encounter a kaleidoscope of color in navigating daily life. 
Surprisingly, almost nothing is known at present regarding how the 
different colors that people perceive impact their affect, cognition, and 
behavior. We suspect that the influence of color on psychological 
functioning is as pervasive as it is subtle and provocative, and we urge 
other researchers to join us in adding color, literally and figuratively, 
to the scientific literature. Elliot et al. (2007) p.166. 
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4.1 Summary of the study rationale 
 
Despite considerable empirical support for the association between colours and 
emotions (Figure 4.1 b.), the effects of mood/emotion on memory (c.) and the 
contribution of colour to recognition memory (a.), a study that attempts to tie all the 
three main effects together is still missing (d.). This study will therefore investigate 
whether diagnostic colours of emotions will aid recognition memory for emotional 
information presented as facial expressions and words that reflect the six basic 
emotions: happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust and surprise (e.). If colour 
contributes at high-level cognitive processing and takes part in the memory 
representations of emotional information, and if the colour diagnosticity effect 
extends to emotional information, emotional stimuli presented in high diagnostic 
colours of emotions should be recognized better than emotional stimuli presented in 
low diagnostic colours or neutral information presented in either high or low 
diagnostic colours of emotions. However, if colour only contributes at a sensory, low-
level processing, then no differences should be evident between emotional stimuli 
coloured appropriately or emotional stimuli coloured inappropriately. 
 
Figure 4.1: An Illustration of the Study Rationale  
a. Colour                          Memory (objects, pictures, words, faces) 
b. Colour                          Emotion (e.g. six basic emotions) 
c. Mood/Emotion (vs. neutral)                        Memory 
 
d.                  Diagnostic Colour                                 Memory 
                                                                    a 
                         
                                              b                ???                     c 
                      
                                                         Emotion/mood 
 
 e. Diagnostic Colour                                 Recognition of emotional information  
                                            a+b+c 
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The question of whether diagnostic colours can enhance the recognition memory of 
emotions is inevitability contingent on whether colour can be identified as diagnostic 
of an emotion. Accordingly, Study 1 relied on the methodology used by Tanaka and 
Persenall (1999) to assess the colour diagnosticity of objects. Their feature listing task 
was applied specifically to the six basic emotions, in order to determine whether 
colour is a symptomatic feature of each of the six basic emotions (e.g. If anger was an 
object or something tangible that you can hold in your hands, how would you 
describe it or what would it look like? Give eight different perceptual features). 
Whereas many colour emotion association studies have used a version of the Colour 
Typicality Task on emotions (asking Which of the selected colours is most typical of a 
specific emotion?, is equivalent to asking, Which of the selected colours best 
represents a specific emotion?) to our knowledge no study to date has attempted to 
adjust the colour feature listing task (typically used for objects: e.g. Indicate which of 
the selected colours is the most typical of a target object.) to emotions. Thus, although 
many investigations attempted to address the link between colour and emotion in an 
associative manner only (as reviewed in Chapter 3) Study 1 of this dissertation aims 
to deal with the same issue on a deeper level by asking whether the revealed 
associations between the two types of stimuli (colour and emotion) are also diagnostic 
in nature. 
 
Considering the results from Study 1 which revealed colours as symptomatic of 
emotions and given the fact that the majority of the literature on colour and emotion 
associations does not support a high degree of consistency in associating the two 
types of information, particularly not as it is evident for colours and objects (that are 
high on colour diagnosticity),  Studies 2 and 3 continued to scrutinise the colour 
diagnosticity effect in short-term and long-term recognition memory of emotional 
information, respectively, while accounting for the variability in associating colours 
with emotions. Specifically, in each of the following experiments colour emotion 
associations will be used individually.  Thus, all emotional stimuli will be coloured 
for each subject individually, reflecting his or her own colour-emotion associations. 
Furthermore, the consistency in which each individual associate colours with 
emotions and its effect on recognition memory will be also measured. This 
investigation is therefore unique and powerful in two ways: it uses emotions as 
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stimuli for the investigation of colour diagnosticity effect on memory and it accounts 
for the individual differences in associating colours with emotions. However, the 
question of whether the individual consistency in associating colour with emotions 
impairs or improves recognition memory of diagnosticly coloured information has not 
been investigated at all for objects or emotional stimuli, thus there is no support of a 
hypothesis in a specific direction. Memory enhancement in both Study 1 and 2 was 
assessed by the use of the Signal Detection Theory (SDT) measures and Reaction 
Time. The SDT measures of ‘hits’, ‘false alarms’, ‘misses’ and ‘correct rejections’, 
specifically, enable the effect of sensitivity and response bias to be teased out from 
memory facilitation. 
 
In Study 3, an additional aim was added to the investigation of colour diagnosticity on 
recognition memory of emotional information, that is, to explore whether non-
diagnostic colours of emotions impair recognition memory relative to diagnostic and 
any other random colours. Consequently, the study used a retention interval of 1 week 
only and assigned subjects to an additional third colour condition in which the 
emotional stimuli were coloured in a random order. The question of whether non-
diagnostic colours of objects specifically impair recognition memory has not been 
investigated enough for objects and certainly no evidence exists for emotional stimuli, 
thus there is no support of a hypothesis in a specific direction. If non-diagnostic 
colours of emotions impair recognition memory of emotional information, then 
memory performance for stimuli coloured with the individual's low diagnostic colours 
of emotions should be significantly lower than for stimuli coloured randomly. 
However, if non-diagnostic colours of emotions do not impair recognition memory of 
emotional information, then memory performance for stimuli coloured with low 
diagnostic colours of emotions should not differ from stimuli coloured randomly. 
 
Finally, results from Studies 1, 2 and 3 together provide support for the theory of 
colour diagnosticity and its beneficial effect on recognition when using emotions as 
stimuli. Study 4 then used the naming Stroop paradigm as used by Klein (1967) and 
Naor et al., (2003) for object stimuli to further investigate whether colour plays a 
significant role, not only within the individual’s conceptual representations of objects, 
but also of their conceptual representations of basic emotions. Subjects' performance 
on all the different measurements used in the four studies was consistently assessed 
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for emotional information as well as for neutral information. Thus, any differences in 
performance between the two information types, emotion versus neutral, were the 
within-subjects-variables, whereas differences in performance as a result of the colour 
manipulation, low diagnostic, high diagnostic or random colours, were the between-
subjects-variables.  
 
4.2. Main hypotheses 
 
Relying on the large body of literature that was reviewed in the previous chapters, our 
main hypotheses are in line with prior studies’ conclusions.  
 
4.2.1 Study 1 - colour is a symptomatic feature of emotions (Hypothesis 1) 
 
Based on the large body of literature reviewed in Chapter 3 which demonstrates the 
relation between colour and emotions (e.g. Boyatzis & Varghese, 1996; Hemphill, 
1996; Valdez & Mehrabian, 1994; Zentner, 2001) it is expected that the findings will 
support the notion that colour, in general, is indeed a symptomatic feature of 
emotions. More specifically, by keeping the subjects naive to the studys' expectations 
and restricting them to using adjectives only, it is assumed that for most emotions 
colour features will be used at least once by the majority of subjects. Furthermore, 
colour-emotion associations that were found fairly stable across cultures (e.g. red and 
anger) may reveal a similar pattern of consistency with subjects using colour 
information in accordance with cross-cultural findings (e.g. Hupka et al., 1996) and in 
higher frequency for emotions with consistent colour associations than for emotions 
with inconsistent colour associations.  
 
4.2.2. Studies 2 and 3 - higher recognition memory for facial expressions and 
emotional words coloured in the individual's highly associated colours of emotions 
than for the individual's least associated colours of emotions (Hypothesis 2) 
 
Relying on the supporting evidence (e.g. Olivia & Schyns, 2000; Price & Humphreys, 
1989; Tanaka & Persenall, 1999; Wichmann, Sharpe & Gegefurtner, 2002) for 
memory enhancement of appropriately coloured objects (as discussed in Chapter 1) or 
objects high in colour diagnosticity (e.g. orange carrot, yellow sun) over 
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inappropriately coloured objects or objects low in colour-diagnosticity (e.g. violet 
strawberry, blue leaves) and considering the well-documented human tendency to 
associate colours with emotions (reviewed in Chapter 3), it is expected that memory 
performance will be better for emotional stimuli (words and facial expressions) high 
in colour diagnosticity than for emotional stimuli low in colour diagnosticity. 
Specifically, shorter response times, higher proportions of hits and lower proportions 
of false alarms are anticipated for emotional stimuli coloured with the individual’s 
high diagnostic colours of emotions (also referred to as appropriate colours) than for 
emotional stimuli coloured with the individual’s least diagnostic colours (also referred 
as inappropriate colours) of emotions. 
 
4.2.3 Studies 2 and 3 - the difference in memory between the two colour types (low 
and high diagnostic colours) should be greater for emotional stimuli than for neutral 
stimuli (Hypothesis 3) 
 
Based on the extensive body of research that indicates enhanced memory for 
emotional material over neutral material, it is expected that, overall, coloured 
emotional stimuli will be remembered better than coloured neutral stimuli. When the 
additional proposed relationship between colours and emotions is taken into 
consideration, it will be also expected that the contribution of high diagnostic colours 
to recognition memory of emotional stimuli will be more significant than the 
contribution of high diagnostic colours to recognition memory of neutral stimuli. This 
means that the difference in memory between appropriately coloured emotional 
stimuli and inappropriately coloured emotional stimuli will be significantly higher 
than the difference in memory between appropriately and inappropriately coloured 
neutral stimuli.  
 
4.2.4 Study 4 - shorter colour-naming times (Stroop task) for emotional words 
coloured with the individual's highly associated colours of emotions than for the 
individual's least associated colours of emotions (Hypothesis 4) 
 
A few studies previously used the Stroop paradigm to explore the question whether 
diagnostic (or natural) colours of certain objects play a substantial part in the 
conceptual representation of objects (Menard-Buteau & Cavanagh, 1984; Klein, 1964; 
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Naor-Raz, Tarr & Kersten, 2003). Their results mostly demonstrated faster mean 
response times for objects coloured in typical colours than for objects coloured in 
atypical colours. Since the present investigation, in fact, leans on the possibility that 
colours also play a notable role in the conceptual representation of emotions, the 
Stroop paradigm was used in Study 4 to empirically support or refute that possibility. 
Accordingly, mean response time for emotional stimuli coloured in the individual's 
high diagnostic colours of emotion are expected be faster than for emotional stimuli 
coloured in the individual's least diagnostic colours of emotion. 
 
4.2.5 Study 4 - The difference in naming ink colours (Stroop task) of emotional words 
coloured in the two types of colour (low and high diagnostic colours), separately, 
should be greater for emotional stimuli than for neutral stimuli (Hypothesis 5) 
 
Since colour information is mostly associated with emotional stimuli rather than 
neutral stimuli (e.g. Valdez & Mehrabian 1994; Terwogt & Hoeksma, 1995; Zentner, 
2001) the difference in naming ink colours of emotional words coloured in low and 
high diagnostic colours should be greater for emotional stimuli than for neutral 
stimuli. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagnostic colours of emotions 
  
 
74
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is the role of colour in the memory of 
emotions? 
Can colour be diagnostic for recognition 
memory of emotional information? 
Is colour diagnostic of emotions? 
Better memory 
for coloured 
emotional stimuli 
than for 
grayscale 
stimuli.* 
Experiment 1: 
The feature listing 
task 
H. 1 
Do diagnostic colours of emotions facilitate recognition 
memory of six basic emotions? 
Experiment 
2: Short-term 
recognition test 
H.2 & H.3 
Experiment 3: 
Long-term 
recognition test 
H.2 & H.3 
Does colour play a part in the conceptual representations of 
emotions?
Do non diagnostic 
colours of emotions 
impair recognition 
memory? Stimuli 
are coloured in a 
random colour. 
Experiment 4: 
Emotional-Semantic 
Stroop task 
H.4 & H.5 
Diagnostic colours of emotions 
  
 
75
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 1: 
 
The feature listing task as a test of colour 
diagnosticity of emotion 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Colour diagnosticity refers to the degree to which a colour is associated with, or 
symptomatic of, a particular stimulus (Tanaka & Persenall, 1999). The theory of 
colour diagnosticity has been studied previously by several researchers who used 
either objects or everyday scene information  to address the question whether colour 
can be diagnostic for recognition memory of these stimuli and, as such, will facilitate 
memory performance (Bedirman & Ju, 1988; Gegenfurtner & Rieger, 2000; Olivia & 
Schyns, 2000; Nagai & Yokosawa, 2003; Olivia & Schyns, 2005; Olivia & Torralba, 
2001; Tanaka & Persenall, 1999; Uttle et al., 2006; Vernon & Lloyd-Jones, 2003; 
Vailayan et al., 1998; Wichmann et al., 2002; Wurm et al., 1993). The findings 
reported from many of these studies are inconsistent in supporting the colour 
diagnosticity effect on recognition memory. Some have reported that memory indeed 
benefits from the colour diagnosticity of objects and scenes (Gegenfurtner & Rieger, 
2000; Olivia & Schyns, 2000; Nagai & Yokosawa, 2003; Olivia & Schyns, 2005; 
Olivia & Torralba, 2001; Tanaka & Persenall, 1999; Vernon & Lloyd-Jones, 2003; 
Wichmann et al., 2002) while others have demonstrated a null effect (Bedirman & Ju, 
1988; Ostergaard & Davidoff, 1985; Uttle et al., 2006). One explanation that has been 
suggested to account for such inconsistency concerns the different methods used to 
assess colour diagnosticity (Nagai & Yokosawa, 2003; Tanaka & Persenall, 1999). 
Researchers determined to explore the issue of colour diagnosticity and its 
contribution to memory have urged scientists to use rigorous, well controlled 
measurements of colour diagnosticity (Olivia & Scyns, 2000; Price & Humphreys, 
1989; Tanaka & Persenall, 1999; Wurm et al, 1993). Wurm et al., (1993), for 
example, recommended that a stimulus can be considered high in colour diagnosticity 
only if a specific colour is consistently mentioned as a perceptual feature and is also 
rated as a typical colour of the stimulus:  
 
… from an information-theory perspective, two factors determine 
whether colour is diagnostic of an object: The colour must be 
symptomatic of the object (e.g., "green" is a "symptom" of spinach), 
and not many other objects in the allowable domain should have the 
same colour. (p. 901) 
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Nevertheless, prior measurements of colour diagnosticity of objects were often 
assessed by one measure only, most often via the typicality test for colour 
diagnosticity, which normally requires participants to indicate the colour that they 
thought was the most typical of a target object (e.g. Biederman & Ju, 1988; Vernon & 
Lloyd-Jones, 2003; Uttle et al., 2006). In contrast, Tanaka and Persenall (1999) as 
well as Nagai and Yokosawa (2003) employed the feature listing task beside the 
typicality task. This task aims to identify colour as a typical perceptual feature of a 
certain object.  Both studies showed an enhancement effect of memory as a result of 
colour diagnosticity. Stimuli were considered high in colour diagnosticity only if the 
ratio of subjects' agreement of a typical colour was above 70% and the same colour 
was additionally mentioned more than 35% as a the first typical feature (Tanaka and 
Persenall (1999), though, set a higher baseline of 80%).  
 
Within our everyday environments there are objects that tend to occur naturally with a 
specific colour (e.g. red apple, yellow banana). The suggestion that colour is 
diagnostic of these objects is clearly justified. However, we are also quite familiar 
with the phenomenon of colour association with emotion - a phenomenon that has 
been well investigated scientifically (Barbiere, Vidal, Zellner, 2007; Boyatzis & 
Varghese, 1996; D'Andrade and Egan, 1974; Hemphill, 1996; Hupka, et al., 1997;  
Pecjak, 1970; Murray and Deabler, 1957; Osgood, 1960; Osgood, May & Miron, 
1975; Oyama, Tanaka & Haga, 1963; Terwogt & Hoeksma 1995; Valdez & 
Mehrabian, 1994; Wexner, 1954; Zentner, 2001). Many of these studies demonstrated 
that children as well as adults around the world tend to give emotional meaning to 
colours. Nevertheless, the question of whether colour can be diagnostic not only of 
objects but also of emotions has not been investigated. It can be argued, however, that 
many colour-emotion association studies have used some version of the colour 
typicality task on emotions. Asking participants for example: Which of the selected 
colours is most typical of a specific emotion? is not that much different from asking: 
Which of the selected colours best represent a specific emotions? There is no 
evidence, however, of any study that also attempted to apply the colour feature listing 
task to emotions. The purpose of this experiment, therefore, is to use the feature 
listing task to investigate whether colour associations with emotions are diagnostic. If 
colour is found as a symptomatic feature of emotions among the majority of 
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participants, it may have further implications for its significant role in the memory of 
emotional stimuli, similar to the memory enhancement effect that have been found 
previously with diagnostic colours of objects and natural scenes. Since colours do not 
occur naturally as surface colour of emotions, as they do for objects, this experiment 
set a lower baseline of high diagnosticity (20%) than the experiments of Tanaka and 
Presnell and Nagai and Yokosawa (2003). Contrary to studies that demonstrated 
colour diagnosticity of objects and were interested in the participants' agreement for 
the typicality of a specific colour of objects, this investigation is more interested in 
whether participants generally use colour information as a typical feature of emotions 
while having no awareness whatsoever of the substantial role of colour in the 
experiment.  
 
Consequently, based on the considerable previous support for the existence of colour-
emotion associations, it is predicted that colour information will be mentioned as a 
typical perceptual feature of emotions with more than 50% agreement in general and 
as the first mentioned with more than 20% agreement, in particular.  
 
 
5.2 METHOD 
 
Participants: The participants were 120 undergraduate students at The University of 
Sydney (79% women and 21% men, aged 18-53) with a reported range of 13-28 years 
of formal education who received either course credit or payment for their 
participation. One participant did not pass the Ishihara test for colour-blindness (1917) 
and was thus excluded from the data analysis. All other participants had normal 
colour vision (according to the Ishihara test for colour-blindness, 1917) and were 
tested individually.  
 
The feature-listing questionnaire: the questionnaire was designed according to 
Tanaka and Persenall's (1999) feature listing task (also used by Nagai & Yokosawa, 
2003) which originally assessed the level of colour diagnosticity of objects. The basic 
requirement was to list eight perceptual features associated with seven different 
emotions with the restriction that each feature should include one word only and 
preferably adjectives. For example, for the basic emotion 'anger' the feature-listing 
Diagnostic colours of emotions 
  
 
79
question was: If 'anger' was an object or something tangible, palpable that you can 
hold in your hands how would you describe it or what would it look like? Give eight 
different perceptual features. The questionnaire thus included seven similar questions 
for each of the six basic emotions as well as for a neutral emotion (anger, happiness, 
sadness, fear, surprise, disgust and neutral). The order of these seven questions was 
randomised for each participant. An example of a randomised questionnaire is given 
in the Appendix.  
 
Procedure and Apparatus: participants entered the lab individually and were told that 
the experiment was designed to discover the common associative features people may 
have with emotions. The questionnaire was displayed on a PC (personal computer) as 
a word document which allowed participants to type in their answers for each of the 
given questions. Each question had eight empty slots which participants were asked to 
fill out with their answers. Before entering their answers, each participant had five to 
ten minutes to read the basic instructions and the following seven feature-listing 
questions. Participants were also given time to ask questions or clarify any ambiguity 
regarding their answers. When needed, the experimenter gave an example of a 
possible answer which helped to clarify the restriction of using only a one word 
adjective as a perceptual feature. For instance, it was demonstrated that if one of the 
associative features that came to mind was the object 'knife', instead of typing in the 
noun 'knife', he/she could type the adjective 'sharp'. The participants were instructed 
to complete at least five out of the eight given slots of answers for each of the seven 
questions (emotions) and were given 30 to 40 minutes to do so. No participant was 
aware of the experiment’s full expectations or its hypothesis so that all types of 
answers that were in line with the given restrictions were acceptable as correct 
answers (e.g. shape and tactile information were also possible answers). On 
completion, participants were tested for colour blindness (according to the Ishihara 
test for colour-blindness, 1917) and were given a full debrief. 
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5.3 RESULTS 
 
Table 5.1 depicts the mean percentage of the total colour information that was listed 
as perceptual features for each of the seven emotions. The colour features that were 
mentioned by all participants were categorised into 15 different types of colour 
information. Table 2 demonstrates the mean percentage of the specific colour features 
given for each of the seven emotional categories.  The results shown in Table 5.1 
confirm the assumption that colour information is a symptomatic feature of emotions. 
As the table depicts, colour features were mentioned in 73% to 89% of the completed 
feature slots as possible perceptual features in each of the seven emotional feature-
listing questions. Furthermore, Figure 5.2 plots the order in which participants have 
mentioned colours as the perceptual feature of the seven emotional categories. The 
results from the colour feature order graph shown in Figure 5.2 reveal that the 
majority of the colour features that were mentioned for each emotional category were 
given either in the first or the second slots of perceptual features with a mean of 
52.65% across all the seven emotions. In contrast, only 10.27% of the total colour 
features were mentioned in the 6th to 8th slots of a given feature-listing question. 
Regression analysis revealed a significant correlation of -0.916 between the 
percentage of colour details given for each emotional category and the position 
(location of slots), (p = 0.000, R2 = 0.839).  Together, these two patterns of results 
support the hypothesis that colour features are prioritised over other perceptual 
features which characterise emotions and are thus mentioned generally in more than 
50% of cases and as a first mention in more than 20% of cases. 
 
The highest percentage of colour features mentioned by the participants was for the 
emotion 'happiness' (89.92%) followed by 'sadness' (87.71%) and 'surprise' (85.71%). 
Colour information was also mentioned quite often (80.68%) as a possible feature of 
the neutral (non-emotional) category which may imply that emotional information is 
not different from non-emotional information in colour diagnosticity. Nevertheless, 
Table 5.3 clearly reveals that the specific type of colour information mentioned as 
perceptual features for the neutral category mostly involves achromatic information as 
white (34.92% of the colour features), colourless/transparent (22.22% of the colour 
features) and grey/silver (15.87% of the colour features). On the other hand, colour 
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information mentioned as a perceptual feature of the six basic emotions tends to 
include more chromatic colour information than the features of the neutral category. 
The colour perceptual features of the emotions 'anger', 'happiness', 'sadness' and 
'disgust', for example, included the colours: red in 66.66% of the cases, yellow in 
21.2% of the cases, blue in 25.5% of the cases and 'green' in 23.33% of the cases, 
respectively. Thus, although Table 5.1 shows that, in general, colour information is 
equally symptomatic of emotions and non-emotions, Table 5.3 demonstrates that 
chromatic colour information specifically is symptomatic of emotions. Finally, the 
data also emphasis the high level of variability in associating specific colours with 
specific emotions as demonstrated by the fact that no particular colour, except for the 
colour red, was mentioned in more than 50% of the cases as a possible perceptual 
feature of any particular emotional category (see Table 5.3). The colour features 
'bright' and 'dark', however, were mentioned more frequently than any other colour 
feature for the basic emotions 'fear', 'surprise' 'happiness' and 'sadness' with a mean of 
32.63% agreement.  
 
 
 
Table 5.1: Mean % of the total colour features given for each emotional category in 
the feature-listing questionnaire. 
 
 Anger Fear Surprise Happiness Sadness Disgust Neutral 
Mean % 
of Colour 
Features 
78.15 73.11 85.71 89.71 87.39 78.99 80.68 
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Figure 5.2: Mean % of colour information mentioned for each slot and for each 
emotion in the feature-listing questionnaire. 
 
Table 5.3: Mean % of the specific colour features given for each emotional category 
in the feature-listing questionnaire. 
 Anger Fear Surprise Happiness Sadness Disgust Neutral 
Yellow 1.87 0 14.11 21.2 0 4.17 0 
Red 66.66 3.64 6.13 5.43 0.67 5.83 1.59 
Blue 0.9 15.45 1.22 5.43 25.5 0.83 6.35 
Green 0 3.34 3.07 3.26 2.68 23.33 1.59 
Brown 0 0.91 0.61 0 0 19.17 4.76 
Orange 1.85 0 6.14 3.8 0 4.15 0 
Pink 0 0 5.52 5.43 0 0 1.59 
Purple 0 2.72 1.22 0.54 1.34 2.5 0 
Black 6.48 20 0 0 16.2 15 2.38 
White 0.93 3.64 0.63 2.72 0 0 34.92 
Grey/Silver 0 15.45 0 0 20.13 12.5 15.87 
Bright 5.57 2.27 39.88 35.87 1.34 1.66 7.94 
Dark 15.74 24.56 0 0 30.2 10 0.79 
Colourful  
e.g. 'rainbow 
colours' 
0 0.91 21.47 15.78 0.65 0.86 0 
Colourless/ 
Transparent 
0 6.36 0 0.54 1.32 0 22.22 
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5.4 DISCUSSION 
 
The findings clearly confirm the hypothesis that colour is a symptomatic feature of 
emotions. Without any awareness of the experiment's objectives and expectations, 
participants consistently chose to use colour information as a perceptual feature of six 
basic emotions: happiness, anger, sadness, disgust, fear and surprise (81.92% on 
average). This was also true for the non-emotional, neutral category. However, the 
specific type of colour information mentioned for the non-emotional category was 
consistently different from the type of colour information used for the six basic 
emotions. The findings show that participants have used chromatic colour information 
such as red, yellow and blue as symptomatic features of the six emotional categories 
and achromatic colour information such as grey, white and transparent as 
symptomatic features of the neutral category.  
 
The findings further demonstrate that the colour features of each emotion were 
consistently mentioned as either the first or the second feature from a list of eight 
possible perceptual features (see Figure 5.2). The fact that colour information was 
used so often (in 81.92% of the total given features), and appeared mostly as the first 
or as the second feature, strongly emphasises the close associative relationship colours 
share with emotions. The findings are therefore in line with the numerous studies 
which showed that people readily associate colours with emotions or commonly have 
emotional meanings for colours (e.g. Barbiere, Vidal, Zellner, 2007; Boyatzis & 
Varghese, 1996; Hupka, et al., 1997; Zentner, 2001). The specific colour features 
mentioned for the seven different emotions, as shown in Table 5.3, reveal two 
additional patterns of results that are also consistent with prior colour and emotion 
studies. The first concerns the level of variability in which participants associate 
colours with emotions (Oyama, Tanaka & Haga, 1963; Hupka, et al., 1997) and the 
second relates to the findings that emotions tend to be closely related to the 
measurements of brightness of a colour rather than to its hue (Barbiere, Vidal, Zellner, 
2007; Boyatzis & Varghese, 1996; Valdez & Mehrabian, 1994). The first pattern of 
results is evident by the fact that participants provided 15 different types of colour 
features (as shown in Table 5.3) and that among the 15 colour categories, no specific 
hue (except for red) was mentioned in the majority of the total given colour features 
(above 50% of total agreement). This is clearly in line with the documented tendency 
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to associate colours with emotions in a fairly inconsistent, varied pattern (as discussed 
in Chapter 3). Furthermore, a close look at the specific colour features mentioned for 
each emotion reveals that the colour features 'bright' and 'dark' are either the most or 
second most mentioned colour features for the majority of emotions. For example, for 
the emotions 'fear', 'surprise', 'happiness' and 'sadness' these colour features were 
mentioned more often than any other colour features with a mean of 32.62% of the 
total colour features mentioned for these emotions. Another interesting result that fits 
with other studies' findings is the unique and high consistency level of mentioning the 
colour red as a perceptual feature of the emotion 'anger'. As shown in Table 5.3, for 
the emotion 'anger' alone, no other colour feature has received a similar percentage of 
agreement and, among the seven emotions, no other emotion has received the colour 
feature red with such great agreement. Again, this stresses the unique or even the 
innate association of the colour red with the emotion 'anger' (Hupka et al., 1997; 
Wexner, 1954). 
 
In conclusion, the present investigation has succeeded in revealing similar patterns of 
results to those found previously, although from a slightly different angle. Without the 
necessity to specifically use colour information, participants consistently defined and 
described emotions by using colour features more often than any other perceptual 
features (e.g. shape or tactile information). Thus, it seems that people not only have 
meaningful and emotional associations with colours but may also tend to define or 
even experience their emotions through the use or the experience of colours. In other 
words, the present experiment has found support for the notion that colour is not only 
diagnostic of objects and everyday scenes (Gegenfurtner & Rieger, 2000; Olivia & 
Schyns, 2000; Nagai & Yokosawa, 2003; Olivia & Schyns, 2005; Olivia & Torralba, 
2001; Tanaka & Persenall, 1999; Vernon & Lloyd-Jones, 2003; Wichmann et al., 
2002) but is also diagnostic of emotions.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXPERIMENTS 2 and 3: 
 
Colour diagnosticity in recognition memory of 
emotions  
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In Experiment 1 it was demonstrated that colour is a symptomatic or diagnostic feature 
of emotions. One possible implication of these findings is that individuals may not only 
give emotional meanings to colours, and thus can easily make associations between the 
two types of information (e.g. Barbiere, Vidal & Zellner, 2007; Boyatzis & Varghese, 
1996; Hupka, et al., 1997; Zentner, 2001), but they may also use colour information to 
aid cognitive processes that involve their emotions. Indeed, many scientific studies 
have been devoted to the investigation of whether colour plays a beneficial role in the 
memory of many types of stimulus. Objects, faces, natural scenes and line drawings are 
just a few examples of these stimuli (e.g. Olivia & Schyns, 2000; Latimer et al., 2002; 
Wichmann, Sharpe & Gegefurtner, 2002). In many cases, studies which compared 
recognition memory for coloured over grayscale stimuli resulted in a common 
conclusion - that colour is a powerful tool for recognition memory enhancement 
(Ostergaard & Davidoff, 1985; Price & Humphreys, 1989; Intraub & Nicklos, 1985; 
Homa & Viera, 1988; Park & Mason, 1982; Suzuki & Takahashi 1997; Olivia & 
Schyns, 2000; Latimer et al., 2002; Wichmann, Sharpe & Gegenfurtner, 2002). A few 
other investigations, however, failed to show any effect of colour on memory 
performance (Biederman & Ju, 1988; Davidoff & Ostergaard, 1988; Ostergaard & 
Davidoff, 1985). Some studies suggested only a low-level contribution of colour to 
recognition memory (Mollon & Jordan, 1998; Polyak, 1975; Walls, 1972; Gegenfurtner 
& Rieger, 2000) but many others have shown that colour can also contribute at a higher 
level of visual processing (Wichmann, Sharpe & Gegefurtner, 2002; Olivia & Schyns, 
2000; Tanaka & Persnell, 1999; Mapelli & Behrmann, 1997; Humphreys, Goodale, 
Jakobson & Servos, 1994; Price & Humphreys, 1989). For example, at the lower level, 
Mollon & Jordan (1998) found that colour plays a highly specialised role in some 
image segmentation tasks (e.g. detecting ripe fruit among mature foliage) and 
Gegenfurtner & Rieger (2000) revealed a recognition memory advantage of colour cues 
for very brief presentations (16ms) even when they were tested in black and white. At a 
higher level, Humphreys et al., (1994) showed that people with impaired object 
recognition abilities benefit from colour information and that the performance of 
normal observers is higher for coloured stimuli only when objects are presented in their 
natural colour. Thus, the literature does provide evidence that colour is part of our 
recognition memory as it boosts our ability to remember things faster and better. A 
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critical question, then, is whether this superiority effect of colour on memory appears 
with all kinds of stimuli, particularly emotions. To date, no study has been conducted to 
validate or refute this suggestion. In empirical research conducted by the author in 2003 
(henceforth referred to as the ‘2003 Study’) as part of fulfilment of the Graduate 
Diploma in Science (Psychology), this question was addressed and resulted in further 
evidence for the superiority effect of colour on memory. A beneficial effect of colour 
on recognition memory was found when using emotional information (emotive words 
and facial expressions) representing the six basic emotions: happy, sad, angry, disgust, 
fear and surprise. According to the findings of the 2003 Study, participants performed 
significantly better when asked to recognise faces and words initially presented with 
colours as opposed to emotional information originally presented in a greyscale (with 
no colour). This prominent role of colour was manifested even after a one week 
retention interval and when colours were available only during induction. Participants 
were slower but more accurate when recognising facial expressions than emotional 
words. A higher percentage of accurate responses was obtained for pleasant (happy 
words and happy facial expressions) versus unpleasant emotions (which include all the 
sad, angry, fear and disgust stimuli). Colour was found particularly advantageous for 
recognition memory of unpleasant emotions and facial expressions but no evidence was 
elicited to support the theory of colour-diagnosticity. Diagnostic colours of emotions 
were based on the colour and emotion associations of a pilot study of 26 participants 
and were generalised to a sample of 120 participants in the memory experiment. The 
participants were assigned randomly to three colour conditions which presented the 
emotional stimuli coloured (a) in the most frequently associated colour of emotion 
(appropriate condition), (b) in the least associated colour (inappropriate condition) or 
(c) in grayscale (grayscale condition). Studies that previously tested the colour 
diagnosticity theory on recognition memory of objects and everyday scenes 
(Wichmann, Sharpe & Gegefurtner, 2002; Olivia & Schyns, 2000; Tanaka & Persnell, 
1999; Mapelli & Behrmann, 1997; Humphreys, Goodale, Jakobson & Servos, 1994; 
Price & Humphreys, 1989) claimed that colour information would affect recognition of 
stimuli high in colour diagnosticity (e.g. orange carrot, yellow sun) but not those low in 
colour diagnosticity (e.g. pink carrot, brown sky). Neuropsychological research 
provides further evidence that the neural correlates of typical and untypical coloured 
stimuli are distinct (Luzzatti & Davidoff, 1994; Zeki & Marini, 1998). Typical colours 
of objects (e.g. red strawberries) activate the fusiform gyrus, hippocampus and 
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ventrolateral portion of the frontal cortex - brain areas that are also involved during the 
performance of object colour-knowledge tasks (e.g. responding 'red' to a picture of red 
strawberries). In comparison, objects coloured atypically activated the dorsolateral 
region of the frontal cortex.  
 
The 2003 Study showed that colour assists to recognition memory of emotional 
stimuli, as is evident from the significantly higher performance in the two colour 
conditions compared to the grayscale condition. However, differences in recognition 
memory between the two colour groups (high diagnostic/appropriate colours of 
emotions versus low diagnostic/inappropriate colours of emotions) were not 
significant. Thus, participants did not perform better when the emotional stimuli 
presented were coloured appropriately than when they were coloured inappropriately. 
This null effect of colour diagnosticity could be a result of generalising colour 
emotion association when these associations are in fact quite individual. The colour 
and emotion associations demonstrated in the 2003 Study revealed a high degree of 
variability with regard to mapping of the appropriate (best associated) versus 
inappropriate (least associated) colours of the stimuli - a pattern of result that also fits 
with prior findings (Wexner, 1954; Valdez & Mehrabian, 1994; Boyatzis & Varghese, 
1996; Hemphill, 1996; Burkitt, Barrett & Davis, 2003; Hupka, et al., 1997). These 
previous studies showed that colour diagnosticity is influenced by the degree of 
consistency between the stimulus to be remembered and its associative/diagnostic 
colour. These findings have raised the need to use an individual (rather than a 
general) colour-emotion association to enable control of the extensive individual 
differences of colour and emotion associations found in the literature. Consequently, 
the two experiments reported in this chapter utilise individual colour-emotion 
associations in the investigation of whether or not colour can be diagnostic to 
recognition memory of emotions. In doing so, this investigation expands on the 
previous studies that scrutinised the effect of colour diagnosticity on recognition 
memory of various types of stimulus (e.g. Tanaka & Persenall, 1999; Wichmann, et 
al., 2002; Wurn et al., 1993) by using emotional stimuli, individual colour-emotion 
associations and a comparison within-subject condition of neutral, non-emotional 
stimuli.  
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Given that colour diagnosticity is the degree to which colour is symptomatic of a 
particular stimulus, and that Experiment 1 of this dissertation provides some support 
that colour can be diagnostic of emotions the following experiments specifically focus 
on the role diagnostic colours of emotion have in recognition memory of emotional 
words and facial expressions. The experiments are thus designed to investigate 
whether high diagnostic colours of emotions will facilitate recognition memory of 
emotions more significantly than low diagnostic colours of emotions. As postulated 
before, it is expected that there will be better recognition performance for 
presentations coloured with high diagnostic colours of emotion (appropriate colours 
of emotions) than for presentations coloured with low diagnostic colours of emotions 
(inappropriate colours of emotion). 
 
Finally, since only emotional information was used in the 2003 Study, an additional 
aim of the present study is to investigate the comparable contributing effect that 
colours may have on recognition memory of emotional information over neutral 
information. Consequently, a ‘neutral emotion category’ in addition to the six basic 
emotions was added to the within-subjects variable (neutral facial expressions and 
neutral words). Amygdala activation during encoding of emotional information may 
provide a mechanism by which emotional information is remembered significantly 
better than neutral stimuli (Hamann et al., 1999; Heuer & Reisgerg, 1990; Dewhurst 
& Parry, 2000, Fox, Lester, Russo, Bowels, Pichler & Dutton, 2000). Doerksen and 
Shimamura, (2000) have further argued that memory for contextual information (e.g. 
colour of clothing, background details, etc) is also enhanced by emotional stimuli 
(pleasant and unpleasant words) as source memory for the associated colour was 
enhanced for these particular stimuli. More recently, Kensinger and Corkin (2003) 
found support for a quantitative (better memory performance) as well as qualitative 
(details of presentations) memory benefit for emotional words compared to neutral 
words.  
 
Accordingly, the present investigation further hypothesised that, overall, better 
recognition performance will be shown for the emotional presentations than for the 
neutral ones. With the specific contribution effect of colour diagnosticity on memory 
it is also expected that an interaction effect will be revealed as significant. That is, the 
difference in memory between high diagnostic colours of emotions and low diagnostic 
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colours of emotions is expected to be significantly higher than the difference in 
memory between high diagnostic colours of neutral stimuli and low diagnostic 
colours of neutral stimuli. Thus, the contribution to recognition memory as a result of 
colour diagnosticity should be more significant for emotional stimuli than for neutral 
stimuli.  
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6.2 EXPERIMENT 2: Colour diagnosticity for short-term recognition 
memory of emotional information 
6.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of this experiment was to investigate the role diagnostic colours of 
emotions have on recognition memory - whether high diagnostic colours of emotions 
(Appropriate condition) indeed induce better memory performance than low 
diagnostic colours of emotions (Inappropriate condition). Accordingly, Experiment 1 
had a four-factor (2 x 2 x 2 x 7) design: 2 Colour Conditions 
(Appropriate/Inappropriate) x Consistency (Consistent/Non-Consistent) x 2 Stimulus 
Type (Words/Faces) x 7 Emotion Categories (Six Basic Emotions/Neutral). The first 
hypothesis was that participants would be more sensitive and accurate when 
recognising information coloured with high diagnostic colours of emotions 
(appropriately coloured stimuli) than information coloured with low diagnostic 
colours of emotions (inappropriately coloured stimuli). A second objective was to 
evaluate the degree to which colours specifically affect recognition memory of 
emotion. Since previous research has demonstrated that emotional information is 
remembered significantly better than neutral stimuli, the second hypothesis was of an 
interaction such that differences in memory performance between high and low 
diagnostic colour conditions would be higher for the emotional presentations than for 
the neutral ones.  
 
6.2.2 METHOD 
 
Participants: The participants were 112 undergraduate students at The University of 
Sydney (82% women and 18% men aged 18-35) with a reported range of 13-21 years 
of formal education who received course credit for their participation and were 
randomly allocated to six experimental groups. All had normal colour vision 
(according to the Ishihara test for colour-blindness, 1917) and were tested in groups of 
4-6 participants.  
Stimuli: All emotional stimuli (words and facial expressions) were taken from the 
2003 Study and their selection procedure is described below. Since neutral (non-
emotional) stimuli were added to the collection of emotional stimuli there were 84 
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stimuli comprising 42 words and 42 faces - six words and six faces for each of the 
seven emotional categories.  
Six basic emotions - the emotions involved were the six basic emotions as defined by 
Ekman and Friesen (1975): anger, happiness, sadness, fear, surprise and disgust which 
are considered to have distinctive facial expressions. An additional non-emotional, 
neutral category was included as a comparable within-participants condition to the six 
basic emotions.  
Emotional words - as part of the 2003 Study, a pool of 36 emotional words was 
collected for each basic emotion by using a Microsoft Office Word 2003 'thesaurus' 
computer tool. The words obtained were matched with respect to word frequency 
norms (Kucera & Francis Corpus, 1967). All were low-frequency words (1-2 times 
per million) and consisted of six to nine letters. A pilot study of 15 subjects agreed 
upon their match to six different emotional groups of basic emotions (with an average 
agreement range of 88% - 97%, see Appendix). Six additional neutral words were 
selected in a similar manner to that of the emotional words and received an average 
agreement of 92% as judged by nine judges (see Appendix).    
Faces - A set of 36 emotional faces was collected from a web source - MacArthur 
Face Stimuli - to represent the six emotions. Six different faces were matched to each 
emotion category according to the Ekman and Friesen (1975, pp. 34-128) 
classification of facial expressions.  
Colours - Seven different colours were chosen according to Wexner’s (1954) verbal 
association of colours and mood-tone. These were blue, red, yellow, orange, brown, 
green and purple. An additional grey colour was also included to correspond with the 
inclusion of the neutral condition. All colours were manipulated such that their 
saturation and luminance were as similar as possible. 
Colour-Emotion Association Questionnaire - to assess the participants’ individual 
colour and emotion associations, a webpage questionnaire was created 
(www.adizohar.com/navit) to allow participants to demonstrate their colour-emotion 
associations at their own pace. Experiment 3 required the participants to return to the 
lab after one week, allowing participants to complete the questionnaire at home and 
thus reduce possible drop out rates. The questionnaire instructed participants to click 
on the one colour that best represents a specific basic emotion, then the one colour 
that worst represents the same emotion. The emotions involved were the six basic 
emotions and a neutral, non-emotional category. For each emotional category, the 
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words (e.g. ‘angry’, ‘happiness’ etc) and a representative facial expression appeared 
together on a separate page. The word ‘neutral’ and a neutral facial expression 
represents the seventh neutral category. Colours were the seven colours used in the 
2003 Study (blue, red, yellow, orange, brown, green and purple) with the addition of 
grey to parallel the addition of the neutral category. All colours had the same 
measures of brightness and saturation as those presented in the actual experiment. 
High diagnostic colours of emotions (Appropriate condition) represented the seven 
colours (which need not be always different colours) a participant had chosen to best 
represent the seven different emotional categories. Similarly, low diagnostic colours 
of emotions signify the colours (which also need not be different colours) each 
participant had chosen to worst represent the seven different emotions (Inappropriate 
condition).  
Experimental stimuli - Words and face size, stimulus background size, level of 
contrast (ranging from 0.004-0.42) and measures of colour (brightness, saturation and 
luminance) were constructed and presented by SuperCard 10.4 software. All faces 
stimuli (280mm x 280mm) were coloured and presented on a background (400mm x 
320mm) coloured with the individual low or high diagnostic colour of emotion, 
depending on the colour-emotion association questionnaire results. All word stimuli 
(240mm x 60mm) were coloured with the low or high diagnostic colour of emotion 
according to the results from the colour-emotion association questionnaire. Word 
backgrounds were coloured grey except for cases in which the colour grey was part of 
the participant’s colour-emotion associations (e.g. grey was chosen to best represent 
the emotion sad or to worst represent the emotion happy). In these cases, word 
backgrounds were coloured white to keep the contrast level at each presentation in the 
standardised range. Half of the total 84 stimuli were used as test stimuli and the 
remainders were the distractors. Both sets of stimuli had an equal amount of words 
and faces stimuli (24 words and 24 faces in each set). Retention intervals of 15 
minutes and one week were used in Experiment 2 and in Experiment 3, respectively. 
In both experiments, participants were randomly assigned to each of the colour 
groups: high diagnostic colours (appropriate colours), low diagnostic colours 
(inappropriate colours) and random colours (in Experiment 3 only). 
Apparatus: The experiment was run using SuperCard software on a Macintosh 
monitor. Stimuli were viewed on screen at a distance of 60 cm, face stimuli subtended 
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26.6 x 33.7 degrees of visual angle and word stimuli subtended 21.8 x 5.7 degrees of 
visual angel.  
Procedure: Before arriving at the experiment, participants completed the colour-
emotion web questionnaire twice (without knowing about the second completion in 
advance). Via email, participants' were first instructed to submit their results seven 
days before their experiment participation and then one to two days before their 
arrival they were contacted again to submit their second results. Consequently, all the 
participants first submissions were received five to seven days before their actual 
participation and all the second submissions were received the day before or on the 
same day of their participation. The level of participants’ consistency in associating 
colour with emotion was determined by the similarities between the first and the 
second completions. Participants who had at least 5 out of 7 different colour-emotion 
associations similar were defined as consistent in their ability to associate colours 
with emotions (their level of consistency was 71 % or more, based on a rough median 
split). Participants who had 4 or less different colour-emotion associations similar 
were defined as non-consistent in their ability to associate colours with emotions 
(their level of consistency was 57 % or less, based on a rough median split). In the 
consistent group those who were more consistent with colours that best represent 
emotion were assigned to the high diagnostic colours (of emotion) condition which is 
also called the Appropriate (colour of emotion) condition. Conversely, those who 
were more consistent with colours that worst represented the seven different emotion 
categories were assigned to the low diagnostic colour (of emotion) condition, also 
called the Inappropriate (colour of emotion) condition (see Table 6.1). Since 
participants were much more consistent with the appropriate colours of emotions than 
with the inappropriate colours, those who were consistent with both types of 
association were assigned to the inappropriate condition (about 40% of the 
participants in this condition). Non-consistent participants were assigned to the two 
experimental conditions (Appropriate versus Inappropriate) randomly (see Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1: Sample size per cell for the between subject design (Experiment 2). 
 Consistent  Non-Consistent Total 
Appropriate n = 36 n = 20 N = 56 
Inappropriate n = 36 n = 20 N = 56 
Total  n = 72 n = 40 N = 112 
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The stimulus presentation program allowed the researcher to adjust the colour 
presentations, from one participant to another, by entering the last participant’s 
colour-emotion association details prior to their participation. On arrival, each 
participant was asked to sit next to the computer screen which comprised his/her 
individual colour choices. In the induction phase, participants were instructed to view 
the stimuli as they appeared on the screen. Stimuli included three words and three 
faces from each set of emotive stimuli as well as three words and three faces from the 
neutral stimuli (42 stimuli overall) presented in a random order. If a participant was 
assigned to the Appropriate colour condition, he/she was presented with words 
coloured with the colours the participant chose to best represent the seven emotional 
categories and with faces background coloured with the same colours (see Figures 6.3 
and 6.4). However if a participant was assigned to the Inappropriate colour condition, 
his/her words and facial expression presentations were coloured with the colours that 
were chosen to worst represent the seven emotional categories (see Figures 6.5 and 
6.6).  
 
Following the induction phase participants were asked to complete a filler task, a 
paper copy of a MENSA intelligence test, for 15 minutes and then to immediately 
continue to the next experimental phase - retrieval. In the retrieval phase there were a 
total of 84 stimuli (which included the 42 induction stimuli and an additional 42 
distractors). For each participant all stimuli were coloured with the same colours that 
were presented in the induction phase. For example, those who were presented with 
the set of appropriate colours of emotions were also tested with the same appropriate 
colours and those who were presented with the set of inappropriate colour of emotions 
were tested with the same inappropriate colours.  Participants were instructed to 
recognise the original emotional stimuli as accurately and quickly as possible by 
pressing different counterbalanced screen buttons for ‘I recognise’ and ‘I don’t 
recognise’. Stimulus presentation time during both the induction and retrieval phases 
was four seconds per stimulus with a ‘white blank’ interval of 2 seconds between each 
stimulus (see Figures 6.7 and 6.8). Each subject was presented with a different 
random sequence of stimuli in both of the experimental phases. Before leaving the lab 
participants were debriefed and able to ask questions.  
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Figures 6.3 and 6.4: Example of the two stimulus types as they appear in the 
induction-appropriate colour and test-appropriate colour conditions 
(Experiment 2 and 3). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Word presentations for                Figure 6.4:  Face presentations for  
participants who chose orange as an                participants who chose red as an  
appropriate colour for ‘happy’.                appropriate colour for ‘angry’.     
               
 
 
 
Figures 6.5 and 6.6: Example of the two stimuli types as they appear in the 
induction-inappropriate colour and test-inappropriate colour conditions.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Word presentations for                       Figure 6.6:  Face presentations for 
participants who chose purple as an                         participants who chose blue a 
inappropriate colour for ‘happy’.                             an inappropriate colour for ‘angry’.                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
gleeful 
gleeful  
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Figure 6.7: Example of an induction trial (Experiment 2 and 3) 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                   2  seconds - white blank 
                                                                                                                                                   
                                                                    4 seconds- emotional face (or word)                                           
                                                                   on two sets of experimental conditions:  
                                                                   app-colour, inapp-colour (in random order) 
 
                                                                  2 seconds - white blank 
  
 
 
 
 
 Figure 6.8: Example of a test trial (Experiment 2 and 3) 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                           2 seconds - white blank 
                                                                                                                                                   
                                                                          4 seconds- emotional word (or face)                                     
                                                                     on three sets of test conditions: app-colour, 
                                                                     inapp-colour (in random order). 
                                                                      
                                                                   2 seconds - white blank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
gleeful
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6.2.3 RESULTS 
 
Experiment 2 hypotheses were tested by analysis of variance with a significance level 
of 0.05. Figure 6.9 depicts the mean percentage correct recognition for the between 
subject variables 2 (Appropriate and Inappropriate) x 2 (Consistent and Non- 
Consistent). Figure 6.12 sets out the mean percentage correct recognition for the 
within subject variables 2 (Emotional and Neutral) x 2 (Words and Faces). Results 
showed significant differences between the Appropriate and Inappropriate 
experimental conditions. Regardless of consistency level, participants’ correct 
responses were significantly higher when stimuli were coloured with the appropriate 
colours of emotions than when they were presented with inappropriate colours of 
emotions F(1,110) = 7.353, p = 0.008. The interaction effect of the colour conditions 
and consistency level was not significant F (3, 108) = 1.804, p = 0.151.  
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Figure 6.9: Mean percentage correct recognition for Appropriate versus Inappropriate 
presentations as a function of consistency level (Experiment 2).  
 
In addition to calculating the % of correct responses, we applied SDT to measure d-
prime for each of the two factors (consistent vs. non consistent). Figures 6.10 and 6.11 
show that not only did participants have significantly higher correct responses in the 
Appropriate colour condition than in the Inappropriate colour condition but also that 
participants were more sensitive in discriminating between ‘old’ and ‘new’ stimuli 
(faces or words) when the stimuli were presented with appropriate rather than 
inappropriate colours of emotion F(1,110) = 6.181, p = 0.014. No significant bias 
effect among the between variable conditions was found F(1,110) = 1.942, p = 0.166) 
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as β values were nearly consistent among all groups (see Figure 6.11). That is, 
participants consistently used a conservative recognition approach to decide whether 
to reject or accept a stimulus, thereby reducing false alarms. 
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Figure 6.10: d’ values as a function of colour condition and level of consistency 
(Experiment 2).  
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Figure 6.11: Bias (β) in recognition memory performance as a function of 
experimental condition (Experiment 2).  
 
An ANOVA also confirmed the expectation for an interaction effect (F (3, 220) = 
4.204, p = 0.006) between the Stimulus Type (Emotion vs. Neutral) and the Colour 
conditions (Appropriate vs. Inappropriate). Figure 6.12 plots the mean percentage of 
correct responses in each of the experimental conditions. As the figure shows, the 
differences in recognition memory between the two colour conditions (Appropriate 
vs. Inappropriate) were significant only for emotional stimuli, F(1, 110) = 8.168, p = 
0.005, but not for neutral stimuli, F(1, 110) = 0.149, p = 0.7. The measures of d’ 
(Figure 6.13) and  β also revealed a similar finding. Participants were significantly 
more sensitive to emotional stimuli coloured with the individual's high diagnostic 
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colours of emotions F(1,110) = 6.366, p = 0.013 than when they were presented with 
low diagnostic colours of emotions (in these presentations β measures were only 
marginally significant F(1, 110) = 3.787, p = 0.54). This sensitivity in discriminating 
'old' stimuli from 'new' stimuli, as well as the memory facilitation, did not appear 
when participants viewed the set of neutral stimuli F(1, 110) = 0.045, p = 0.832 (β 
measures were also non-significant F(1, 110) = 0.74, p = 0.392).  
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Figure 6.12: Mean percentage correct recognition as a function of stimulus type and 
colour Condition (Experiment 2).  
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Figure 6.13: d’ values as a function of colour condition and stimulus type (Experiment 
2). 
 
Finally, Figure 6.14 depicts the mean percentage of correct recognition for the four 
different stimulus types used in the experiment as the within-participants variables, 2 
(Emotion vs. Neutral) x 2 (Words vs. Faces). The findings shown in Figure 6.14 
disclose a peculiar and unexpected pattern of results. Specific interaction effects 
between stimulus type (words/faces) and stimulus category (emotion/neutral) revealed 
that unlike other experimental conditions, participants performed extremely well 
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when recognising neutral words from a set of distractors F(1, 222) = 168.25, p = 
0.000 (see Figure 6.14). However, participants performed significantly better when 
they were presented with emotional facial expressions than when presented with 
neutral facial expressions F(1, 222) = 5.24, p = 0.023. Reaction time data tested by 
analysis of variance indicated no significant findings (see Figure 6.15). Participants 
responded with similar decision times across all the experimental conditions.   
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Figure 6.14: Mean percentage correct recognition for emotional versus neutral 
information as function of stimulus type (Experiment 2). 
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Figure 6.15: Mean reaction time as a function of stimulus type and colour conditions 
(Experiment 2). 
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6.2.4 DISCUSSION 
 
The presence of diagnostic colours of emotions (or the individual's highly associated 
colour with emotion) aid performance in a short-term recognition memory task. The 
findings of Experiment 2 give strong affirmative answers to both of the experimental 
hypotheses and thus expand on previous findings in showing that emotional stimuli, 
like other stimulus types (objects, everyday scenes), can also benefit from the use of 
diagnostic colours in recognition memory tasks. Overall, the participants' performance 
was significantly improved when they were presented with emotional stimuli coloured 
appropriately (with the high diagnostic colours of emotions) compared to emotional 
stimuli coloured inappropriately (with the low diagnostic colours of emotions). The 
colour diagnosticity enhancement effect was uniquely present for emotional words 
and emotional facial expressions but not for the non-emotional/neutral stimuli. These 
results are consistent with existing studies that show a superiority of recognition 
memory for objects and natural scenes high in colour diagnosticity (Ostergaard & 
Davidoff, 1985; Price & Humphreys, 1989; Intraub & Nicklos, 1985; Homa, & Viera, 
1988, Park & Mason, 1982; Suzuki & Takahashi, 1997; Olivia & Schyns, 2000; 
Latimer, Palethorpe, Mezey, Ellwood, Raju & Hicks, 2002; Wichmann, Sharpe & 
Gegenfurtner, 2002).   
 
As mentioned before, the fact that neutral words were remembered significantly better 
(14%) than emotional words is in contradiction with many other studies that show, in 
fact, a memory facilitation for emotional information over neutral information. 
However, the fact that this uncharacteristic result was not evident for the facial 
expression stimuli raised the possibility that the neutral word stimuli used in the 
current experiment do not reliably represent the non-emotional or neutral category, at 
least not in a similar way to the collection of emotional words representing the six 
basic emotions. Furthermore, neutral words were judged as non-emotional even 
though they were not as closed in meaning as were the emotional words for each of 
the basic emotions.  For example, although the words bombastic, immutable, atheistic, 
diligent, credible and cosmetic are indeed non-emotional, they do not mean 'neutral'. 
In contrast the emotional words of fearing, horrified, worrying, frightful, panicked, 
terrorize all convey the meaning of 'fear'.  Consequently, a new collection of neutral 
words was employed in Experiment 3 by using the exact method of collection that 
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was done with emotional words - using a Microsoft Office Word 2003 'thesaurus' 
computer tool to find words that have the same or similar meaning to the word 
'neutral'.   
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6.3 EXPERIMENT 3: Colour diagnosticity for long-term recognition 
memory of emotional information 
 
6.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Experiment 2 validated the theory of colour diagnosticity in showing memory 
facilitation for emotional stimuli coloured in the (individual) diagnostic colours of 
emotions compared with emotional stimuli coloured in the non-diagnostic colours of 
emotions. This memory enhancement was demonstrated using 15 minute retention 
intervals. Thus, there was still a need to investigate the role of diagnostic colours of 
emotions in long-term memorisation. Experiment 3, therefore, used a retention 
interval of one week and employed similar methods to that in Experiment 2 two 
additions. The first concern the use of six new neutral words and the second involved 
the addition of a third colour condition in which the emotional stimuli were coloured 
in a random colour. A random colour was any colour that differed from the 
participant's best choice (appropriate) and worst choice (inappropriate) of colour for a 
specific emotion. This third colour condition provided a baseline measure against 
which individual’s high diagnostic colours of emotions (appropriate colours of 
emotions) improve performance on both. For example, if non-diagnostic colours of 
emotions impair recognition memory of emotional information then memory 
performance for stimuli coloured with the individual's low diagnostic colours of 
emotions should be significantly lower than for stimuli coloured randomly.  
 
Since the colour diagnosticity effect in Experiment 2 was evident even for participants 
with non-consistent colour-emotion associations, the present investigation did not 
account for the participants' level of consistency. Accordingly, Experiment 3 had a 
three-factor (3 x 2 x 7) design: 3 Colour Conditions 
(Appropriate/Inappropriate/Random) x 2 Stimulus Type (Words/Faces) x 7 Emotion 
Categories (Six Basic Emotions/Neutral). It was expected  that participants would be 
more sensitive and accurate when recognising information coloured with high 
diagnostic colours of emotions (Appropriately coloured stimuli) than information 
coloured with low diagnostic colours of emotions (Inappropriately coloured stimuli). 
However, this colour diagnosticity effect was expected to appear specifically for 
emotional words and facial expressions but not for the neutral stimuli. The question of 
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whether non-diagnostic colours of objects (or natural scenes) particularly impair 
recognition memory has not been investigated previously. Consequently, there is no 
support for a hypothesis in a specific direction. 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants: Experiment 3 included 90 participants (79% women and 21% men aged 
18-42) with a reported range of 13-26 years of formal education. All were screened 
using the Ishihara Test to confirm that they had normal colour vision. All participants 
were allocated randomly to each of the experimental groups.  
Stimuli: All colours, faces and word stimuli, except for the six neutral words, were 
the same as in Experiment 2. The new set of neutral words was collected by using the 
same method as in the 2003 Study and Experiment 2 by using a Microsoft Office 
Word 2003 'thesaurus' computer tool which produced alternative words that matched 
the word-meaning 'neutral'. The new set of words was: impartial, balancing, equalize, 
abstain, unbiased and equitable which was compatible with the set of emotional 
words in frequency and length (all were low-frequency words and consisted of six to 
nine letters). A group of 12 judges agreed upon their match with the term 'neutral' and 
demonstrated a total of 94% agreement (see Appendix).  
Apparatus and Procedure: The experiment's apparatus and procedure were the same 
as in Experiment 2 with the exception that following the induction phase, participants 
were asked to return seven days later for a retrieval phase. Furthermore, in this 
experiment participants were assigned to three colour conditions rather than two (in 
Experiment 2), where both emotional and neutral stimuli were coloured either in the 
individual’s high diagnostic colours of emotions (Appropriate colour condition), in 
the individual’s low (or non) diagnostic colour of emotion (Inappropriate colour 
condition) or in a random colour - a colour that was necessarily different from both 
low and high diagnostic colours of emotions (random colour condition). 
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6.3.3 RESULTS 
 
Overall, the ANOVA revealed that significant differences among the three colour 
groups, F (1, 87) = 12.006, p = 0.001. Priori contrast showed that the percentage of 
mean correct responses was significantly higher for stimuli coloured appropriately 
than for stimuli coloured inappropriately, t (87) = 2.017, p = 0.047 or for stimuli 
coloured in a random colour t (87) = 3.465, p = 0.001 (Figure 6.16). Differences in 
correct responses between stimuli coloured inappropriately and stimuli coloured 
randomly were not significant, t (87) = 1.448, p=0.151. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.16: Mean percentage correct recognition as a function of colour conditions 
(Experiment 3).  
 
Differences in correct responses between stimuli coloured inappropriately and stimuli 
coloured randomly were not significant, t (87) = 1.448, p=0.151.The measure of d' 
also revealed a similar significant pattern in line with the experimental expectations. 
An overall ANOVA revealed significant differences in d' among the three colour 
groups, F (2, 87) = 5.749, p = 0.005.  Figure 6.17 shows significant d' differences 
between the Appropriate and Inappropriate colour conditions t (87) = 2.264, p = 0.026 
as well as between the Appropriate and the random colour conditions t (87) = 3.318, p 
= 0.001. However, no significant differences were found in d' between the 
Inappropriate and the random colour conditions t (87) = 1.054, p = 0.295.  
Furthermore, no differences in bias in the participants' discrimination between ‘old’ 
and ‘new’ stimuli were found among the three colour conditions, F (2, 87) = 0.052, p 
= 0.949. Specifically, differences in β values between the appropriate versus 
inappropriate colour conditions and between the appropriate versus the random 
conditions were not significant, t (87) = 0.229, p = 0.819 and t (87) = 0.312, p = 
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0.756, respectively. Thus, the short-term memory patterns of enhanced performance, 
for diagnostic colours of emotions over non-diagnostic colours of emotions revealed 
in Experiment 2, were replicated in Experiment 3 for long-term memory performance.  
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Figure 6.17:  d’ and β values as a function of colour condition (Experiment 3).  
 
Overall, emotional faces and words were remembered significantly better than neutral 
faces and words F (1,178) = 19.501, p = 0.000 (Figure 6.18). Unlike in Experiment 2, 
differences between the emotional words and neutral words specifically, were not 
significant F (1,178) = 1.271, p = 0.261. Significant differences in percentage correct 
responses were again found between the emotional facial expressions and the neutral 
facial expressions F (1,178) = 25.781, p = 0.000. 
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Figure 6.18: Mean percentage correct recognition for emotional vs. neutral 
information as a function of stimulus type (Experiment 3). 
 
Furthermore, the hypotheses for an interaction effect between the Colour conditions 
(Appropriate vs. Inappropriate vs. Random) and the Stimuli Type (Emotion vs. 
Neutral) were also confirmed (Figures 6.19 and 6.20). Contrasts analysis applied 
separately for each type of stimulus revealed significant differences in mean correct 
percentage between the three colour conditions for the emotional stimuli, F(2, 87) = 
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6.057, p = 0.002, but not for the neutral stimuli, F(2, 87) = 1.149, p = 0.255. Although 
the findings depicts in Figure 21 may reflect a floor effect for the neutral stimuli, this 
is not consistent with the results shown in Experiment 2 (Figure 6.12).   Further, 
interaction results for emotional versus neutral stimuli were also found with d'. 
Differences among the three colour conditions were significant for emotional stimuli, 
F (2, 87) = 4.063, p = 0.021 (with β values constant and not significant across the 
three groups, F (2, 87) = 0.562, p = 0.32) but not for neutral stimuli, F (2, 87) = 0.523, 
p = 0.594. Although for emotional stimuli, differences in d' between the appropriate 
and inappropriate colour conditions were only marginally significant F (2, 87) = 
3.162, p = 0.065 the differences between the appropriate and random colour 
conditions showed a stronger significance - F (2, 87) = 8.564, p = 0.005.  Finally, as it 
was found in Experiment 2, results form the Reaction Time Measure did not reveal 
any significant differences across the experimental conditions (see Figure 6.21). 
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Figure 6.19: Mean percentage correct recognition as a function of stimulus type and 
colour condition (Experiment 3).  
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Figure 6.20: d’ values as a function of colour condition and stimulus type  
(Experiment 3). 
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Figure 6.21: Mean Reaction Time as a function of stimulus type and colour conditions 
(Experiment 3). 
 
 
6.3.4 DISCUSSION 
 
Experiment 3 overall showed an enhanced memory performance for emotional stimuli 
over neutral stimuli - a pattern than supports previous findings (Sven-Ake, 1991; 
Kensinger & Corkin, 2003a; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003b; Hamann et al., 1999; 
Doerksen & Shimamura, 2001; Hiroyuki, Hiroto, Matthew & Ralph, 2002). 
Experiment 3 also replicated Experiment 2’s finding by demonstrating a facilitation of 
recognition memory of emotional stimuli coloured with diagnostic colours 
(Appropriate colour condition) compared to emotional stimuli coloured with non-
diagnostic colours (Inappropriate and random colour conditions). The interaction 
effect between the colour conditions, appropriate versus inappropriate, and the 
stimulus type, emotional versus neutral, was only moderately significant. In contrast, 
the interaction effect between the appropriate and random colour conditions which did 
show strong significant differences. This difference may relate to the fact that 
participants were asked to associate both appropriate and inappropriate colours with 
the seven categories of emotions but were not asked to do so for random colours. 
Thus, the fact that participants actively associated appropriate and inappropriate 
colours with emotions prior to the experiment may have resulted in some degree of 
learning or memory facilitation for these colours that was not possible for the 
collection of random colours. Nevertheless, the fact that the differences between the 
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inappropriate and the random colour conditions were not significant may suggest that 
the beneficial effect of colour-emotion associations on memory, as evident by this 
study, lies beyond a mere learning process.  
 
The fact that no significant differences were found among the three colour conditions 
for neutral stimuli may further suggest that colour-emotion associations are stronger 
and more meaningful for the individual than the associations between colour and non-
emotional or neutral stimuli. Finally, while both Experiments 2 and 3 were designed 
to look at whether highly associated colours of emotions (appropriate colours) can 
enhance recognition memory of emotions more significantly than the least associated 
colours of emotions (inappropriate colours), Experiment 3 also aimed at investigating 
whether inappropriate colours of emotions impair recognition memory of emotions 
compared to any other colours. The findings showed that this third colour condition 
did not result in significantly different memory performance than the memory 
performance shown in the inappropriate colour condition. This was also evident as an 
interaction effect between the three colour conditions and the stimulus type. For 
emotional stimuli only, differences in memory performance between the appropriate 
and the random colour conditions were significant whereas differences between the 
inappropriate and random colour conditions were not significant.  
 
Two conclusions can be made based on these findings. First, any colour other than the 
individual appropriate colour of a certain emotion is effectively a non-diagnostic 
colour and thus is likely to impair the memory of that emotional stimulus as much as 
any individually chosen inappropriate colour. Second, as mentioned above, the 
findings that highly associative colours of emotions enhance memory cannot be 
explained merely by a learning process in which participants were engaged during the 
colour-emotion association questionnaire. Instead, the data indicates that the 
individual's highly associated colours of emotion are, in fact, part of their memory 
representations and are therefore activated during the retrieval process - a suggestion 
that will be investigated specifically and more thoroughly in Experiment 4. However, 
preceding the description of Experiment 4 some post hoc findings from both 
Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 are presented in the following section. 
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6.4 EXPERIMENTS 2 and 3: Post Hoc Findings  
 
6.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Since both Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 required that participants associate 
appropriate and inappropriate colours with seven emotional categories, in two 
different experiments (with a gap of one year between each) it was possible to assess 
the consistency level with which our student population from both experiments linked 
colour and emotional information, even though it was not originally one of the study's 
objectives. Although colour-emotion association consistency had been investigated 
quite thoroughly cross-culturally (D'Andrade & Egan, 1974; Pecjak, 1970; Murray & 
Deabler, 1957; Osgood, 1960; Osgood, et al., 1975; Oyama et al., 1963; Hupka et al., 
1997) only one study looked at these associations within the Australian population 
(Hemphill, 1996) and none had checked their consistency level over time. 
Furthermore, studies that looked at the colour-emotion relationship have mostly 
focused on the association of colours that best represent emotions (appropriate colours 
of emotions) and none have investigated the associations of colours that worst 
represent emotional information (inappropriate colours of emotions). Consequently, 
the two experiments described above provided an opportunity to explore two well-
studied, colour-emotion association attributes. First, the two experiments allowed the 
degree of consistency (Boyatzis & Varghese, 1996; Hemphill, 1996; Valdez & 
Mehrabian, 1994; Wexner, 1954; Zentner, 2001) with which participants associate 
inappropriate and appropriate colours with emotions to be explored. Consistency was 
measured firstly by the total percentage agreement from both experiments for 
appropriate versus inappropriate colour-emotion associations (Table 6.22). Second, 
the two experiments also provided the ability to assess the consistency in associating 
colours the seven different emotions. That is, whether some specific emotions tend to 
be linked more easily and thus more consistently with colours than with any other 
emotions (Figures 6.23 and 6.24). 
 
In summary, the data given in this section may highlight some important questions for 
further investigations using a statistical analysis. The first is whether the consistency 
level in associating appropriate colours with emotions is significantly different than 
the consistency level in associating inappropriate colours of emotions (Table 6.22). 
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The second is whether there are significant differences in the participants' agreement 
in associating specific (appropriate and inappropriate) colours with certain emotions 
(Figures 6.23 and 6.24). Specifically, the figures provide insights into whether some 
emotions tend to be associated more consistently with specific (appropriate and 
inappropriate) colours than other emotions and as a result tend to receive an overall 
higher agreement of colour-emotion associations than any other emotion and whether 
the same highly associated emotions with appropriate colours are also highly 
associated with inappropriate colours. Finally, since the main objective of this thesis 
was to study recognition memory in relation to the participants' ability to associate 
colours with emotions, an interesting question is whether the participants' consistency 
level in associating colours with emotions had an effect on memory performance 
among the various types of the colour-emotion associations, for example, whether 
high percentage agreement in associating specific colours with specific emotions 
resulted in a higher percentage of correct recognition responses for the same emotions 
(Figures 6.25 and 6.26). 
 
6.4.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Figures 6.23 and 6.24 depict the total percentage agreement from Experiment 2 and 
Experiment 3 of associating appropriate and inappropriate colours with seven 
emotions, respectively. Overall, the findings demonstrate that four specific 
appropriate colour-emotion associations have been agreed by the majority of 
participants from both experiments (percentage agreement 50% or higher) whereas 
only two inappropriate colour-emotion associations resulted in the same level of 
agreement.  
 
For both appropriate and inappropriate colour-emotion associations, the emotions 
'happiness' and 'sadness' received a consistent level higher than 50% for the colour 
associations: yellow-happy (appropriate), grey-happy (inappropriate), sad-grey 
(appropriate) and sad-yellow (inappropriate). The appropriate colour-emotion 
associations (Figure 6.23) additionally show high percentage agreement (above 50%) 
for the emotions 'anger' and 'disgust' associated with 'red' and 'brown', respectively. 
The first appropriate highly associated colour-emotion combination (anger-red) 
received an agreement level higher than any other colour-emotion combinations 
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(appropriate or inappropriate) from the participants in both experiments (an average 
of 93%).  
 
A higher consistency level was shown for appropriate colours than for inappropriate 
colours. It was therefore worth looking at whether such consistency patterns had some 
effect on recognition memory performance on emotions with consistent colour 
combinations versus emotions with specific non-consistent colour associations. 
Figures 6.25 and 6.26 plot the percentage correct recognition for emotions that had 
colour associations with a total percentage agreement of 20% and above in the two 
experiments for appropriate and inappropriate colours respectively. As Figure 6.25 
depicts, 11 different appropriate color-emotion associations received a percentage 
agreement at that level and Figure 6.26 shows a total of 10 different inappropriate 
colours of emotions with the same agreement level. Although both experiments were 
not designed specifically to compare the recognition memory of emotions with 
consistent and stable colour associations to those with non-consistent colour 
associations (the group number is not equal) the findings do suggest that for 
appropriate colours specifically, as the total agreement level for the colour-emotion 
associations increases, so does the memory performance for these colour-emotion 
combinations. That is, emotions that received a high degree of agreement for a 
specific colour-emotion combination tended to be remembered better than emotions 
that received low level agreement in their colour associations. This pattern of result is 
more evident for the appropriate colour-emotion associations than for the 
inappropriate colour-emotion associations. For example, the emotions ‘angry’ 
‘happiness’, ‘disgust’ and ‘sadness’ received a degree of consistency higher than 50% 
for the  association of  the appropriate colours red, yellow, brown, and grey 
respectively. These were the only consistent colour-emotion associations that received 
a percentage of correct responses higher than the average percentage of correct 
responses for the same emotions across all colours. The inappropriate colour-emotion 
combinations, happy-grey and sad-yellow, were the only ones that received a degree 
of consistency higher than 50% among all other inappropriate colour-emotion 
associations. Only the first combination had a percentage of correct responses higher 
than the average percentage of correct responses for the same emotions presented 
across all colours. Table 6.22 depicts the percentages of correct recognition and the 
consistency level for each of these highly associated colour-emotion combinations. 
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The pattern shown for inappropriate colour-emotion combinations reveals that most of 
the emotions that had colour associations with a total percentage agreement of 20% or 
higher were remembered equally well (Figure 6.26). For the consistent appropriate 
colour emotion associations, on the other hand, the majority of colour-emotion 
associations that received a percentage of correct responses equal to, or higher than, 
the percentage of correct responses for the same emotions presented with any colour, 
on average, had an agreement level of at least 50%. Thus, it seems that the 
consistency level in associating colours with emotions may have a greater effect on 
the memory of emotions presented with appropriate colour-emotion associations than 
on the memory of emotions presented with inappropriate colour-emotion associations.   
 
Table 6.22: Relationship between high agreement level and recognition memory of 
Appropriate and Inappropriate colour-emotion associations (Post hoc findings, 
Experiments 2 and 3). 
 
 Colour-Emotion 
Associations 
% Agreement 
for the specific 
colour-emotion 
association 
% Correct 
Recognition for 
the specific 
colour-emotion 
association 
Average of % 
CR for the 
same emotion 
presented with 
any colour 
Angry-Red 93.2 75.2** 72.5 
Happy-Yellow 79.2 76.7** 70.7 
Disgust-Brown 64.7 71.3** 66.6 
Appropriate 
Colour 
Associations 
Sad-Grey 52.1 70.1** 67.9 
Happy-Grey 78.6 72.** 64.8 Inappropriate 
Colour 
Associations 
Sad-Yellow 68.4 64.9 68.9 
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Figure 6.23: Percentage agreement of Appropriate colour choices for each of the 
seven emotional categories in Experiments 2 and 3 (N = 66). 
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Figure 6.24: Percentage Agreement of inappropriate colour choices for each of the 
seven emotional categories in Experiments 2 and 3 (N = 66). 
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Figure 6.25:  % Correct recognition differences for Appropriate colour-emotion 
associations (which had 20% agreement or more in Experiments 2 and 3) as a 
function of % Agreement.  
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Figure 6.26:  % Correct recognition differences for Inappropriate colour-emotion 
associations (which had 20% agreement or more in Experiments 2 and 3) as a 
function of % Agreement.  
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6.4.3 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The post hoc findings shown above reveal a few consistent patterns in which 
participants associate colours with emotions. First, it seems that participants tend to be 
more consistent in associating appropriate colours with emotions than in associating 
inappropriate colours with emotions. Nevertheless, some emotions (happiness and 
sadness) seem to be easier to associate colours with than other emotions regardless of 
whether it is an appropriate associative colour or an inappropriate associative colour 
(e.g., 'happiness', 'sadness'). Furthermore, the data emphasises that specific 
appropriate colour associations of 'anger' with red, and 'happiness' with yellow are the 
most consistent associations across the two experiments. These highly consistent 
colour-emotion associations were also shown to be quite dominant in Experiment 1 of 
this dissertation as well as in previous studies (Hupka, et al., 1997; Luscher, 1971; 
Wexner, 1954). More uniquely, the findings reveal two novel inappropriate colour-
emotion associations, happy-grey and sad-yellow, that had strong agreement rates in 
both of the experiments. This may be related to the idea that happy and sad are 
opposite emotions on the valence dimension, and are often indicating a strong 
negative correlation (Green, Goldman, & Salovey, 1993; Feldman Barrett & Russell, 
1998).  
 
Finally, the data demonstrate a link between consistent colour-emotion associations 
and the degree to which these emotions are remembered. Specifically, emotions that 
had highly appropriate consistent colour associations among participants from both 
experiments may tend to be remembered better when they were presented with these 
highly associative colours than emotions with associated colours that had a lower 
degree of consistency. Inappropriate colour-emotion associations however, revealed 
that for emotions that had colour- associations with a consistency level of 20% or 
above were remembered roughly the same regardless of which colour they were 
presented with. Thus, as far as memory performance of emotional information is 
concerned, post-hoc analysis suggests that consistent appropriate colour-emotion 
combinations may have a greater effect on memory (of these emotions) than 
consistent inappropriate colour-emotion associations. Consequently, more research is 
needed to investigate the particular question of whether emotions presented with their 
consistent appropriate colour-emotion associations are indeed remembered 
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significantly better than emotions presented with their consistent inappropriate 
colour-emotion associations.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 4: 
 
Stroop Test for Colour Diagnositicity of Emotions 
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The results from Experiments 1, 2 and 3 together, validate the theory of colour 
diagnosticity in showing memory facilitation for emotional stimuli coloured in the 
(individual) diagnostic colour of emotion compared with emotional stimuli coloured 
in the (individual) non-diagnostic colour of emotion. Previous colour and memory 
investigations have suggested that this superiority effect of colour diagnosticity on 
recognition memory of objects and natural scenes is (at least partly) a result of high 
level of visual processing of colour information. At this level of processing, colour 
activates memory representations that are linked to the knowledge of the stimulus's 
congruent colour (Davidoff, 1991; Joseph & Proffitt, 1996; Joseph, 1997; Nicholson 
& Humphrey, 2004; Tanaka et al, 2001; Wichmann, 2003). Thus, studies that have 
shown a beneficial effect of colour diagnosticity on memory usually imply that the 
diagnostic colours themselves are part of the memory representations of the to-be-
remembered items (Gegenfurtner & Rieger, 2000; Olivia & Schyns, 2000; Nagai & 
Yokosawa, 2003; Olivia & Schyns, 2005; Olivia & Torralba, 2001; Tanaka & 
Persenall, 1999; Vernon & Lloyd-Jones, 2003; Wichmann et al., 2002). 
 
Do the findings presented so far in this dissertation directly indicate that the 
individuals’ diagnostic colours of emotions are also part of the conceptual (or 
memory) representations of basic emotions? Studies to date, aimed at investigating 
the question of whether diagnostic (or natural) colours of certain objects play a 
substantial part in the conceptual representation of objects, often preferred the Stroop 
paradigm to recognition tests (Menard-Buteau & Cavanagh, 1984; Klein, 1964; Naor-
Raz, Tarr & Kersten, 2003). For example Naor et al claimed that object identification 
and recognition tasks employ both visual and nonvisual sources of information and 
thus hinder the ability to establish the specific level or levels of processing (visual, 
conceptual, or lexical) at which the surface properties of an object affect its 
recognition. Thus, to test whether the visual representation of an object intrinsically 
includes surface properties such as colour, Naor-Raz et al used a Stroop task and 
asked observers to make judgments that do not directly invoke object identity- to 
name the colour of the object (rather than to name or identify the object itself). Since 
both, Klein's and Naor-Raz, et al's studies found a faster mean response times for 
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objects coloured in typical colours than for objects coloured in atypical colours, they 
agreed that colour is indeed, an intrinsic property of object representation.    
 
Our previous results (from Experiment 1 to 3) showed a colour diagnosticity 
superiority effect for the memory of emotional stimuli. However, the automaticity of 
this colour-emotion diagnostic relationship, demonstrated by an interference effect for 
emotional words coloured with non-diagnostic (inappropriate) colours, has not yet 
been studied. The experiment described herein aims to investigate this effect 
empirically by using the Stroop paradigm to test colour diagnosticity of emotions. If 
any knowledge of colour is stored in the representations of the individuals' emotions, 
this experiment should reveal a faster naming times of the (individual) appropriate 
colours of emotional words than the naming times of the (individual) inappropriate 
colours of emotional words. However, if colour is not part of the conceptual 
representations of emotions, than naming time of appropriate colours of emotions 
should not differ than the naming time of inappropriate colours of emotions. 
Furthermore, if colour representations are unique to emotions but not to non 
emotional information, than such differences in naming times of appropriate versus 
inappropriate colours, should not be evident when participants are presented with the 
collection of neutral words.  
 
The current study involves the manipulation of colours on emotional and non-
emotional (neutral) stimuli A Stroop task designed to look at the differences in 
reaction time of naming appropriate versus inappropriate emotional colours when the 
carrier words are either emotional or neutral, may be affected not only by the 
Semantic Stroop effect discussed above, but also by the Emotional Stroop effect. The 
emotional Stroop effect is the slowdown in naming the colour of the emotional words 
compared with the naming speed of the neutral words, as a failure of fully selective 
focusing on colour induced by the carrier words (for reviews, see MacLeod, 1991; 
Williams et al.,1996; Melara & Algom, 2003). Although the majority of emotional 
Stroop studies have reported larger interference in non-clinical groups to negative 
concern-related stimuli (Williams et al., 1996), a few researchers have demonstrated 
that emotional interference for nonspecific negative stimuli (McKenna & Sharma, 
2004; McKenna & Sharma, 1995; Pratto & John, 1991; Richard et al, 1992). Little or 
no interference has been found however for positive emotional stimuli (McKenna & 
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Sharma, 1995; Pratto & John, 1991; Richard et al, 1992). To exclude any biased 
contradicting effects on the naming times of positive and negative words,  the basic 
emotions used in the current Stroop task exclude the emotions ‘happy’, ‘surprise’ and 
‘disgust’ and include only ‘sadness’, ‘anger’ and ‘fear’. Thus, although this 
experiment is mainly focused on the differences in naming emotional versus neutral 
words as a function of the colour manipulation, the well-documented Emotional 
Stroop effect may be also evident in showing faster reaction times for naming neutral 
words than naming emotional words. Experiment 4 included a three-factor (2 x 3 x 4) 
design: 2 Colour Conditions (Appropriate/Inappropriate) x 3 Word Stimulus Type 
(Emotional/ Neutral/ Non Word) x 4 Order (Appropriate Emotion/Inappropriate 
Emotion/ Appropriate Neutral/Inappropriate Neutral).  
 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants The participants were 70 undergraduate students at The University of 
Sydney (78% women and 22% men, aged 18-43) with a reported range of 13-23 years 
of formal education who received course credit for their participation and were 
randomly allocated to two experimental Stroop tasks. All had normal colour vision 
(according to the Ishihara test for colour-blindness, 1917) and were tested 
individually.  
Apparatus and Material Word stimuli- all emotional and neutral word stimuli were 
taken from the collection of words obtained for the previous experiments (Experiment 
2 & 3), with the addition of six nonwords which were created from the existing six 
neutral words (impartial; balancing; equalize; abstain; unbiased; equitable) by 
changing the order of their letters (lapmirtia; glabiancn; uezlaqie; tabinsa; dsbuinae; 
etqeblaiu). The emotional words represented the basic emotions ‘sad’, ‘anger’ and 
‘fear’ and included two words per category (desolate and grieving; enraged and 
furious; panicked and fearing, respectively). The total percentage agreement of 
emotional words was 95 % as judged by 21 participants overall (in Experiments 2 & 
3). The total percentage agreement of the neutral words was 94% as judged by 12 
participants (see Appendix). 
Colours- to ensure that each colour was used in the colour-emotion association 
questionnaire only once (see the procedure section for more details) colours included 
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eight colours used in Experiments 2 & 3 (blue, red, yellow, orange, brown, green, 
purple, grey) with the addition of two colours: white and pink. The exclusion of 
‘black’ form this collection of colours was to prevent the possibility of associating 
only achromatic colours with the neutral category (a pattern that was shown in 
piloting). 
Word and face stimuli were constructed and presented using SuperCard 10.4 software 
and were identical in all measurements to those used in the previous experiments 
(Experiments 2 and 3). Additionally, all word stimuli were coloured with the low or 
high diagnostic colours of emotions, in a similar fashion to that used in Experiments 2 
and 3 according to the results from the colour-emotion association questionnaire.  
Design and Procedure: Before testing participants on the Emotional Stroop task 
designed specifically for this experiment's objectives, there was a need to test whether 
the specific Stroop paradigm (block design) used in the current experiment was also 
capable of producing the standard colour Stroop effect, originally introduced by 
Stroop (1935). According to Stroop (1935), when participants are asked to name the 
ink colour of words (usually colour names), they experience a delay by the presence 
of an irrelevant colour word that conflicts with the target colour (Classic Stroop 
Effect). For example, if the word red is presented in green ink, then the word 
interferes with the identification of the ink. Studies (Klein 1964; Naor-Raz et al, 
2003) that established the Stroop-like effect with objects words that had typical 
colours (Semantic Stroop) have usually relied on a blocked design (similar to that 
used in the standard Stroop task) in which participants read through lists of entirely 
colour-typical or colour-atypical colour -word pairs and the dependent measure is the 
time taken to name all colours in the complete list. We adopted this particular block 
design for our Emotional Stroop task, as a group of ten participants who were tested 
on the standard Stroop task showed results consistent with the standardized Stroop 
effect (see the Result section for the detailed findings).  
The remaining 60 participants were then tested on the Emotional Stroop task which 
had a similar block design to that used in the Standard Stroop, with the exception of 
presenting emotional and neutral words (or non words) as the carrier words, instead of 
colour words. To assess their colour-emotion associations, all 60 participants were 
asked initially to complete the online questionnaire used in Experiments 2 and 3 by 
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instructing them to associate only one colour with each emotion and three different 
colours with the neutral condition. The questionnaire included two types of colour 
associations, association of the best and worst colour with each emotion category. To 
ensure that the same colour was not presented twice or more in the Stroop naming 
task that followed, participants were not allowed to choose one colour more than once 
in each of the two association tasks (as they were in the previous experiments). Thus, 
the collection of the individual best colours of emotions (appropriate colours of 
emotions) as well as the collection of the individual worst colours of emotions 
(inappropriate colours of emotions) in the present experiment resulted in different 
individual colour associations. 
Following the completion of the colour-emotion association questionnaire, 
participants were randomly assigned to one out of two different block-designed 
Stroop tasks, each comprising four different blocks. One Stroop task included the 
blocks: emotional (negative) words coloured appropriately, emotional (negative) 
words coloured inappropriately, neutral words coloured appropriately and neutral 
words coloured inappropriately (Table 7.1). The second included the blocks: neutral 
words coloured appropriately, neutral words coloured inappropriately, non-words 
coloured in the appropriate neutral colours and non-words coloured in the 
inappropriate neutral colours (Table 7.2).  The second blocked Stroop task was 
designed to exclude any potential bias in reaction time as a result of the participants’ 
tendency to specifically use achromatic colours (e.g. white, grey, brown) as the 
appropriate colours of neutral category, and chromatic colours (e.g. red, pink, orange) 
as the inappropriate colours of the neutral category. Within each block, four different 
trials displayed the six emotional, neutral or non-words stimuli, in a random order. In 
each trial participants were presented with three columns (and 12 rows) of words 
displaying the six different coloured word stimuli repeated 12 times (Figure 7.3). 
Thus, there were 36 word stimuli in each trial and a total of 144 word stimuli in each 
block. All 36 words within each trial were randomized in such a way that no ink 
colour appeared twice or more in succession within one raw. Similarly, all trials 
within each block as well as the order of the emotional versus the neutral blocks were 
presented randomly. An additional practice trial was used prior to the actual testing, to 
allow participants to familiarize themselves with the task.  Participants were 
instructed to verbally name the ink colour of each word from left to right (three words 
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per row) as quickly and accurately as possible, and to press a button when they have 
finished naming all the 36 colour words on each trial. Between each trial participants 
were given five minutes break to prevent any potential emotional interference effect 
(slow emotional effect that can last among trials and may result with the slowdown of 
naming neutral words) as suggested by McKenna, and Sharma, (2004).   The 
researcher was provided with the list of correct colour names for each trial which 
enable to notify participants when a mistake was made. In this case, the instruction 
was to repeat the colour name until it was named correctly. 
 
 
Table 7.1: Sample size per cell for Experiment block 1 (Experiment 4). 
 Emotional Words  Neutral Words 
Appropriate Colour n = 10 n = 10 
Inappropriate Colour n = 10 n = 10 
Total  n = 20 n = 20 
 
Table 7.2: Sample size per cell for Experiment block 2 (Experiment 4). 
 Neutral Words Non Words 
Appropriate  Neutral Colour n = 5 n = 5 
Inappropriate Neutral Colour n = 5 n = 5 
Total  n = 10 n = 10 
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Figure 7.3: Example of an inappropriate emotional Stroop trial (Experiment 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Name the ink colour for each word from left to right 
enrageddesolate panicked
enraged panicked desolate 
desolate  panicked enraged
panicked desolate enraged
desolate  enraged panicked
enraged desolate panicked
desolate  panicked
panicked enraged
enraged
desolate 
panicked desolate enraged
desolate  enraged panicked
enraged desolate panicked
desolate  panicked enraged
 
Continue  
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7.3 RESULTS 
 
7.3.1 Standard Stroop Task: the data for colour naming and word reading in the five 
conditions of each task are shown in Figure 7.4. Plotted are the mean reaction times 
for each of the ten participants performing in the five conditions of the (blocked 
design) standard Stroop task. A glimpse at Figure 7.4 reveals that reading coloured 
words was considerably faster than colour naming, with an overall difference of 8.46 
seconds favoring reading, F (1, 19) = 20.38, p = 0.00. Reading black and white words 
(RBWW) was also significantly faster than naming congruent (NCGC), F (1, 9) = 
30.584, p = 0.011, or incongruent (NINCGC) colour words, F (1, 9) = 30.584, p = 
0.000. Overall, there were no significant differences among the three reading 
conditions F (2, 9) = 3.135, p = 0.110, except for the differences between reading 
congruent versus reading incongruent colour words, which had a mean speed 
difference of 1.26 seconds , F (1, 9) = 6.99, p = 0.027. 
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Figure 7.4:  Mean reaction as a function of task condition for each of the 10 
participants in the Standard Stroop Task (Experiment 4). 
 
The most critical result to emerge from the standard Stroop task is the significant 
slowdown in colour naming of incongruent colour names compared to all other 
conditions, with an averaged speed difference of 13.42 seconds, F (4, 9) = 23.915, p = 
0.000. Looking at the two naming conditions, the specific speed difference between 
the congruent and the incongruent colour conditions were also significant, with a 
mean difference of 10.9 seconds favoring congruent colours, F (1, 9) = 20.378, p = 
0.001. Another very important result of the preliminary analysis was the total absence 
of order effects in the data. A five-way ANOVA for repeated measures with task 
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condition as a within subject factor and order of presentation as a between subjects 
factor revealed no main effect of order of presentation, F (3, 6) = 3.817, p = 0.077 and 
no interaction effect between the task condition and the order of presentation, F (3, 6) 
= 0.857, p = 0.512. The absence of an order effect in our standard Stroop data and the 
fact that the findings fit with the previous pattern of results commonly shown for the 
standard Stroop effect (Stroop 1935; Melara & Algom, 2003), allowed us to continue 
confidently testing the two following Stroop tasks (reported below) that had an 
identical block design to that used in the standard Stroop task, with the exception that 
the carrier words were either emotional, neutral or non words, instead of colour 
names. 
 
7.3.2 Stroop Task for Colour Diagnosticity: the Stroop task for colour diagnosticity 
consisted of two different Stroop tasks in which participants were assigned randomly 
to. The first, compared participants' reaction time to emotional words (coloured 
appropriately and inappropriately, in two different blocks) with their reaction time to 
neutral words (coloured appropriately and inappropriately in two additional blocks). 
The second compared the participants' reaction time to neutral words (coloured 
appropriately and inappropriately, in two different blocks) with their reaction time to 
non-words (coloured with the same appropriate and inappropriate neutral colours, in 
two additional blocks). The analyses for these two Stroop tasks are reported 
separately below.  
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Figure 7.5: Mean reaction for each of the four Stroop tasks as a function of task 
position, in Stroop Task 1 (Experiment 4). Name InappNC = naming inappropriate neutral 
colour; Name AppNC = naming inappropriate neutral colours; Name AppEC = naming inappropriate 
emotional colours; Name InappEC = naming inappropriate emotional colour. 
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Naming Appropriate and Inappropriate colours of Emotional versus Neutral words: a 
four-way ANOVA on the reaction time data, was performed as repeated measures 
with task condition as a within subject factor and order of presentation as a between 
subjects factor. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of task condition, F (3, 
36) = 8.24, p = 0.007 (observed power 0.798), a significant interaction effect of task 
condition and order of presentation, F (9, 36) = 6.11, p = 0.002, but no significant 
main effect of order of presentation (observed power 0.94), F (3, 36) = 0.36, p = 
0.358. As shown in Figure 7.5 participants' reaction times in each of the four Stroop 
tasks was not significantly affected by the order of presentation except for cases in 
which the first Stroop task was to name inappropriate colours of emotional 
information (Name AppEC).   
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Figure 7.6: Mean reaction for each of the four Stroop tasks conditions, in Stroop Task 
1 (Experiment 4). InappNC = naming inappropriate neutral colour; AppNC = naming inappropriate 
neutral colours; AppEC = naming inappropriate emotional colours; InappEC = naming inappropriate 
emotional colour. 
 
2 x 2 ANOVA for stimulus type (Emotion vs. Neutral) and colour conditions 
(Appropriate vs. Inappropriate) revealed significant interaction effect among the four 
experimental groups F (3, 117) = 5.917, p = 0.02. These findings are demonstrated in 
Figure 7.6, and show faster naming of appropriate versus inappropriate colours of 
emotions, with a mean difference of  1.63 seconds in favor of naming appropriate 
colours, F (1, 39) = 7.663, p = 0.009. Conversely, when the Stroop tasks were to name 
the colours of neutral words, a significant main effect between naming appropriate 
and inappropriate neutral colours was in favor of the inappropriate neutral colours, 
with a mean difference of 1.67 seconds, F (1, 39) = 9.003, p = 0.005. Furthermore, 
naming appropriate colours of emotional words was on averaged 1.88 seconds 
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significantly faster than naming appropriate colours of neutral words, F (1, 39) = 
9.225, p = 0.004, whereas naming inappropriate colours of emotional words was on 
averaged 1.42 seconds significantly slower than naming inappropriate colours of 
neutral words, F (1, 39) = 7.483, p = 0.009. No significant differences were found 
between the appropriate emotion and inappropriate neutral conditions, F (1, 39) = 
0.326, p = 0.571, or between the inappropriate emotion and appropriate neutral 
conditions, F (1, 39) = 0.146, p = 0.704. 
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Figure 7.7: Mean reaction for naming emotional and neutral colours, in Stroop Task 1 
(Experiment 4). 
 
Finally, Figure 7.7 depicts the overall mean reaction times for naming emotional 
colours versus naming neutral colours. A repeated measures analysis on the 
participants' reaction time compared the mean reaction time for naming emotional 
colours (both appropriate and inappropriate) with the mean reaction time for naming 
neutral colours (both appropriate and inappropriate). There were no significant 
differences between the naming latencies of the two stimulus type, F (1, 79) = 0.274, 
p = 0.602. 
 
Neutral versus Non-word Stroop Task:  As the results reported above show, the 
significant differences between the two colour conditions (naming appropriate colour 
versus naming inappropriate colours) were reversed between the emotional words and 
the neutral words. Participants were significantly faster to name appropriate 
emotional colours than inappropriate emotional colours but were also significantly 
slower to name appropriate neutral colours than inappropriate neutral colours. The 
colours chosen as appropriate or inappropriate colours of the two stimulus type were 
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not random but were based on the participants' individual colour associations. A 
specific pattern of colour associations was identified for the total collection of neutral 
colours. Specifically, participants were more likely to choose achromatic colours (e.g. 
grey, white, brown) as appropriate colours of the neutral and chromatic colours (e.g. 
pink, orange, red) as inappropriate neutral colours. This trend of colour choices raised 
the need to exclude the possibility that the significant slowdown in naming 
appropriate colours of neutral words was not purely due to differences in colour 
between the two groups of neutral words.  
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Figure 7.8: Mean reaction for each of the four Stroop tasks as a function of task 
position, in Stroop Task 2 (Experiment 4). Name AppNW = naming appropriate neutral colour 
of neutral words; Name InappNW = naming inappropriate neutral colours of neutral words; Name 
AppNONW = naming neutral appropriate colours of non words; Name InappNONW = naming 
inappropriate neutral colours of non words. 
 
 
If this had been the case, than a similar pattern of result should also emerge from a 
Stoop task that uses non-words coloured in the appropriate an inappropriate neutral 
colours. Interestingly however, as shown in Figure 7.9, a mix model ANOVA 
revealed no significant main effects among the four conditions of the second Stroop 
task, F (3, 48) = 2.42, p = 0.104 (observed power, 0.5), except for the simple effect 
between the inappropriate neutral words condition and the inappropriate non-words 
condition, F (1, 19) = 6.51, p = 0.019. Figure 7.9 plots the mean reaction time for 
each of these l four Stroop tasks, which demonstrates that participants were 
significantly faster (MD= 1.53 seconds) in naming non words coloured in the 
inappropriate neutral colours than naming neutral words coloured inappropriately, but 
had even naming speed times among the other conditions. An ANOVA that added 
order of presentation as a between subject variable, resulted with no significant main 
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effect, F (3, 16) = 1.507, p = 0.251 or interaction effects between order and the four 
task conditions of the second Stroop task, F (3, 16) = 2.42, p = 0.104. This pattern of 
result is depicted in Figure 7.8 which plots the mean reaction times for each task 
condition in four different orders of presentations. Finally, a two way ANOVA on the 
overall reaction times between neutral words and non words, also yield significance 
difference in favor of colour naming for non words (MD= 1.45 seconds), F (1, 39) = 
5.322, p = 0.026 (Figure 7.10).  
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Figure 7.9: Mean reaction for each of the four Stroop tasks conditions, in Stroop Task 
2 (Experiment 4). Name AppNW = naming appropriate neutral colour of neutral words; Name 
InappNW = naming inappropriate neutral colours of neutral words; Name AppNONW = naming 
neutral appropriate colours of non words; Name InappNONW = naming inappropriate neutral colours 
of non words. 
 
 
10
15
20
25
30
Words Non Words
Stimulus Type
M
e
a
n
 R
e
a
c
ti
o
n
 T
im
e
 
(s
e
c
)
 
Figure 7.10: Mean reaction for naming neutral colours of words and neutral colours of 
non words, in Stroop Task 2 (Experiment 4). 
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7.4 DISCUSSION 
 
The present experiment has succeeded in confirming its main hypotheses. First, from 
a methodological point of view, the results from the standard Stroop task clearly show 
the well-studied standard Stroop effect (Stroop 1935; Melara & Algom, 2003; 
MacLeod, 1991) thus confirming that the method of presentation and the design 
format may be also suitable for the assessment of other possible Stroop tasks (e.g. 
Emotional Stroop and Semantic Stroop - see McKenna & Sharma, 2004 for a review). 
Consequently, we continued to investigate the theory of colour diagnosticity on 
emotions by using two unique Stoop tasks that, for the first time, utilise individuals’ 
colour emotion associations as the target colours and emotional versus neutral versus 
non-words as the carrier words.   
 
The findings from the first Stroop task, that show a reversed pattern of colour naming 
for neutral words (faster naming times for inappropriate colours than for appropriate 
colours), were not expected and are particularly ambiguous considering that there was 
no main effect of order (in both Stroop tasks) and that the second Stroop task did not 
result in a similar pattern of findings for the non-word stimuli, even though the same 
collection of individual neutral colours was employed for both types of word carrier - 
neutral and non-words. Thus, the fact that participants in the second Stroop task were 
not faster to name inappropriate neutral colours of non-words compared to 
appropriate neutral colours of non-words, ruled out the possibility that the 
interference effect for appropriate neutral colours was simply due to the specific 
collection of the individual colours used for the representation of the neutral category 
(which, overall, had more chromatic colours for the collection of inappropriate 
colours than for the collection of appropriate colours). Furthermore, the fact that the 
second Stroop task did not show significant differences between naming the 
inappropriate and appropriate neutral colours when the carrier words were neutral 
may suggest that the interference effect that was found on the neutral carrier words, in 
the first Stroop task, may be attributed to the persistent (slow) disruptive effects that 
emotional stimuli can have beyond their presentation. However, since the observed 
power in the second Stroop task was lower than the first (0.5 and 0.94, respectively) 
further research should investigate the differences in the two Stroop tasks using equal 
sets of sample size.   Previous studies that investigated the magnitude of disruption 
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from negative emotional stimuli in Emotional Stroop tasks pointed out that these 
types of stimulus can have an emotional lingering effect, and thus, a relatively slow 
effect that operates between trials is in fact stronger than any fast interference effect 
that may be activated within trials only. This may eventually result in a reversed 
interference effect – a slow down in naming neutral stimuli compared to negative 
stimuli or a disappearance of the emotional intrusion effect (McKenna, 1986; 
McKenna & Sharma, 1995; Sharma & McKenna 2001; McKenna & Sharma, 2004). 
Indeed, the overall comparison between the emotional and neutral stimuli did not 
yield a significant difference in the first Stroop task, thus the data provided herein fits 
with the above findings. It can be argued also that this null finding is due to the 
presence of another, no less prominent, Stroop interference which unlike the former 
Stroop effect was found significant - the semantic interference of colour associations 
(appropriate versus inappropriate) with emotional information. Despite the failure to 
show the immediate disruptive effects of emotional negative stimuli on information 
processing this experiment does add substantial weight to the argument that colours 
are semantically linked to emotions and may therefore be represented together with 
the emotional conceptual representations. That the findings from both Stroop tasks do 
not show a similar semantic Stroop for neutral colours as for emotional colours (the 
pattern was reversed or absent) suggests that any prototypical (conceptual) links that 
may exist between emotional information and colour information are different from 
the conceptual links that may exist between neutral information and colour 
information. This is in line with the findings from our previous experiments which 
demonstrated that, unlike emotional colour associations, neutral colour associations 
involve more achromatic colours (Experiment 1) are less stable (Post-Hoc findings of 
Experiments 2 & 3) and are not as strong as emotional colour associations in their 
ability to affect recognition memory (Experiment 3).  
 
Finally, considering the mixed results of naming times for appropriate and 
inappropriate neutral colours, and the fact that the data did not show an Emotional 
Stroop effect, it interestingly raised the need to resolve a new research question: does 
a semantic Stroop effect, which involves two types of closely related stimuli, have the 
ability to fade out another strong and well-known attentional effect, namely, the 
Emotional Stroop? To provide a full account for such possibility, an expanded block 
design, similar to what has been used in the present experiment and which consists of 
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five different blocks, should be adopted: (a) Emotional words coloured appropriately 
and inappropriately vs. Neutral words coloured appropriately and inappropriately 
(done in this experiment); (b) Emotional words coloured appropriately and 
inappropriately vs. Non-Words coloured in individuals' appropriate and inappropriate 
colours of emotions;  (c) Emotional words coloured appropriately and inappropriately 
vs. Non-Words coloured in individuals' appropriate and inappropriate neutral colours 
emotions; (d) Neutral words coloured appropriately and inappropriately vs. Non- 
Words coloured in individuals' appropriate and inappropriate neutral colours (done in 
this experiment); (e) Neutral words coloured appropriately and inappropriately vs. 
Non-Words coloured in the individuals' appropriate and inappropriate colours of 
emotions. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General Discussion and Conclusions: 
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8.1. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Our world is full of colours. Colours surround every part and moment of our lives so 
that from a very early age humans learn the colours of nature:  that the sky is often 
coloured with shades of blue, the sun is radiant with yellow and a rose glows red. 
Through evolution humans acquire the knowledge to use colour to identify the 
location of food and to specifically judge its quality or ripeness (Mollon & Jordan, 
1998; Polyak, 1975; Walls, 1972; Gegenfurtner & Rieger, 2000). Lately, research has 
further proposed that colour plays a critical role in everyday object recognition 
(Ostergaard & Davidoff 1985; Price & Humphreys 1989; Intraub & Nicklos 1985; 
Homa, & Viera, 1988, Park & Mason 1982; Suzuki & Takahashi 1997; Olivia & 
Schyns 2000; Latimer, Palethorpe, Mezey, Ellwood, Raju, & Hicks, 2002; 
Wichmann, Sharpe & Gegenfurtner 2002).  Studies specifically suggest that acquired 
knowledge of objects, natural objects in particular, includes colour information which 
under imperfect viewing conditions can act as a diagnostic tool for their recognition 
(Wichmann, Sharpe & Gegefurtner, 2002; Olivia & Schyns, 2000; Tanaka & Persnell, 
1999; Mapelli & Behrmann, 1997; Humphreys, Goodale, Jakobson, Servos, 1994; 
Price & Humphreys, 1989).     
      
The main objective of this dissertation was to study the possibility that this special 
role of colour in recognition memory of objects and everyday scenes extends to the 
memory of our day-to-day emotional experiences and, as such, acts as a diagnostic 
tool for the recognition memory of emotions. While the diagnostic link between 
colours and objects strongly relies on the constant and natural appearance of specific 
colours with certain objects (e.g. yellow banana, blue sky), the appearance of 
particular colours under specific emotional circumstances is substantially less 
consistent. As suggested in Chapter Three, colour-emotion associations may be 
formed through the influence of culture (e.g. white clothing can symbolise, in some 
cultures, mourning and grief but in others purity and peace), physical appearance (e.g. 
the redness of an angry face; traumatic exposure to blood) or mere repetition of 
learning experiences (e.g. a blue dress of ones mother can form into to a colour-
emotion association of favouring blue over all other colours). Furthermore, previous 
research (as well as the current investigation) provides evidence that unlike colour 
associations with natural objects, the degree to which people associate colours with 
emotions is highly varied not only across cultures but also within cultures (e.g. 
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Eysenck 1941; Wexner, 1954; Choungourian 1968; Valdez & Mehrabian 1994; 
Boyatzis & Varghese 1996; Hemphill 1996; Hupka et al. 1997). Thus, the fact that 
colour was found to be part of the conceptual representations of objects (Klein, 1964; 
Naor-Raz, Tarr & Kersten, 2003) does not necessarily mean that it is also part of the 
conceptual or memory representation of other information types such as emotions. 
Four different experiments were employed in this dissertation to scrutinise the above 
research questions. In this chapter I will summarise the main findings and basic 
conclusions drawn from each of the four experiments and will tie them together to 
reflect upon potential implications and possible future research directions.  
 
8.1.1. Main Findings and future direction of research 
 
8.1.1.1 Colour is a typical perceptual feature of emotion 
  
Experiment 1 involved the completion of the feature listing task (as suggested by 
Tanaka, Persenall (1999) and Wurm et al., (1993) for diagnostic colours of objects) to 
determine whether colour is a diagnostic feature of emotions (e.g. If 'anger' was an 
object or something tangible that you can hold in your hands, how would you 
describe it or what would it look like? Give eight different perceptual features). The 
participants were naïve to the specific purpose of the investigation and were given the 
same task for each of the six basic emotions as well as for a neutral, non-emotional 
category.  
 
It was found that, more than any other perceptual information (e.g. shape and tactile 
information); colour information was consistently chosen (in 82% of the lists of 
features) as a perceptual feature of the seven emotional categories - happiness, 
sadness, anger, fear, disgust, surprise and neutral.  Furthermore, chromatic colours 
(e.g. red, blue, orange), specifically, were consistently used as typical colours of each 
of the six basic emotions whereas achromatic colours (e.g. white, grey, transparent) 
were often mentioned as symptomatic perceptual features for the description of the 
neutral, non-emotional category.  
 
In line with previous colour-emotion investigations, a wide array of colours which 
comprise 15 different types of colour features were mentioned as perceptual features 
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that describe the seven emotions (Eysenck 1941; Wexner, 1954; Choungourian 1968; 
Valdez & Mehrabian 1994; Terwogt & Hoeksma, 1995; Boyatzis & Varghese 1996; 
Hemphill 1996; Hupka, Zaleski & Tarabrina, 1997; Zenter, 2000; Burkitt, Barrett & 
Davis 2003; Leichsernring 2004; Ou, Luo, Woodcock & Wright, 2004). Red was the 
single colour that received more than 50% agreement of the total given colour 
features (Hupka et al., 1997; Luscher, 1971; Wexner, 1954). Specific colour features 
that are closely related to the measurement of the colour's brightness were mentioned 
more often than any other colour features (Barbiere, Vidal, Zellner, 2007; Boyatzis & 
Varghese, 1996; Valdez & Mehrabian, 1994).    
 
These findings confirm that people do have strong emotional associations with 
colours (e.g. Barbiere, Vidal, Zellner, 2007; Boyatzis & Varghese, 1996; Hupka, et 
al., 1997; Zentner, 2001) and imply that colour information may be represented 
together with, or closely to, the representation of emotions and in a similar fashion to 
the associative colour representation with objects (Menard-Buteau & Cavanagh, 1984; 
Klein, 1964; Naor-Raz, Tarr & Kersten, 2003). 
 
8.1.1.2 Colour is diagnostic for recognition memory of emotions   
 
The pattern of results in Experiments 2 and 3 consistently revealed that the presence 
of diagnostic colours of emotions aids performance in short-term and long-term 
recognition memory. Participants recognised emotional information coloured with 
their individual appropriate colour associations significantly better than emotional 
information coloured inappropriately. Experiment 3 further revealed an overall 
enhanced memory performance for emotional stimuli (words and faces) over neutral 
stimuli. These findings confirm two common memory effects that are often 
documented in the literature. Firstly, the superiority effect of colour on recognition 
memory (e.g. Olivia & Schyns 2000; Gegenfurtner & Rieger, 2000; Wichmann, 
Sharpe & Gegenfurtner 2002) was once again replicated and further extended to 
emotional information. Secondly, the findings also fit with many studies that show a 
memory enhancement of emotionally laden visual stimuli over neutral stimuli 
(D'Argembeau & Linden, 2004; Doerksen & Shimamura, 2001; Dolcos & Cabeza, 
2002; Kensinger et al., 2002; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Margaret et al., 1992; 
Ochsner, 2000).  These two main effects of memory on emotional information were 
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evident in the findings of both memory tests here, strengthening the reliability of our 
measures and further explicating the existence of an interaction effect between 
stimulus type (Emotional versus Neutral) and colour type (Appropriate versus 
Inappropriate - Experiment 2; Appropriate versus Inappropriate versus Random - 
Experiment 3). Specifically, both experiments consistently show that the facilitation 
effect of appropriate colours on memory was eliminated for neutral stimuli. Memory 
performance was enhanced only when stimuli were coloured appropriately and were 
emotional rather than neutral. This suggests that the powerful effect of colour on 
memory does not extend to all types of information and is mostly dependent upon a 
strong associative relationship between the colour cues and the memory items.  
 
The present investigation acknowledged the documented inconsistent tendency of 
associating colours with emotions among participants (which also exists among 
cultures). Its empirical strength relies on the fact that each of the above beneficial 
effects of colour on memory takes into account the individual differences in colour-
emotion associations. Thus, although colours and the six basic emotions (e.g. red and 
anger) do not share as strong an associative relationship as do colours with natural 
objects and scenes (e.g. red and strawberry), the results shown herein suggest that 
they are indeed strong and meaningful enough to facilitate recognition memory when 
presented together with the memory item. Moreover, consistent with the findings of 
Hupka et al. (1996), the results also revealed that different colour-emotion 
associations may vary in their strength. This suggests that a particularly strong 
association like anger-red may have a stronger effect on memory than any other 
colour-emotion association (a trend that was shown in the post hoc findings). 
Conversely, inappropriate or simply random colour-emotion combinations are not 
only different in their level of association with emotions but also different in their 
effect on memory. Experiment 3, particularly, demonstrated that appropriately 
coloured stimuli were remembered significantly better than both inappropriately and 
randomly coloured emotional stimuli. These two types of coloured emotional stimuli 
were equally impaired in memory compared to appropriately coloured stimuli. As 
mentioned in Chapter Four, this implies that the memory facilitation that was evident 
for appropriately coloured emotional information is not the result of a temporary, 
short-term learning process but reflects a more consistent representation of specific 
colour knowledge that is part of the representation of emotional information.   
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Together these findings may have some significant implications for professional 
settings (e.g. clinical, forensic, education) that value the ease of memory processes for 
emotional information. Such implications will be discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter.   
 
8.1.1.3 Association patterns for colour and emotion combinations 
 
Post hoc findings from Experiments 2 and 3 allowed the analysis of two colour-
emotion association attributes - the comparison of the consistency levels with which 
our large student population (n = 210) overall associated appropriate colours versus 
inappropriate colours with emotions and the evaluation of the different consistency 
levels among the seven emotional categories.  Overall, appropriate colour-emotion 
associations have received higher agreement levels than inappropriate colour-emotion 
associations. The emotions happiness and sadness were specifically highly consistent 
(with an agreement level higher than 50%) regardless of the type of association 
(appropriate or inappropriate). A reversed consistent colour-emotion association for 
the two emotionally valenced stimuli (happy-yellow, sad-grey; happy-grey, sad-
yellow) illustrates the strong negative correlation that often exists between the two 
(Green, Goldman & Salovey, 1993; Feldman, Barrett & Russell, 1998). These 
consistent appropriate colour-emotion associations also fit with studies that show that 
brighter colours are often related to positive emotions whereas darker colours relate 
more to negative emotions (Barbiere et al., 2007; Boyatzis & Varghese, 1994; 
Hemphill 1996; Valdez & Mehrabian, 1994).  
 
In contrast, although the appropriate colour emotion association between anger and 
red was extremely consistent (93%) and in line with previous studies (Hupka, et al., 
1997; Luscher, 1971; Wexner, 1954) no inappropriate colour combination with the 
emotion anger reached an agreement level higher than 36%. These findings suggest 
that a consistent associative relationship between colours and emotions is not 
dependent solely on the type of emotion but rather on the relationship between both 
colour and emotion information.  
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A further prominent link between the consistency levels (of appropriate and 
inappropriate colour-emotion associations and among the emotions) and recognition 
performance was evident in the data. Emotions that received a high degree of 
agreement for a specific colour-emotion combination (e.g. anger-red, happiness-
yellow, disgust-brown and sad-grey) were more likely to receive a higher percentage 
of correct responses than emotions that received low level agreement in their colour 
association. This pattern was less apparent for inappropriate colour-emotion 
associations than for appropriate colour-emotion associations which discloses a need 
for future research to explore, more specifically, whether consistent-appropriate  
colour-emotion associations (e.g. happy stimuli coloured in yellow) are remembered 
better than consistent-inappropriate colour-emotion associations (e.g. happy stimuli 
coloured in grey). 
 
8.1.1.4 Faster naming latencies for appropriately coloured emotional information 
than for inappropriately coloured emotional information and neutral information 
 
Two novel Semantic-Emotional Stroop tasks were designed in Experiment 4 to assess 
whether naming appropriate colours of emotional carrier words is faster than naming 
inappropriate colours of emotional carrier words. The first Stroop task compared the 
participants' naming times between appropriately and inappropriately coloured 
information for carrier words that are emotional as well as neutral. The second Stroop 
task measured the naming times for appropriate neutral colours and inappropriate 
neutral colours when the carrier words were either neutral or non-words. The main 
findings from the first Stroop task confirmed the expectation above, showing 
significantly faster reaction times for appropriate colours of emotional words over 
inappropriate colours of emotional words. The findings for neutral words revealed the 
opposite pattern with significantly faster naming times for inappropriate neutral 
colours over appropriate neutral colours. The latter finding was not evident however 
in the second Stroop task for neutral word carriers, which suggests that the advantage 
of inappropriate neutral colours was due to a disruptive effect from the preceding 
emotional trials - an effect shown previously in several studies (McKenna, 1986; 
McKenna & Sharma, 1995; Sharma & McKenna 2001; McKenna & Sharma, 2004).  
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The fact that the beneficial effect of appropriately coloured emotional stimuli over 
inappropriately coloured emotional stimuli and neutral stimuli was replicated with 
two completely different tasks (recognition and Stroop: one that employed an explicit 
memory system and the other a more automatic, implicit system) strengthens the idea 
that appropriate colours are part of the conceptual representations of the six basic 
emotions. In all three of our experiments this beneficial effect of appropriate colours 
was absent for neutral stimuli. This implies that colour information is not involved in 
the representation of neutral information, at least not in a similar manner to that of 
natural objects (Naor-Raz et al., 2003; Klein, 1967) and the six basic emotions. 
Additionally, the finding from the Stroop tasks specifically suggest that colour may 
mediate not only explicit (as evident by the results from Experiment 2 and 3) but also 
implicit memory systems when processing emotional information. Further research 
should aim at investigating this unconscious retrieval of appropriately and 
inappropriately coloured emotional stimuli using the measure of repetition priming 
(Cave et al., 1996; Mecklenbrauker, Hupbach & Wippich, 2001; Vernon & Lloyd-
Jones, 2003, 2005). For example, a potential experiment could identify whether a 
priming effect is observed when participants are asked to identify the emotion 
expressed by facial expression stimuli whose background is coloured in the individual 
high diagnostic colours of emotions, low diagnostic colours of emotions or in random 
colours. 
 
8.1.2 Recognition memory patterns of emotional information are in line with 
existing models and neurological mechanisms of object recognition 
 
The main objective of this dissertation was to examine the possibility that colour 
information is a beneficial cue for the recognition memory of other information types 
than objects and natural scenes (as it has been shown previously in a few studies, e.g. 
Olivia & Schyns 2000; Tanaka & Persnell, 1999; Wichmann, Sharpe & Gegenfurtner 
2002), namely, emotional information. It did not intend to extend our knowledge or 
understanding of the processing of emotions or colours solely, but on whether the 
second can contribute to memory of the first. The results from all three experiments 
support the hypothesis that colour indeed contributes to the recognition memory of 
emotional information, suggesting that it also takes part in memory representations of 
emotions and thus is processed not only on a low level (as a sensory attribute) but also 
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on a higher, cognitive level, where it acts as a retrieval cue for memory purposes.  
There is no study to date that provides such evidence for recognition memory of 
emotional stimuli.  Thus this dissertation strengthens the notion that the effect of 
colour is not limited to a low level of sensory processing (where it acts as a sensory 
cue) but is in fact also dominant at a higher level of cognitive processing and it may 
be represented at the same level as other types of memory cues such as shape, 
structure and function, which are all activated during recognition processes.  
 
The above findings suggest that the models of object recognition (Davidoff, 1991; 
Tanaka, 2001) presented in Chapter One are applicable to the domain of emotions. 
Davidoff (1991) argued that object recognition processes activate two types of 
memory representations; structure (hasa) and functional information of objects (isa). 
Shape information typically activates the first type of representation whereas colour 
information specifically activates the second. At this high level of representation, 
appropriate colours are stored as part of the acquired object knowledge and affect 
recognition of information that is coloured appropriately through a top-down 
mechanism (Joseph & Proffitt, 1996; Joseph, 1997; Rumelhart, 1986; Tanaka, 2001) 
but not recognition processes of information that is coloured inappropriately. 
Correspondingly, since the data from this investigation illustrate a similar pattern of 
memory enhancement for emotional information coloured appropriately over 
emotional information coloured inappropriately and over neutral information 
regardless of colour, this suggests that the diagnostic effect of emotional information 
on recognition memory engages similar top-down mechanisms to those involved with 
object recognition. Furthermore, inappropriate colour-emotion associations were 
found to be less consistent than appropriate colour-emotion associations. These two 
patterns of results are specifically in line with Bower's network theory of memory and 
emotion which postulates that emotional knowledge and its associative concepts (e.g. 
colours) serve as memory units that are activated during the processing of emotional 
information. Consequently, appropriately coloured emotional information results in 
better memory performance and benefits from more consistent colour-emotion 
associations since the appropriate colours of emotions (unlike the inappropriate 
colours of emotions) are part of the acquired emotional information or its associative 
knowledge.  
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Neuropsychological studies (Chao & Martin, 1999; Howard, et al., 1998; Martin et 
al., 1995) provide further evidence that the two different cognitive processes - 
perceiving a surface colour (e.g. inappropriate colour) and knowing that an item is 
coloured appropriately - involve distinct neural substrate (left inferior temporal 
activation by the retrieval of object knowledge but not by colour perception) during 
the processing of natural objects. Zeki and Marini (1998) showed specific and 
different neural pathways for naturally coloured observed objects and abnormally 
coloured observed objects. Observing red strawberries for example activated the 
fusiform gyrus, hippocampus and ventrolateral frontal cortex (areas that are also 
activated by other object-colour-knowledge tasks). Participants who observed 
abnormally coloured objects such as purple strawberries showed activation of the 
dorsolateral regions of the frontal cortex. This raises the question of whether such 
neural mechanisms are also involved in the processing of diagnostic colours of 
emotions. Are these separate neural correlates for appropriately versus inappropriately 
coloured items specialised for object processing per se, or do they reflect more 
general neural processing that extends to any two types of information that have 
appropriate and inappropriate relationships?  
 
Finally, the findings also fit with the binding hypothesis (MacKay et al., 2004; 
MacKay & Ahmetzanov, 2005), which suggests that emotionally charged stimuli 
trigger binding mechanisms that link the emotion stimulus to salient contextual details 
(such as colour) that are closely related to the stimuli. According to this hypothesis, 
since appropriate colour associations are more closely related to emotional stimuli 
than inappropriate colour associations, the binding mechanism between the two types 
of information, colour (as a contextual feature of the emotional stimulus) and the 
emotional stimulus itself may result in better recognition memory for the appropriate 
(and closely related) colours than inappropriate colours. Although memory 
performance for these two types of colour was not measured in this thesis, it can be 
still argued that the memory enhancement effect for the appropriately coloured 
emotional stimuli was affected by a possible hidden ability of participants to also 
remember the appropriate colours themselves better than the inappropriate colours. 
 
In summary, the results of the current study fit nicely with various empirical studies 
and recognition models that have demonstrated the superior role of colour in memory 
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processes. This the question of whether the similarity in the current pattern of results 
with those found previously for objects is a consequence of the use of a similar brain 
mechanism that may have been designed originally for survival purposes - to detect 
and recognise food faster and more accurately. The high level of efficiency in 
information processing of this object recognition mechanism may make it, by default, 
the dominate mechanism for processing many other considerably different types of 
information, including emotions. If this argument can be supported by neurological 
evidence that shows neural pathways that connect visual processing of colours with 
emotional processing, it may explain the existence of the human tendency to associate 
colours with emotions (that is substantially more evident than emotional associations 
with shapes, different types of fragrances, etc.) 
 
The literature describes a significant amount of work that may be relevant to the 
above questions. There is evidence from several studies of a connection between the 
medial geniculate nucleus of the thalamus (MGN) and the amygdala. The role of that 
pathway in acoustic fear-conditioning may parallel in other emotion-sensory 
connections (LeDoux, 1995; LeDoux, Cicchetti, Xagoraris, Romanski, 1990a; 
LeDoux, Farb, Ruggiero, 1990b; Vuilleumier, Richardson, Armony, Driver and 
Dolan, 2004). Via this subcortical thalamo-amygdalar pathway, sensory information 
arrives in limbic nuclei before being processed by cortex, thus providing the 
advantage of making a quick emotional response appropriate to the sensory stimulus. 
Although most of the studies of the role of amygdala in fear-conditioning use acoustic 
stimuli (McKernan, Shinnick-Gallagher, 1997; Rogan, LeDoux, 1996; Rogan, Staubli, 
LeDoux, 1997), it can be assumed that other sensory modalities have access to the 
amygdala via the thalamus. There are several studies on the emotional content of 
other sensory modalities (Shi, & Davis 2001; Linke, De Lima & Pape, 1999; 
Vuilleumier, et al, 2004). Linke et al. (1999) specifically pointed toward a direct 
projection from colour-coding parvocellular layers of LGN (and perhaps from the 
superior colliculus) to limbic areas. According to his argument, these subcortical 
colour pathways may be organized in a similar way to the acoustic pathways from 
MGN to amgydala. Since the retino-geniculate pathway is topographically organized 
to preserve colour information, it is not necessary to process that information in 
cortical areas before having meaningful information to evoke appropriate emotional 
responses. Additionally, Vuilleumier, et al, (2004) have recently shown evidence for a 
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modulatory influence from the amygdala on visual sensory processing. Their study 
presented a case where emotional visual stimuli (fearful faces) induced enhanced 
responses in the visual cortex (fusiform and occipital cortex) for healthy individuals 
and those with hippocampal damage but not for those diagnosed with an amygdala 
lesion.  
 
The behavioral findings from our study and the neurological connections suggested 
above may provide some explanation as to why humans often have a particular 
favorite colour or a colour that is consistently associated with a particular emotion. 
Human beings are inclined to process colour information at both high and low 
cognitive levels of processing to enable us to benefit from fast detection and accurate 
recognition of the many objects in our environment. For this reason, it may be that 
any colour information receives priority processing, automatically, in many situations 
that do not necessarily involve a conscious recognition of objects. Since humans are 
also blessed with a great variety of emotions, every moment of our lives entails some 
portion of emotion. Research has further shown that the more meaningful the human 
experience is, the more easily it is remembered. Thus, the two enhanced memory 
tendencies, to remember emotionally intense experiences and coloured things (that are 
naturally part of these situations), may (unconsciously) result in the well-known 
tendency that is yet to be understood - to associate colours as opposed to shapes or 
any other visual or sensory information with emotions. Future research that will 
challenge these assumptions empirically may resolve the current mystery surrounding 
the formation of colour-emotion associations. 
 
 
8.1.3 Implications 
 
The findings offer a few possible applications for the use of colour in professional 
settings as a powerful tool for enhancing memory of emotional information.  In this 
section I will: suggest a way in which colour may aid in the memory reconstruction of 
people with episodic memory impairment such as the elderly with dementia, describe 
how it might also increase the accuracy of eyewitness testimonies and the reports of 
children who have been suspected to have undergone sexual abuse and then suggest 
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ways in which colour may facilitate learning processes especially for those who are 
diagnosed with learning disabilities.  
 
8.1.3.1. The use of colour as a memory aid for the elderly with Alzheimer’s disease  
Alzheimer's disease is the most common form of dementia (Evans et al., 1989) and is 
a group of disorders that impairs mental functioning. Approximately 24 million 
people worldwide are living with Alzheimer’s (Ferri et al., 2006). It is a slowly 
progressive disease characterised by the loss of cortical neurons and synapses leading 
to a loss of memory and cognition, accompanied by functional impairment (Burns, 
2000). The most significant impairment in the early stages of Alzheimer's disease is a 
loss of the ability to remember recent events. Previous research which has attempted 
to assess differences in types of memory impairment has found consistently that 
recognition or recall of familiar faces among other pictorial and verbal cues 
significantly deteriorates over the years (Becker, Lopez, & Boller, 1995). However, 
whether colour perception is also diminished within this population is still an issue of 
controversy among researchers. On one hand, there is evidence that colour vision 
disproportionately deteriorates in people with Alzheimer’s disease concurrently with 
other cognitive functions (Cronin-Golomb, Sugiura, Corkin & Growdon, 1993; 
Kurlyo, Corkin, Dolan, Rizzo & Parker, 1994). On the other hand, Bassi et al., (1993) 
and Wijk and Sivik (1995) suggested that the impairment of colour vision is not 
specific to those with Alzheimer's so that they are, in fact, able to discriminate 
between common colour categories just as the non-demented elderly can.  
Recently, Cernin, Keller and Stoner (2003) have specifically addressed the question 
of whether colour cues can improve object recognition in three elderly groups: those 
with Alzheimer’s, those with other dementias and those cognitively intact. They 
assessed the use of colour, of form and of combined colour and form cues as a short-
term memory aid. Colour cues were better short-term memory aids than form cues 
alone or combined form and color cues and decreased recognition time equally for all 
three elderly populations. The authors concluded that colour-coding techniques can be 
used as an orientational device that may help to interpret the environment and 
improve independent daily functions. If colour was found beneficial for the 
recognition memory of objects, our findings suggest that it may also improve 
recognition memory of emotional information such as relatives' and caregivers' faces. 
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Consequently, studies should assess whether colour-coding of appropriate colours of 
emotions may serve as a memory aid for the recognition of patients' relatives and 
caregivers or alternatively may generally help to reactivate memories of recent 
emotional experiences. This use of colour-emotion association may be found to be 
particularly useful for memory recollection of emotionally laden information that may 
need only a few extra cues to trigger their retrieval as opposed to memory 
reconstruction of emotional information that the individual has completely forgotten. 
For example, colours that may signify or match a specific caregiver or relative, as a 
result of a specific emotional association to this person, may aid in the retrieval of his 
or her colour-coded identity. 
8.1.3.2 The effect of children's drawings and specific colour choices on memory 
 
DiLeo (1970) wrote that children can express their thoughts and feelings graphically 
with the use of colours thus they naturally tend to draw what they know rather than 
what they see. Piaget and Inhelder (1956, 1969, 1971) similarly argued that children’s 
drawings are an expression of their mental construction and not the end product of 
pure observation. Focusing on the content of drawings, according to the above 
developmental theorists, may therefore reveal the child's inner self - his traits, 
attitudes, behaviour characteristics and personality strengths and weaknesses. For this 
reason, projective drawing techniques were developed as a measurement of 
personality and emotional states in the analysis of self-concept, body image and sex-
role identity (Thomas & Jolley, 1998). As a non-verbal tool, drawing allows children 
to express feelings they may not be able to express verbally including non-conscious 
aspects of mental representations (Fury, Carlson & Sroufe, 1997). Nowadays, 
children’s drawings are used occasionally as evidence of their maltreatment in court 
cases (Czenner, 1986; Malchiodi, 1990) and are legally accepted as part of a child’s 
testimony especially in cases where maltreatment is alleged (Cohen-Liebman, 1995). 
Further, drawings have a long history of clinical use, providing a window into the 
child’s view of family dynamics and self within the family (Malchiodi, 1998). 
Empirical research supports clinicians’ assertions that family drawings are also useful 
in understanding children’s representations of family relationships (Fury et al., 1997; 
Madigan, Ladd & Goldberg, 2003; Pianta et al., 1999). Not only clinicians, but also 
teachers, therapists, school psychologists, and other professionals use drawing 
techniques to assess the child’s level of cognitive development and any possible 
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neurological impairment (Goh & Fuller, 1983; Peterson et al., 1995; Prout, 1983). Of 
the many aspects of information being assessed in the contents of children’s drawings, 
colour choice is usually among them. For example, the Family Drawing Procedure 
(Fury, Carlson & Sroufe, 1997; Gullone, King & Ollendick, 2006; Madigan et al., 
2003), administered to assess children’s mental representational models of attachment 
relationships, rates global pathology according to the following descriptions: “overall 
degree of negativity reflected in global organization, completeness of figures, use of 
colour, detail, affect, and background scene” (Fury et al., 1997, p. 1157). Similarly, 
Leon, Wallace and Rudy (2007) also developed the Parent–Child Alliances Scale to 
assess the extent to which children's drawings represent their alliances with their 
parents. This was indicated by details like separation between figures and 
differentiation of figures (e.g. the non-aligned parent may be less detailed or 
colourful).  
 
There is also evidence in the literature of a few attempts to develop personality tests 
for the diagnosis of children's emotional difficulties through the use of spontaneous 
drawings or even more specifically through the choices of colours (Vander, 1942; 
Luscher & Scott, 1969; Scott, 1970). Vander (1942), for example, assessed the 
possibility that a few formal elements in children's drawing can provide stable and 
reliable criteria for personality prognosis. These assumptions were based on a large 
sample of children who were each asked to provide at least six different drawings. 
The drawing elements that were found potentially systematic for the analysis of 
personality characteristics were: proportions of the drawing and the shape of the paper 
chosen, size of the single form elements, distribution of form elements, use of lines or 
spots, choice of colours, and representation of motion. For example, with respect to 
colour choices, it has been suggested (Vander, 1942) that normal children use all 
colours but black and white are used significantly less. Neurotic depressives avoid 
yellow and red and use a considerable amount of black and some white. Psychotic 
children often have a definite fear of colour or of certain colours, while dull children 
are generally apathetic to colour.  
 
Although adults as well as children may indeed have meaningful associations with 
colours which can be depicted via the tool of drawing (Burkitt, et al., 2003), research 
has identified difficulties associated with the use of projective tests. For example, 
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interpretations are usually very dependent on the view of the examiner thus test 
reliability is likely to be low (Torem, Gilbertson & Light, 1990). Further, drawings 
made by a child may not show the same important features on two different occasions 
of drawing. To illustrate, although there have been various investigations carried out 
concerning the significance of the size of topics drawn, Golomb (2004), Joiner, 
Schmidt and Barnett (1996) were unable to find reliable statistical evidence relating to 
the assumption that the size of a topic drawn is significant. More recently, Veltman 
and Browne (2002) conducted a systematic review that aimed to identify studies using 
drawing techniques with maltreated children and their application to practice. Their 
review pointed toward a clear massage - "caution should be employed in the use and 
over interpretation of drawings" (p. 34) which otherwise may result with a high rate of 
false identification of sexual maltreatment in cases where drawings were the single 
indicator. The authors summarised their review by urging further research to provide 
a large-scale controlled investigation of the use of drawings in professional settings. 
The findings from this dissertation may provide an opportunity for such investigation. 
I suggest that the use of specific colours in children's drawings may reflect their 
personal associations with six basic emotions which can be used to trigger an 
elaborative conversation that may aid in retrieving emotional information that has 
been suppressed or lost in memory. For example, if a child who associates red with 
fear and (in a separate setting) has drawn a figure coloured in red, this may imply that 
the child (consciously or unconsciously) has developed fearful emotions toward the 
figure drawn. This can be investigated through triggering questions that do not 
directly concern the child’s emotional attitude toward the figure i.e. “What does red 
mean to you? Why did you choose red?” The use of colours in such clinical settings 
concerns the possibility that important emotional information (e.g. details that may 
help to identify molestation) may be retrieved unwittingly through the development of 
conversation around the colour choices, rather than the possibility that the content of 
drawing alone directly indicates whether or not the child has experienced trauma. To 
support this assumption, Butler, Gross and Hayne (1995) showed children's memory 
is more complete and accurate when information is given through drawing than 
through verbal expressions alone. Their study demonstrated that 5- to 6-year-old 
children who were asked to draw what happened in a unique event in which they had 
participated reported more information than the 5- to 6-year-olds who were asked to 
tell what happened after a one-month delay. The authors postulated that: "…drawing 
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simultaneously provided additional retrieval cues, decreased traditional conversational 
constraints, and helped children remain on task for a longer period of time." (p. 606), 
which all contributed to increased memory performance. Todd and Perlmutter (1980) 
also suggested that children provide a greater amount of information about events 
when they themselves initiate the retrieval. The results from this dissertation may 
provide an explanation for the growing body of research indicating that children's 
drawings are beneficial for assessing memories that have been stored at sensory, 
perceptual and cognitive levels (but are not always considered important to be 
retrieved verbally by the child). I specifically suggest that the element of colour 
choices within children's drawings is at least partly what makes drawing such a 
powerful memory tool. Since colour details were found significantly effective for the 
memory of various types of information, colour choices used in drawing need to be 
assessed more thoroughly and in conjunction with other elements of drawings in order 
to fully utilise their contribution to memory.  
 
In summary, the specific combination of using drawing techniques and assessing a 
child's colour choices and their associations with emotions may be found effective as 
a retrieval tool in clinical and forensic professional settings. Specific ways in which 
the findings can be applied for eyewitness identification procedures (with older 
populations) are discussed next.  
 
8.1.3.3 The use of colour in eyewitness memory 
 
Studies examining the role of colour in eyewitness memory are lacking and rather 
dated. A few studies have investigated the impact of context cues on eyewitness 
identification responses but resulted in equivocal findings (Maass & Brigham, 1982; 
Malpass & Devine, 1981; Smith, Glenberg & Bjork, 1978; Sanders, 1984; West & 
Long, 1993). There are reports (Maass & Brigham, 1982; Malpass & Devine, 1981) 
that have substantiated the effectiveness of context cues in increasing the probability 
of identifying a previously seen target in a photo display. Other studies suggested that 
different categories of context cues operate in dissimilar manners. For example 
Sanders (1984) demonstrated that reinstating personal appearance context cues (e.g. 
clothing or hairstyle) had several undesirable consequences such as increasing false 
alarm rates whereas physical surroundings cues had no discernible effects. Indeed, it 
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seems reasonable to assume that when innocent targets are forced to wear similar 
clothing or have similar facial hair the similarity between the innocent and the 
criminal encourages false identification. But it is also well established that people 
remember events more accurately when the similarity between the conditions 
surrounding the original experience and those present at the time of recall are greater 
(Anderson & Bower, 1974; Bower, 198l; Godden & Baddeley, 1975) specifically 
when the surrounding cues are coloured backgrounds (Vernon & Lloyd-Jones, 2003; 
2005). 
 
A review of the literature found only one study specifically interested in the effect of 
colour on eyewitness identification accuracy (West & Long, 1993). Their participants 
witnessed an incident with a male actor wearing either all black clothing (control 
group) or coloured clothing (experimental group) and were asked to act as 
eyewitnesses by completing a questionnaire pertaining to the characteristics of the 
person they saw. The questionnaire consisted of six colour related questions (e.g. hair 
colour, clothing colour); six detail questions (e.g. hair length and style) and five 
description questions (e.g. age, weight, height). Their findings revealed that those who 
witnessed the actor wearing colourful clothing were more accurate than the control 
group on the descriptive questions, less accurate than the control group on the colour 
related questions and similar to the control group on the detail questions. It was 
suggested that the disadvantage in the colour related question shown by the 
experimental group was related to the different amount of colour information given to 
the two groups and not, as suggested by the above studies, that the colour cue can lead 
to false identification. Considering that a large number of studies, including this 
study, have clearly demonstrated a memory advantage of coloured information over 
non-coloured information, there may be good grounds to hypothesise that colour cues 
can also be beneficial for eyewitness memory as this specific type of memory 
involves not only object or scene information but also a great deal of emotional 
burden.  
 
One option for investigating the above hypothesis is to test the effect on identification 
accuracy of displaying appropriate colours as the background of suspect facial 
pictures. These appropriate colours can be associated with the eyewitness's emotional 
reaction to the crime or with specific colour details that were present in the crime 
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scene (e.g. the colour of the suspect's shirt, the colour of his/her car, etc.) and as such 
are also likely to be associated with (or induce) the eyewitness's emotional reaction to 
the crime. Eyewitnesses could be asked on two separate occasions to associate colours 
with suspect facial pictures (without asking them to identify the suspect). The degree 
of consistency can be assessed and in a third setting the witness will be asked to 
identify the suspects from pictures that have the most consistent colours as a 
background colour. Furthermore, it may be worth checking whether these consistently 
chosen colours share some similarity with colour details that were evident within the 
crime scene. If so, these colours may increase the possibility of accurate retrieval in 
identifying the suspect’s face (or other coloured objects that were in the crime scene).  
 
  
8.1.3.4 Education 
 
As demonstrated above, the use of colour cues to enhance memory performance has a 
wide array of possible implications. Since memory facilitation is no less significant in 
learning processes, the findings of this study can be further applied for teaching and 
educational purposes especially for those diagnosed with ADD and ADHD. Empirical 
work has demonstrated that students with ADHD respond differently from their 
classmates to novel stimulation (e.g. colour, music, classroom activities) in the 
environment (Zentall, 1975). Their performance can be improved to the same level as 
(and in some cases even more than) their peers when such stimulations are added to 
academic tasks (Zentall, 1989). The logic behind this finding is that this type of 
stimulation allows them to achieve a more optimal level of internal arousal that is 
necessary for attention and performance (Cooley & Morris, 1990). Thus many 
researchers have argued that these students do not have an attentional deficit per se 
but simply show an attentional bias or preference for novelty (i.e. to pay attention to 
what is bigger, more intense, colourful or moving). Studies that specifically 
investigated the effect of colour stimulation have almost conclusively yielded 
supporting results for the effect of adding non-specific colours to reading, 
handwriting, word-spelling recognition and social tasks (Belfiore, Grskovic, Murphy 
& Zentall, 1996; Imhof, 2004; Iovino, Fletcher, Breitmeyer & Foorman, 1998; Lee & 
Zentall, 2002; Zentall, 2005; Zentall & Dwyer, 1989b; Zentall & Kruczek, 1988). 
Furthermore, Imhof (2004) questioned the exclusive susceptibility of children with 
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ADHD to colour since their findings revealed that children with speech disorders also 
responded to colour stimulation (e.g. offering coloured sheets; writing assignments 
are performed with a coloured pencil) for a spelling and handwriting exercise. This 
specific contribution of colour cues as a training tool is in line with other empirical 
evidence which suggests more efficient information processing in the presence of 
increased stimulation especially through the visual channel (Barkley, 1997; 
Castellanos, 1999). Changes in cortical activation, which are elicited by colour 
stimulation, have an influence on behavioural inhibition and facilitate motor 
coordination, attention regulation (Rockstroh & Elbert, 1990; Zentall, 2005) and the 
effective monitoring of cognitive functions such as working memory and motivational 
regulation (Barkley, 1997; Barkley, 1998).  
 
Although the practical implications of the use of colour cues to stimulate learning 
have been studied quite extensively (particularly for ADHD students), the results from 
the current study validate these previous findings and add to them in suggesting that 
not only the use of colour in general, but the specific type of colour, may affect 
learning performance. An earlier study (Imhof, 1995 as cited in Imhof, 2004) found 
that ADHD children had a preference for saturated and very bright colours. Thus, 
identifying a student’s specific appropriate (or most favourite) colours which he/she 
will match individually to a set of tasks can contribute to forming his/her own study 
aids (in tasks like: reading comprehension, spelling, handwriting,  maths problems, 
etc) which will result in an enjoyable and more meaningful learning process. More 
importantly, however, having the student use his/her own matched colours may cue 
the student’s memory for the term learned (e.g. spelling of words, memorising and 
understanding maths facts) and help him/her retain the information even more 
beneficially than with just any colour (or colours that were chosen for him/her). Thus, 
it is suggested that this population of students (and potentially students diagnosed 
with speech disorders as well) should not merely engage in colour-coded training but 
also actively choose their colour preferences for each task, apply them appropriately 
(and maybe differently) for each one and be encouraged to add as much meaning as 
they possibly can to each of the selected colours (e.g. red coloured words are 
associated with a favourite red coloured cartoon). This procedure is not only based on 
improving the child’s attention by the addition of colour stimulation (as suggested 
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above) but also relies on the findings from this study and others that emphasise colour 
as a powerful tool for recognition memory of various types of information.   
  
 8.1.4 Limitations 
 
As demonstrated so far, the findings of this dissertation are consistent with previous 
studies in revealing the powerful effect that colour has on recognition memory. 
Several practical and theoretical implications have also been suggested. Yet, the 
author also acknowledges some limitations that ought to be mentioned. Firstly, the 
study did not involve a condition of emotional stimuli coloured in grayscale. 
Although unpublished work by the author has shown significant memory performance 
for coloured emotional stimuli over grayscale emotional stimuli (2003 Study) it is 
important to examine whether the differences in memory of appropriately coloured 
emotional stimuli are indeed more significant than for both appropriately coloured 
neutral stimuli and grayscale neutral stimuli. Even more important is to validate the 
fact that colour is diagnostic for emotional information but not for neutral information 
by also including a grayscale condition that will enable a specific comparison between 
the contribution of appropriate colours to emotional stimuli (compared to a grayscale 
emotional condition) and the contribution of appropriate colour to neutral stimuli 
(compared to a grayscale neutral condition). To support the above assumption, the 
improvement in memory between appropriate and grayscale emotional stimuli should 
be significantly higher than the improvement in memory between appropriate and 
grayscale neutral stimuli. 
 
Secondly, the ability to compare the independent variables of emotion versus neutral 
information clearly relies on their being equated. In our study however, there were six 
different emotions compared to one neutral condition. This forced the design to have 
an unbalanced quantity of experimental stimuli for each of these conditions. For 
example, Experiments 2 and 3 had 72 emotional stimuli but only 12 neutral stimuli 
(words and faces). Experiment 4, however, presented participants with an equal 
number of word stimuli for each condition. It may be reasonable to argue that this 
difference is rooted in human nature- humans naturally have more emotional than 
non-emotional states of mind. It is then left for future research to investigate ways of 
measuring differences between information processing of emotional versus neutral 
stimuli while accounting for the natural differences in the variety of each human state. 
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Finally, since colour was manipulated as a between subjects variable in Experiments 
2-4, any replications attempts in future research should also include  colour as a 
within subjects variable.   
 
 
8.2 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The present dissertation represents a detailed investigation into the effect of colour on 
recognition memory. In a series of four experiments the study validated and expanded 
on previous findings that demonstrated the facilitative effect of colour on memory. 
While this superior effect of colour was shown previously on various types of 
information categories including faces, textures, everyday scenes, graphs, symbols 
and animals (Olivia & Schyns, 2000; Latimer et al., 2002; Wichmann, Sharpe & 
Gegefurtner, 2002) this dissertation is the first to demonstrate that recognition 
memory also benefits from colour cues when the stimuli are emotional. Furthermore, 
the findings reveal that colour has the potential to be diagnostic for recognition 
memory or the description of emotions particularly if it is being consistently and 
appropriately associated with the emotional item. The study provides evidence that 
suggests colour and emotion information are not simply closely related and often 
associated with each other but also conceptually represented together. Altogether, 
these results offer a few practical implications as well as several directions for further 
research that should be seriously considered in future empirical and practical 
applications. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Details of colours used in Experiments 1-4. 
 
RGB HSB  Colour number in 
Supercard 10.4 R G B hue saturation brightness 
White 1 255 255 255 60 0 100 
Blue 175 0 0 194 359 0 100 
Red 72 194 0 0 359 100 76 
Yellow 6 255 255 0 60 100 100 
Orange 24 255 102 0 24 100 100 
Brown 138 128 64 0 30 100 50 
Green 230 0 128 0 120 100 50 
Purple 104 128 0 128 300 100 50 
Grey 250 93 93 93 309 0 36 
Pink 32 255 0 218 309 100 100 
 
 
 
Experiment 1: An example of the feature listing task 
 
What perceptual features do you have for six basic emotions? 
 
 
For the following questions you are asked to list perceptual features you associate 
with six different emotions. Please try to limit your answers to one word only, 
preferably adjectives (e.g. instead of writing 'knife' write 'sharp' etc.).  
 
 
 
If fear was an object or something tangible palpable that you can hold in your hands 
how would you describe it, or what would it look like? Give eight different 
perceptual features: 
 
1.___________ 
2.___________ 
3.___________ 
4.___________ 
5.___________ 
6.___________ 
7.___________ 
8.___________ 
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 If a neutral state (non emotional state) was an object or something tangible palpable 
that you can hold in your hands how would you describe it, or what would it look 
like? Give eight different perceptual features: 
 
1.___________ 
2.___________ 
3.___________ 
4.___________ 
5.___________ 
6.___________ 
7.___________ 
8.___________ 
  
 
If surprise was an object or something tangible palpable that you can hold in your 
hands how would you describe it, or what would it look like? Give eight different 
perceptual features: 
 
1.___________ 
2.___________ 
3.___________ 
4.___________ 
5.___________ 
6.___________ 
7.___________ 
8.___________ 
 
If anger was an object or something tangible, palpable that you can hold in your 
hands how would you describe it, or what would it look like? Give eight different 
perceptual features: 
 
1.___________ 
2.___________ 
3.___________ 
4.___________ 
5.___________ 
6.___________ 
7.___________ 
8.___________ 
 
If happiness was an object or something tangible palpable that you can hold in your 
hands how would you describe it, or what would it look like? Give eight different 
perceptual features: 
 
1.___________ 
2.___________ 
3.___________ 
4.___________ 
5.___________ 
6.___________ 
7.___________ 
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8.___________ 
 
 If sadness was an object or something tangible palpable that you can hold in your 
hands how would you describe it, or what would it look like? Give eight different 
perceptual features: 
 
1.___________ 
2.___________ 
3.___________ 
4.___________ 
5.___________ 
6.___________ 
7.___________ 
8.___________ 
  
 
If disgust was an object or something tangible palpable that you can hold in your 
hands how would you describe it, or what would it look like? Give eight different 
perceptual features: 
 
1.___________ 
2.___________ 
3.___________ 
4.___________ 
5.___________ 
6.___________ 
7.___________ 
8.___________ 
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Experiment 2: 
 
Mean % Agreement for the distribution of emotional words to six basic emotions and 
non-emotional words to the neural category (n=9). 
 
Emotional 
Word
Basic 
Emotion
%
Agreement
% 
Total 
Agree-
ment
Emotional 
Word
Basic 
Emotion
% 
Agreement
% 
Total 
Agree-
ment
gleeful    100 repugnant 100
 blissful   88.88  repelled 100
 jovially    100 repulsive 77.77
 gladness 100  revolting 100
 joyfully    100  sickening 100
ecstatic   
HAPPINESS 
77.77
94.31
 nauseate
DISGUST 
88.88
94.44
depressed 100 fearing 100
 grieving 88.88 horrified 100
 desolate 100 worrying 88.88
 miserably 88.88 frightful 100
 sorrowful 100 panicked 100
 gloomily
SADNESS
100
96.29
terrorize
FEAR
77.77
94.44
enraged 100 astonish 100
infuriate 100  astound 100
madness 77.77  stunned 100
 furious 100  
amazingly
88.88
irritated 100 startle 100
wrathful
ANGER
100
96.3
shocking
SURPRISE
88.88
96.29
bombastic 88.88
immutable 100
atheistic 77.77
diligent 88.88
credible 100
cosmetic
NEUTRAL 
100
92.59 
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Experiment 3: 
 
Mean % Agreement for the distribution of emotional words to six basic emotions and 
non-emotional words to the neural category (n=12).  
 
Emotional 
Word
Basic 
Emotion
%
Agreement
% 
Total 
Agree-
ment
Emotional 
Word
Basic 
Emotion
% 
Agreement
% 
Total 
Agree-
ment
gleeful    100 repugnant 100
 blissful   100  repelled 100
 jovially    100 repulsive 100
 gladness 100  revolting 100
 joyfully    100  sickening 100
ecstatic   
HAPPINESS 
83.33
97.22
 nauseate
DISGUST 
91.66
98.61
depressed 100 fearing 100
 grieving 91.66 horrified 100
 desolate 83.33 worrying 91.66
 miserably 91.66 frightful 100
 sorrowful 100 panicked 100
 gloomily
SADNESS
100
94.44
terrorize
FEAR
83.33
92.22
enraged 100 astonish 100
infuriate 100  astound 100
madness 83.33  stunned 100
 furious 91.66  
amazingly
83.33
irritated 83.33 startle 100
wrathful
ANGER
83.33
90.28
shocking
SURPRISE
100
97.22
impartial 100
balancing 100
equalize 100
abstain 83.33
unbiased 91.66
equitable
NEUTRAL 
91.66
94.44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
